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1 INTRODUCTION: 
SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES IN THE FLEXIBLE WORKING LIFE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In most developed countries, the welfare state provides some form of protection for its 
citizens. The provision of social arrangements differs substantially between countries but, 
on the basis of institutional characteristics such as the level of spending on welfare 
programmes, entitlements and labour market participation, countries can be clustered into 
several ideal-typical welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999); social 
democratic, corporatist and liberal2. This typology is based on differences in how 
responsibilities are distributed between the state, market and the family. The social 
security system is central to public welfare, covering social risks such as unemployment, 
sickness, disability or old age3. 
The social security system depends on public support in society. Public support is 
important for the legitimacy of social security systems and, in this way, is an important 
factor in the expansion or decline of the welfare state (Brooks and Manza, 2007; 2006; 
Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005; Burstein, 1998; Page and Shapiro, 1983). Of course, one 
must not overlook the relevance of all kinds of macro level factors, such as the 
globalization of financial markets, the costs associated with welfare reform (such as the 
‘sunk costs’ in existing public arrangements), sudden shocks from outside the political 
system and the influence of the media, all of which may also affect the development of 
the welfare state (see, for example, John, 2006; Pierson, 1998; Pierson, 1994; Pfau-
Effinger, 2005), but electoral pressure means that how people perceive social security 
practices is a very significant factor for social policy. In accordance with democratic 
theory (cf. Manza and Cook, 2002), it is commonly accepted that social policy 
preferences impact on levels of social protection, while power relations between social 
actors (such as the strength of left-wing political parties) may moderate social policy 
2 However, it is commonly agreed, this classification can be extended to more welfare state regimes: a 
Southern European and a Central-Eastern European welfare system (see, for example, Cerami, 2005; Arts 
and Gelissen, 2002; Bonoli, 1997). 
3 Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) refers to the level of ‘de-commodification’; the possibility of making a 
living independently of the market.   
 
                                                 
preferences in shaping actual policy outputs (see, for example, Korpi, 2006; Korpi and 
Palme, 2003).  
 
Many researchers argue that the legitimacy of the modern social security system is under 
pressure (see, for a review, Clasen, 2002). For example, as a consequence of rising living 
standards or the socio-cultural process of individualization, people may be less willing to 
pay for social security programmes. However, according to Taylor-Gooby (2001), Ullrich 
(2000) or Pettersen (1995) and, for example, De Beer and Koster (2007) or Becker (2005) 
in the Netherlands, empirical research generally shows that the level of support for social 
security programmes is stable in most countries4. One possible explanation for this may 
be ‘force of habit’ – citizens tend to support existing social arrangements, whatever these 
arrangements actually are (Arts, 2002). In other words, the existing welfare state is ‘taken 
for granted’ by its citizens.  
While there seems to be no clear legitimacy crisis, this does not imply that people 
are not questioning social security arrangements at all. For example, Iversen and Cusack 
(2000) argue that deindustrialization, the decline in industrial employment since the 
1960s, poses risks for individual workers and that, consequently, people expect support 
and protection from these risks. According to this line of reasoning, we can understand 
the welfare state expansion across countries between the 1960s and 1990s; the 
transformation from industry to services meant that people experienced greater insecurity 
and demanded collective (economic) support.  
Today, the work context is changing again. Against the background of rapid 
technological developments and increasing economic interdependence between countries, 
increasing flexibilization is one of the most fundamental changes in the labour markets of 
Western economies (Kalleberg, 2003; 2001; 2000). The search for flexibility has resulted 
in the growth of ‘atypical’ employment relationships, for example. ‘Atypical’ 
employment is any type of employment that is not full-time and permanent and it 
includes temporary contracts, agency work, self-employment and part-time employment 
(Hevenstone, 2010). All these ‘atypical’ forms of employment have now become 
common forms of working. Another important type of labour flexibility is functional 
4 Cf. also Pierson (1998). 
 
                                                 
flexibility5 and refers to new working practices, such as job rotation, task rotation, job 
enlargement, job enrichment and (semi-autonomous) team-working. To date, it remains 
to be seen whether social policy preferences will be affected by the increasing importance 
of labour flexibility in most European countries (see for the empirical importance of 
different types of flexibility, for example, Dekker, 2007; European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007a). 
 
This study aims to increase our understanding of individual reactions to increasing labour 
flexibility and the impact on social policy preferences. While the existing literature on 
individual support for social security focuses on a variety of individual risk factors 
related to the labour market (Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm, 2005; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; 
Kramer and Stephenson, 2001), no empirical studies have been conducted on the question: 
does labour flexibility play a role in the formation of social policy preferences and if so, 
in what way and why? This will be the central research question of the study. Although 
the literature provides us with several – contradictory – arguments about the possible 
effects of labour flexibility on individual support for social security, research is limited.  
 
The central research question involves some important aspects of sociology. In studies 
that seek to explain social policy preferences, many scholars focus on self-interest, 
ideological values or community sentiment as a basis for supporting social security 
arrangements (see, for example, Yang and Barrett, 2006; Van Oorschot, 2002). 
Regarding the idea of self-interest, social insurance is particularly in the interest of the 
poor and it is therefore they who are more supportive towards social security compared to 
others (see Cook and Barrett, 1992). This idea that the socially disadvantaged – such as 
the less well-educated, the less well-paid and the unemployed – are more likely to 
support social security, relates to the theoretical issue of class-based policy preferences 
and behaviour. In other words, the less-skilled working class in particular has an interest 
in social security. While some would argue that the relevance of social class6 in 
5 Some refer to the concept of ‘high-performance work systems’, particularly in the case of team-working 
(see, for example, Gittleman et al., 1998). 
6 There is no agreed definition of social class in sociology. In general, the occupational status is central to 
the concept of social class (Houtman, 2003; Breen and Rottman, 1995; Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992).  
 
                                                 
understanding political voting behaviour is declining (Pakulski and Waters, 1996; Clark 
and Lipset, 1991), or that social class is no longer relevant at all given the processes of 
individualization and globalization (Beck, 1999), most scholars state that class 
considerations are still important in understanding voting behaviour and social inequality 
in general (see, for example, Achterberg, 2006; Achterberg and Snel, 2008; Blossfeld et 
al, 2006). A problem regarding studies of social class is that they tend to neglect 
structural changes in the labour market. While some attempts have been made to include 
the post-industrial employment structure into class analyses (De Graaf and Steijn, 1997; 
Esping-Andersen, 1993), scholars have been less interested in the importance of labour 
flexibility for new inequalities (e.g. risk) and its impact on social policy preferences. 
Regarding labour flexibility, there are two conflicting assumptions. Some authors suggest 
that labour flexibility will increase insecurity for all employees (Beck, 2000; Heery and 
Salmon, 2000), while others, such as Breen (1997), suggest that labour market risks in 
flexible economies will especially affect the position of the already less-advantaged in 
society. Beck assumes that the nature of work is changing towards less stable 
employment relationships for all individuals: regardless of whether someone is highly 
educated or not, all employees will be hit by work insecurity. This is the debate on the 
‘individualization of insecurity’. By contrast, Breen (1997) argues that labour market 
risks in a flexible economy follow the lines of occupational class. In his opinion, the 
already vulnerable, lower-skilled workers are exposed to increased work insecurity in 
flexible economies. While empirical studies have shown that social class is important in 
social stratification research (see Blossfeld et al., 2006 for an overview), it is still unclear 
how different forms of labour flexibility impact on the perception of risk and the 
willingness of different groups of workers to support social security. In this study, I will 
therefore investigate whether labour flexibility has resulted in risk cleavages between 
different groups of employees and how this is linked to their social policy preferences.        
 In addition to labour flexibility, its impact on the risks that people experience and 
their social policy preferences, this study also focuses on the controversial question of the 
role of community in modern society (cf. Day, 2006; Delanty, 2003). Looking at the 
labour market, it is generally agreed that by interacting with one another, the workplace 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
provides an opportunity for the development of community (Vogl, 2009). This is 
considered particularly true for the so-called Fordist workplace. A key principle of the 
Fordist workplace is one in which manual and mental labour are separated, but also one 
in which employees believe that they are likely to work for the same employer over a 
long time and with stable terms of employment. This strong tradition of stable 
employment binds people together. However, during recent decades, the labour market 
has undergone some significant changes. In the contemporary, post-Fordist workplace the 
importance of the standardized and stable employment contracts has declined in favour of 
‘atypical’ employment contracts (Kalleberg, 2000). According to several sociologists, 
such as Sennett (1998) and Bauman (2001), it is more difficult to create a sense of 
community among workers in the post-Fordist workplace. In their view, ‘atypical’ 
workers are less likely to form a coherent group, and more likely to be fragmented, 
shifting them away from other members in a given society. While some researchers have 
made empirical advances in this debate on the changing labour market and community 
(Vogl, 2009), the connection between labour flexibility and community is still mainly 
being debated at the theoretical level. I would therefore argue that a fruitful approach 
would be to seek an empirical approach to test the different theoretical claims. The 
question is, then, what the changing nature of labour implies for the perception of 
community and the willingness to support social security.                    
In this study, I will explore the relationships between labour flexibility, risk, sense 
of community and social policy preferences. Throughout the study, I will show how 
researchers have different and often contradictory views on these relationships. My main 
interest is in ‘atypical’ employment and functional flexibility as two central features of 
labour flexibility, because these two forms of flexibility are widespread throughout the 
workforce and well established in the theoretical literature (Kashefi, 2007). 
 
The next section will present a review of the literature on the determinants of social 
policy preferences. Secondly, the chapter will focus in greater detail on the notion of 
labour flexibility and its international proliferation. Then, I will explore the possible 
implications for understanding social policy preferences. Fourthly, a description of the 
 
data sources and methodology will be given. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief 
overview of the study.   
 
1.2 Understanding social policy preferences: a short review  
 
How can we account for variations in individuals’ levels of support for social security? In 
the literature, we can basically distinguish two types of theory: institutional and cultural 
theories at the macro level, and individual explanations at the micro level. 
 
1.2.1 Macro level theory 
In an institutional approach, authors claim that individuals adapt to existing institutions – 
in other words, social policy preferences are a product of institutional characteristics. As 
Arts and Gelissen (2001: 296) note, “people’s notions of solidarity and their choices of 
justice principles need to be understood in the context of the frames of reference and the 
forces of circumstances created by their welfare state regimes”. This type of reasoning is 
related to cultural factors (see, for example, Van Oorschot, 2007a). Generally speaking, 
the cultural tradition of a country (such as the religious and/or ideological background of 
a society – see Van Kersbergen, 1995; Roebroek, 1993) reflects itself in a specific 
welfare state regime and produces differences in support for governmental actions (cf. 
Andreß and Heien, 2001). In this way, researchers such as Linos and West (2003) argue 
that differences in social norms about the causes of poverty, and thus individual support 
for redistribution, are related to the characteristics of individual countries. In this way, in 
liberal welfare states such as the United States and Australia, citizens view their society 
as highly mobile, and this is reflected in lower support for wealth redistribution by the 
government (see also Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). This line of reasoning is also reflected 
in the study by Larsen (2008), who found that living in a liberal country increases the 
chances that an individual will perceive the poor and the unemployed as ‘lazy’, thus 
affecting individual support for social policy. Another empirical example of a macro 
level explanation is the study by Jaeger (2006a). By using two waves of the European 
Social Survey (ESS), Jaeger shows that individual support for wealth redistribution 
increases in line with total social spending, a finding which supports a regime-type theory. 
 
Although the empirical studies presented so far demonstrate the institutional and cultural 
influence on social policy preferences, Gelissen (2001; 2000) reports that the highest 
levels of support for the welfare state have been found in liberal regime-type countries 
(see also Bean and Papadakis, 1998). Taylor-Gooby (2001) finds no differences in 
support for the welfare state between Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and 
Jaeger (2007) shows that support for the old and the sick is uniformly high across eight 
Western countries. Furthermore, Van Oorschot (2005) finds the same high levels of 
solidarity towards the elderly, the sick and disabled and less solidarity with the 
unemployed and immigrants, across 23 European countries. In short, while evidence has 
been found for regime-type explanations, most empirical studies provide only ‘mixed’ 
(Jaeger, 2006a), ‘scarce’ (Blekesaune, 2007) or ‘limited’ (Svallfors, 2003) support for 
this view. More generally speaking, “the connection between regime types and attitudes 
(…] could not be established firmly” (Pfeifer, 2009: 117). Sharp (1999) is also sceptical 
about the relationship between the institutional context and social policy preferences. She 
argues there is a ‘sometime connection’ at best, depending on the specific policy domain7. 
 
Following the literature on the subject of social policy preferences, I conclude that most 
macro level studies have yielded mixed results. However, while comparative welfare 
state research shows no systematic ‘institutional profiles’ with regard to the level of 
individual support, this does not undermine the relevance of cross-national differences in 
welfare culture, which includes collective values and ideals among social actors in a 
given society. According to Van Oorschot (2007a), welfare culture is an important factor 
in understanding social policy and social policy preferences, although culture does not 
have a straightforward determining influence but, rather, a mutual one. This idea provides 
a more complex picture of how social policy preferences are formed, implying that 
welfare culture and social policy are interrelated8 and that persons are not fully 
autonomous individuals, but dependent on and influenced by the society around them. 
This does not mean that individual opinions on social security are fully conditioned by 
7 See, for a further discussion, Raven et al. (2011). 
8 Culture may influence social policy, but social policy may also affect shared perceptions and social 
images among citizens (Van Oorschot, 2007a; 2003), for example, with regard to work ethic (see for 
theoretical considerations Schuyt, 1995; Zijderveld, 1999; 1983). 
 
                                                 
cultural values but, rather, that these are partially rooted in the collective values and 
ideals (cf. Van Oorschot, 2003). In simple terms, the ideas of social actors are in part 
shaped by the collective values and ideas within a society, but at the same time social 
actors may themselves influence these cultural patterns (Scott, 2008). Referring to social 
policy and social policy preferences, Pfau-Effinger (2005: 7) claims that one of the 
current problems with regime-type explanations of individual support is the heterogeneity 
of welfare state policies in a country, which are legitimized by different, and sometimes 
inconsistent elements of welfare culture. For example, the social security system can be 
based on cultural assumptions about the degree of state intervention or about which social 
groups should be integrated into the social system. In other words, welfare states consist 
of different arrangements which are based on different cultural ideals, and these cannot 
easily be captured by specific ‘welfare regime-types’. In the literature, there seems to be 
universal agreement that social policy and social policy preferences reflect different 
cultural assumptions which can vary substantially between and within countries (see 
Pfau-Effinger, 2005)9. Consequently, although I would not suggest any automatic causal 
link between welfare culture, social policy and social policy preferences, social policy 
and individual preferences are certainly linked to the collective ideas of societies and 
these must therefore be taken into account in (comparative) welfare state research. 
Accordingly, both changes in social policy and social policy preferences will always be 
‘path-dependent’ to some extent, since elements of the cultural context are (partially) 
maintained (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).         
 
1.2.2 Micro level theory 
While the institutional argument claims that institutions affect social policy preferences, 
micro level studies focus on individual explanations. Social policy preferences at the 
individual level are often viewed as the result of self-interest or ideology (Blekesaune, 
2007; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989). With respect to self-interest, recipients or potential 
recipients of social arrangements are expected to favour social spending. In the literature, 
9 For example, in the United States, people tend to believe that equity is best guaranteed by means of the 
free market, while in Germany state intervention is generally perceived to be the best way to achieving this. 
Differences may also exist within countries. For instance, Norway can be characterized as more 
conservative with regard to assumptions about the role of the family system and, at the same time, social 
democratic with regard to the social security system (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).  
 
                                                 
there appears to be much empirical support for this argument. As Svallfors (2003: 514) 
argues, for instance: “groups with a stronger market position show weaker support for 
state intervention”. Many scholars have found similar results – see Cook and Barrett 
(1992) or Bean and Papadakis (1998)10, for example. While a common proxy variable for 
market position is ‘class’, only a few studies provide more detailed information on the 
link between specific labour market risks and social policy preferences. For example, 
research suggests that specific skill levels (Cusack et al., 2006; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; 
Rehm, 2005) or being employed in industries with higher unemployment rates (Cusack et 
al., 2006; Rehm, 2005; Kramer and Stephenson, 2001) increases individual support for 
government redistribution. These empirical studies confirm explanations of support that 
are based on self-interest11. 
 Other commentators focus on the role of ideological values, or justice beliefs, 
regarding social security. For example, by analysing American survey data, Hasenfeld 
and Rafferty (1989) conclude that individual beliefs regarding the responsibilities of the 
state or people’s perceptions of the poor play an important role in understanding varying 
levels of individual support for the welfare state. Alesina and La Ferrera (2005) show that 
beliefs about whether society offers equal opportunities plays an important role in 
understanding social policy preferences. Another study conducted by Sears et al. (1980) 
also demonstrates that ideological values (such as having a liberal-conservative ideology, 
party identification and racial prejudice) strongly affect social policy preferences. 
Traditionally, individual support for the welfare state is stronger among those on the 
political left than among others (see, for example, NieuwBeerta, 1995; Groskind, 1994). 
Whether people acquire these beliefs in their social milieu, such as their family 
background, through their own experiences, or from their national culture (Andreß and 
Heien, 2001), ideological values seem to play an important role in understanding social 
policy preferences.     
 
10 Although the link between class and individual opinions on government intervention seems to be clear, 
the increased importance of cultural issues across countries makes the traditional relationship between 
(working) class and (left-wing) voting behaviour less straightforward (Achterberg, 2006).    
11 In general, self-interest is a key feature of rational choice theories of individual action where people try 
to maximize their utility (see, for example, Friedman and Diem, 1990). 
 
                                                 
I can now conclude that self-interest and ideological values affect people’s social policy 
preferences. However, in his historical analysis of the welfare state, De Swaan (1989) 
suggests that these two motivating factors are not distinct but interrelated. According to 
him, community sentiment among people towards the ‘needy’ in society can be explained 
by self-interest. While social security provides (financial) protection for the poor, this not 
only benefits the recipients of social security, but also the non-recipients. For example, 
sickness or unemployment affect the sick and unemployed themselves, but they may also 
have an indirect effect on others. These are known as ‘external effects’, such as the risk 
associated with a less healthy population, rising poverty or high crime rates. In this way, 
public health care systems and unemployment assistance not only safeguard the interests 
of those directly affected by problems, but also those who are not directly affected. From 
this perspective, I have to determine whether community sentiment is determined by self-
interest to some extent, as De Swaan (1989) has argued.                      
 
1.2.3 Risk perception bias 
While I have shown that self-interest can be an important reason for supporting social 
security arrangements, people do not always make such rational calculations. This can be 
found in the literature on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; 1979). One of 
the central features of this theory is that people prefer the ‘status quo’ – the current 
situation or reference point – if they are satisfied with their situation. He/she is then in 
what is known as a ‘gains domain’, while dissatisfied individuals are in a ‘losses domain’ 
and have, consequently, a tendency to reject this ‘status quo’ and support reform. In 
general, people have a strong ‘loss aversion’, which is called a ‘status quo bias’ (Vis et 
al., 2008)12.  Furthermore, the theory describes an ‘endowment effect’, “whereby present 
or past experiences are intuitively given higher value than future prospects” (Schmid, 
2006: 5). What is relevant to the central issue in this study is that attitudes to (changes in) 
social security may be biased by these ‘non-rational’ perceptions of risk. Firstly, people 
may tend to favour the ‘certainty’ of the current social security system (‘status quo bias’). 
Secondly, people may overestimate current risks, while underestimating risks in the 
future (the ‘endowment effect’) (Schmid, 2006: 7). As a result, understanding individual 
12 “Losses usually loom intuitively larger than the corresponding gains” (Schmid, 2006: 5). 
 
                                                 
opinions regarding social security may be different than what self-interested, rational 
choice models might suggest. In other words, the exposure to risk may lead to an interest 
in greater social security, but a bias in risk perception may reduce the empirical value of 
this self-interest argument.    
 
1.2.4 Towards an understanding of social policy preferences 
Which framework is most suited to studying social policy preferences? As I have seen so 
far, when searching for differences in social policy preferences, one must be aware of the 
specific cultural factors at work in a country. Furthermore, the literature suggests that it is 
important to take account of individual characteristics, such as people’s perceived self-
interest and/or ideology. These motivational principles may be interrelated. I have to 
consider ‘non-rational’ risk perceptions among individuals which may affect the 
empirical results regarding the self-interest argument. For example, it is possible that 
people may find it difficult to evaluate risks that lie ahead in the future. This possible bias 
in risk perception could undermine the argument of rationally calculated self-interest. 
Since the main focus of my investigation is how working in a flexible labour market 
affects individual perceptions of risk and social policy preferences, micro level terms and 
concepts seem to be best suited for inclusion in this study. In the following part of this 
section, I will therefore present the theoretical framework and the central micro level 
concepts that are used.   
 
According to the sociological literature, social policy preferences relate to the issue of 
‘welfare legitimacy’ (Mau and Veghte, 2007). If people perceive that social arrangements 
are no longer ‘just’, people might no longer be motivated to pay for these programmes. 
This raises the question of what makes people supportive of social security. This question 
is closely connected to the notion of solidarity, which is a difficult concept to define. 
Usually, solidarity refers to ‘positive’ social relationships among individuals (De Beer 
and Koster, 2007), such as the willingness to help other members of a group (Beckert et 
al., 2004). Because the social security system provides economic security for all its 
citizens, this can be seen as an act of institutionalized solidarity (Gelissen, 2001). At the 
micro level, the concept of solidarity is used as a normative or affective principle 
 
underlying support for the social security system (Trampusch, 2007). In relation to 
solidarity, sociological theories refer broadly to two basic factors that underlie individual 
support (see, for overviews, Van Oorschot, 2007b; 2002; Van Oorschot and Komter, 
1998). Firstly, solidarity is related to the idea of ‘self-interest’. This means that people 
support social security because they perceive that they may benefit from the social 
system, in both the long and short term (Hechter, 1987). This is the same type of 
motivation found earlier in the literature on the micro level determinants of support. 
Secondly, another factor that can explain social policy preferences is a feeling of 
community or moral sentiments. In the sociological literature, the community argument is 
based on the work of Mayhew (1971), who believes that people, by interacting, establish 
a sense of belonging to a broader community and, thus, become more willing to accept 
and work towards collective goals. The second type of motivation, moral sentiments, can 
be found in the work of the sociologist Durkheim (1964), which suggests that social 
policy preferences are formed by the feeling of a moral obligation to serve the collective 
interest rather than self-interest. In both ways, individuals demonstrate that they feel a 
sense of belonging to a broader community which goes hand in hand with increased 
support for collective solutions, such as social security.   
 
On the basis of the general and sociological literature on social policy preferences, I can 
state that self-interest may be an important basis for support social security. Furthermore, 
one’s perception of community must be included in any analysis. This concept is distinct 
from (political) ideology. While ideological values and beliefs are helpful in explaining 
social policy preferences (see, for example, Jaeger, 2006b), I would argue that sense of 
community is a more attractive concept for predicting social policy preferences. In 
contrast to the concept of (political) ideology, sense of community carries positive 
feelings for other members in a society and is, therefore, a stronger type of motivation 
through which to mobilize or support social security programmes. For example, someone 
can join a political party without being committed to the other party-members (Polletta 
and Jasper, 2001). It is the existence of the so-called ‘we-feeling’ among members of a 
community13 which produces the most robust forms of collective behaviour. It is also 
13 Cf. Foster (1997). 
 
                                                 
important to focus on sense of community because, as we will see, the formation of sense 
of community in a flexible labour market is an important subject of debate. Ideology is 
thus a control variable in explaining someone’s feeling of community and social policy 
preferences (cf. Van Oorschot, 2002). In the remainder of this study, ‘self-interest’ and 
‘sense of community’ are used as the two central concepts for determining social policy 
preferences.     
 
In the following section, I will turn to the second dimension of this study: labour 
flexibility.         
 
1.3 Labour flexibility: concept and developments  
 
Labour flexibility is an important trend in Western economies, but the concept of labour 
flexibility remains rather vague (Pollert, 1991). Reviewing the existing literature, labour 
flexibility refers to the extent and speed of adaption by actors in the labour market to a 
changing environment (cf. Standing, 1999; cf. Delsen, 1995).  
In this study, I distinguish two types of labour flexibility: ‘atypical’ employment 
and functional flexibility. ‘Atypical’ employment refers to the external labour market, 
while functional flexibility refers to the existing workforce, or internal labour market. 
Some social researchers also distinguish between a ‘quantitative’ and a ‘qualitative’ type 
of labour flexibility. Quantitative flexibility relates to variations in the amount of work 
(and includes ‘atypical’ employment), while qualitative flexibility relates to the nature of 
the work (and includes functional flexibility) (see Goudswaard, 2003; Looise et al., 1998).  
 
According to Delsen (1991: 123), we need to view ‘atypical’ employment relations as 
those that “deviate from full-time open-ended wage employment” (see also Hevenstone, 
2010). This includes temporary employment contracts, agency work, self-employment 
and part-time employment. While ‘atypical’ employment is certainly not a new 
phenomenon (Kalleberg, 2000), it differs from the traditional, Fordist labour relationships, 
and it has become more common during recent decades. ‘Atypical’ employment is a 
growing part of the European economy. In 1992, 11.2% of all European employees were 
 
in flexible employment, while the proportion of flexible employees in 2009 was 13.5% 
(source: Eurostat, 2010). About 14% of all jobs were part-time in 1992, and this share 
had risen to around 19% by 2010 (source: Eurostat, 2010). This increase is primarily the 
result of a higher participation rate among women. The proportion of self-employed 
workers remained fairly stable between 1995 and 2009, however, at around 15.5% 
(source: Eurostat, 2010).  
 
Figure 1.1 ‘Atypical’ employment levels in the European Union, 1992-2009 
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Source: Eurostat 2010; see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
Functional flexibility is more difficult to define. According to Cordery et al. (1993), 
functional flexibility relates to new flexible work arrangements, such as job rotation, task 
rotation and team working. Functional flexibility is increasingly being used in most 
European countries (OECD, 1999) and American firms (Osterman, 2000). In 2005, for 
example, 47% of all employees in the EU were engaged in task rotation with colleagues, 
while 60% did some, or all of their work in teams (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007a). Tables 1.1 to 1.5 provide an 
overview of employees working flexibly in Europe.  
 
 
 
Table 1.1 Employees with a contract of limited duration in 2009 (% of total employment) 
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Source: Eurostat 2010; see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
Table 1.2 Persons employed part-time in 2009 (% of total employment) 
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Source: Eurostat 2010; see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
The statistics show that people working on contracts of limited duration are found 
particularly in Poland, Spain and Portugal. The Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom show the highest percentages of part-time workers. The highest rates of self-
employment are found in Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 Self-employment rate 2009 (% of total employment) 
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Source: Eurostat 2010; see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
Table 1.4 Functional flexibility among employees in 2005 (Task rotation, in %)  
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Source: EWCS Survey Results 2005; see www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.5 Functional flexibility among employees in 2005 (Team work, in %)14  
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Source: EWCS Survey Results 2005; see www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/ 
 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 illustrate that functional flexibility takes place in most countries, with 
the highest rates found in Slovenia and the Netherlands. 
  
To summarize, this section has investigated the concept of labour flexibility and has 
shown that labour flexibility has become increasingly widespread across all European 
countries. It is assumed that various forms of flexible employment relationships meet the 
needs of organizations to adapt to market fluctuations and technological improvements 
while, on the other hand, it may well enable individual workers to combine their work 
and family lives. This can be observed in the growth in ‘atypical’ jobs. Related to 
functional flexibility is the idea that it also serves shared goals: workers may acquire new 
skills (Campion et al., 1994; Cordery, 1989), organizations may become more adaptable, 
while employers are learning more about employees and their abilities (Eriksson and 
Ortega, 2006; Ortega, 2001).  
In the next paragraph, I will examine the potential impact of labour flexibility on 
social policy preferences.  
 
14 The latest EWCS Survey (2010) shows that only a small number of team workers report high levels of 
team autonomy. At the EU27 level, 22% of all people working in a team report high levels of team 
autonomy (see www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/ewcs/2010/).  
 
                                                 
1.4 Labour flexibility and social policy preferences: research questions  
 
The central research question in this study is whether labour flexibility has an effect on 
social policy preferences. In the literature on social policy preferences, little is known 
empirically. This section will explore the possible consequences of flexible labour for 
workers, particularly relating to social policy preferences. At the end of each section, I 
will point to the contribution of this study to the existing literature.  
 
1.4.1 Consequences of ‘atypical’ employment 
‘Atypical’ employment may be associated with positive outcomes for companies as well 
as for employees. For companies, ‘atypical’ employment provides the flexibility to cope 
with changing market demands (Pfeffer, 1982), while it allows workers to combine work 
and family obligations or gain work experience. Nevertheless, most of the literature on 
the consequences of ‘atypical’ employment for individual workers focuses on its negative 
impact on wages, mobility, working conditions and training investments (see, for 
example, Scherer, 2009; Gash, 2008; Booth et al., 2002). The lack of continuous 
employment in particular seems to be a severe drawback of ‘atypical’ employment. 
Flexible workers experience greater job insecurity (or ‘risk’), leading to higher levels of 
dissatisfaction with their employment situation (Scherer, 2009). ‘Atypical’ employment, 
it might be said, promotes labour instability and growing job insecurity (Sennett, 1998). 
My first expectation is, therefore, that workers with ‘atypical’ employment contracts 
experience less security at work15. Although some authors find no correlation 
(Böckerman, 2002), most of the literature suggests that this is indeed the case (see, for 
example, Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005; De Witte and Näswall, 2003; Green, 2003). 
While most scholars focus on perceptions of company-specific job security, I will 
differentiate between two types of security: company-specific or ‘job security’, and 
external or ‘employment security’, which is the possibility of finding a job outside one’s 
current company16. Many argue that workers are increasingly exposed to instability in the 
15 While perceived insecurity at work may not reflect actual risks, ‘subjective’ insecurity is as least as 
severe as ‘objective’ job insecurity (Lazarus, 1991).  
16 See for different types of security Tangian (2005), Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) or 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004), for example.   
 
                                                 
labour market, making the probability of finding employment outside the current 
organization more important (cf. Schmid and Gazier, 2002). I would expect ‘atypical’ 
employment to be associated with increased job and employment insecurity. Firstly, 
‘atypical’ jobs carry a higher risk of unemployment in the near future, because of the 
predetermined duration of the contract. Secondly, employees in ‘atypical’ jobs do not 
experience feelings of security outside their organization, because working for relatively 
short periods does not allow them to develop their credentials there. Furthermore, 
employers usually offer fewer training facilities to employees with ‘atypical’ jobs, thus 
reducing their employment security still further (Eurostat, 2004). The originality of this 
part of the study is its link between ‘atypical’ employment and different forms of 
perceived insecurity in the labour market.    
 
1.4.2 Consequences of functional flexibility 
While ‘atypical’ forms of employment may cause employees to feel less secure at work, 
functional flexibility may be an important means of allowing employees to gain more 
skills, making them feel more secure. Although older workers may perceive new work 
interventions, such as rotation and the development of teamwork, as threats (Cordery et 
al., 1993), the development of functionally flexible jobs can offer employees the 
opportunity to acquire multiple skills. As such, workers will be able to exercise more 
control over their work than in the past. Greater emphasis will be placed on problem-
solving and undertaking different tasks and roles within an organization, encouraging 
employees to develop different skills.  
While some remain sceptical about functional flexibility and point to the possible 
exploitation of employees by employers (see, for instance, Hyman, 2004) or the ‘time-
greedy’ nature of the high-performance workplace (Van Echtelt, 2007; Wood, 1988), 
functional flexibility may have the potential to offer employees more security in the 
labour market. This implies that functionally flexible workers will perceive greater job 
security than workers without functional flexibility17. Theoretically, functional flexibility 
can provide workers with multiple skills, which may be related to the perception of 
17 One could consider the possibility of reverse causation here, by which job-secure workers may be more 
willing to participate in functionally flexible work practices. According to Smith (1999), however, there is 
no empirical evidence to support this assertion.  
 
                                                 
increased security at work. Although the empirical evidence is scarce, a recent study by 
Kashefi (2007) shows that in the United States, employees who are functionally flexible18 
experience higher levels of job security, while Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) find that 
being included in self-managed teams is positively, but not significantly related to job 
security.  
In general, the threat of dismissal seems to be the proxy for job security. Again, 
my research distinguishes between two types of job security: ‘job security’ and 
‘employment security’. I would expect functionally flexible work practices to be 
associated with increased feelings of security in both senses. Firstly, functionally flexible 
workers are more adaptable and therefore more valuable to the organization. As such, 
they would be unlikely to believe that they would be made redundant in the near future. 
Secondly, these workers are also likely to feel more secure in the external labour market, 
because enhancing their knowledge and skills is likely to cause them to feel more 
‘employable’. An important contribution of this section of the study is examining the 
effects of functional flexibility on different forms of security. Because hardly any 
research has been conducted on this question (see Kalmi and Kauhanen, 2008; Godard, 
2001), this study contributes to the research in this field. In earlier studies on functional 
flexibility, or work innovation in general, researchers are more interested in the effects on 
organizational performance (see, for an overview, Wood, 1999), job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment (see, for example, Appelbaum et al., 2000) or on the chance 
of skill retention (Goudswaard, 2003).  
   
1.4.3 Labour flexibility and social policy preferences 
At an individual level, people can have various motives for contributing to social security 
programmes (as mentioned in paragraph 1.2). People may be motivated by self-interest, 
or by feelings of moral or emotional commitment to others; in other words, by feelings of 
self-interest or by a sense of community (Van Oorschot, 2007b; 2002; Van Oorschot and 
Komter, 1998).  
 
18 Functional flexibility is measured by task flexibility, autonomy and teamwork flexibility.   
 
                                                 
The exposure to labour market risks may have significant effects on social policy 
preferences. From a self-interested perspective (see, for example, Hechter, 1987), I would 
expect secure workers to be less likely to support social security protection. In other 
words, people who face fewer labour market risks, such as unemployment or the threat of 
it, would be less likely to support social insurance. I might expect this to be particularly 
true of spending on unemployment benefits, because this programme is the most closely 
related to the risk of becoming unemployed. Several researchers have already observed a 
link between the incidence of risk and social policy (preferences). Macro level research, 
for example, indicates that economic insecurity affects public spending (Katzenstein, 
1985; Rodrik, 1997; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Burgoon, 2001). At the individual level, 
meanwhile, some studies provide information on specific labour market risks and social 
policy preferences (Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm, 2005; Kramer and Stephenson, 2001; 
Iversen and Soskice, 2001). For example, working in occupations with a higher 
probability of job loss or having specific skills can account for support for social policy at 
the individual level. These results also demonstrate a self-interest mechanism. 
Nevertheless, apart from these few exceptions, the micro level picture remains largely 
unstudied (see Scheve and Slaughter, 2004) as does, in particular, the relationship 
between different individual insecurities in the labour market and social policy 
preferences19. In other words, the question of how perceptions of insecurity in a flexible 
labour market affect individual opinions on social security remains unclear.  
 
Another factor that can explain social policy preferences is a sense of community, or 
moral sentiments. Although support for social security is affected most of all by 
perceived self-interest (Van Oorschot, 2002; 1997), the experience of community is also 
a relevant predictor. We have seen in paragraph 1.2 that this type of motivation is 
grounded in some classical approaches to sociology (Durkheim, 1964; Mayhew, 1971). 
Durkheim suggests that people feel an obligation to serve the collective interest. 
Similarly, Mayhew (1971) has stressed the emotional commitment to larger communities 
as the basis of support for institutionalized solidarity. Following Richard Sennett (1998) 
19 Although a number of researchers take ‘class position’ as a relevant factor in work on social policy 
preferences (see, for example, Svallfors, 2003; 1997; 1995).      
 
                                                 
and Zygmunt Bauman (2001), we may assume that ‘atypical’ employment forms have 
negative consequences for this sense of community. In their view, the erosion of long-
term employment contracts undermines loyalty, trust and the sense of belonging to a 
wider collectivity. In the ‘new’, short-term, unstable labour market, there is simply no 
room for long-term social relations and mutual commitments: “no long term means keep 
moving, don’t commit yourself, and don’t sacrifice” (Sennett, 1998: 25)20. In the flexible 
economy, there is “no shared fate” (Sennett, 1998: 147) which makes an understanding of 
community difficult. According to Bauman (2001: 24-25), the flexible labour market 
“(…) feels like a camping site which one visits for but a few nights and which one may 
leave at any moment if the comforts on offer are not delivered or found wanting when 
delivered (…)”. Because this kind of labour involves uncertainties and risks, it is 
expected to be a strong ‘individualizing force’. “It divides instead of uniting, and since 
there is no telling who might wake up in what division, the idea of ‘common interests’ 
grows ever more nebulous and in the end becomes incomprehensible”.  
Unlike ‘atypical’ employment patterns, functional flexibility may increase the 
likelihood that people will feel a sense of community. Most of the theoretical literature 
states that functional flexibility requires workers to cooperate and communicate more to 
achieve mutual goals than was the case in ‘traditional’ Taylorist organizations (Vogl, 
2009; European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
2007a; Hempell and Zwick, 2005)21. While ‘Taylorism’ includes no extensive job-
learning opportunities and a high technical division of labour, functional flexibility 
emphasizes learning possibilities for employees and the achievement of common goals. 
In a functionally flexible work setting, individual interests are aligned with those of 
others. I therefore assume that working in a so-called ‘holistic’ organization22 (Lindbeck 
and Snower, 2000) enhances an employee’s sense of belonging to a wider collectivity; 
people may learn more about co-workers and their work and become involved with more 
20 At an organizational level, however, Koster (2005) has shown that solidarity among co-workers has not 
been affected by labour flexibility (see also Sanders and Van Emmerik, 2004). The kind of social 
relationships that will be examined in this study, and which is more in line with the work by Sennett and 
Bauman, refers to feelings of belonging to a wider collectivity than the workplace.   
21 See, for a critique, Amoore (2002), Ezzy (2001) and Sennett (1998). They argue that functional 
flexibility simply concerns short-term internal changes, leaving no room for long-term social relationships.    
22 The ‘holistic’ organization is defined by a lower task specialization among workers, featuring job 
rotation, the integration of tasks and learning across tasks (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). 
 
                                                 
collective tasks than other categories of workers. In other words, while workers with 
‘atypical’ labour contracts may be less likely to develop a sense of sense of community, it 
can also be argued that working in a functionally flexible work environment creates a 
stronger sense of sense of community. At this time, little is yet known about the 
relationship between labour flexibility and sense of community. This suggests a need for 
empirical research.  
Because previous research has shown that sense of community is positively 
related to individual support for social security arrangements (Van Oorschot, 2007b; 
2002), I also assume that sense of community positively affects individual support for 
different social security programmes.  
 
1.4.4 Self-employment and social policy preferences  
Thus far, I have discussed ‘atypical’ employment, functional flexibility and their possible 
impact on social policy preferences. In this section, I will discuss the social policy 
preferences of the self-employed. Self-employment is a specific type of ‘atypical’ 
employment. A common definition of the self-employed is “persons who work in their 
own business, professional practice or farm for the purpose of earning a profit, and who 
employ at least one other person” (European Foundation, 2010: 7)23. Looking at social 
policy preferences, the general proposition is that the self-employed are more likely to 
oppose social security spending. According to De Swaan (1989/2004: 175-176), the 
welfare state, historically, emerged in spite of protests by self-employed citizens who did 
not want to hand over their autonomy to the state. Social security is not in the self-interest 
of the self-employed because it involves paying additional taxes and therefore means less 
profit. Furthermore, in many cases the self-employed will not actually enjoy the benefit 
of insurance against social risks. This may also explain why the self-employed are 
expected to be more negative about social security. Turning to sense of community, 
another determinant of individual support, the basic assumption is that being self-
employed is associated along with an individualistic and autonomous ideology (for 
empirical evidence, see Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven, 2005) and, thus, a lower degree 
of individual support for social security spending. However, from the welfare state 
23 Persons who do not employ any other persons are known as self-employed without personnel.  
 
                                                 
literature, we know that people may support social security because their friends or 
family benefit from social security programmes (Van Oorschot, 2007b). The self-
employed may then have a reason to support social security, even though they do not 
benefit from it directly. Furthermore, in some cases the self-employed also benefit from 
social security programmes, such as a basic pension scheme and health care insurance in 
the Netherlands. This raises the question of whether it is really true that the self-
employed are a priori negative towards social security. Specific attention to the self-
employed has been limited in previous studies on social policy preferences24. It is, 
therefore, my goal to focus on the self-employed and their social policy preferences.    
 
1.4.5 Labour flexibility, risk and social policy preferences in different settings 
Thus far, I have demonstrated how labour flexibility may impact on social policy 
preferences. In the next paragraph, I will describe how macro level conditions and the 
organizational context may shape worker’s responses to labour flexibility. 
 
1.4.5.1 Macro level conditions  
Existing institutions may impact on the relationship between labour flexibility and social 
policy preferences. This is most clearly visible in the case of ‘atypical’ employment. As 
stated earlier, these employment relationships may cause greater feelings of insecurity. 
However, the impact of labour flexibility on job insecurity may vary between different 
employment systems: the level of employment protection legislation (EPL) may 
influence the degree of job insecurity. In general, stronger employment protection 
legislation is associated with less job insecurity (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). There 
is also a link between different types of insecurity and the wider labour market conditions; 
a higher unemployment rate or a recent increase in unemployment seem to be associated 
with higher levels of experienced job and employment insecurity, while feelings of 
employment security are enhanced by the level of active labour market policies (see, for 
an overview, Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; OECD, 2004). Green (2009) shows that the 
24 However, several authors who include self-employment as a control variable argue that self-employment 
has negative effects on individual support for social security spending (see, for example, Iversen, 2005; 
Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Svallfors, 1995), while other studies show no systematic relationship (Lee, 2007; 
Svallfors, 1997).     
 
                                                 
country’s stage of overall economic development is another macro level factor which 
may impact on feelings of security25. In order to determine whether country-specific 
studies can be empirically generalized, social researchers must be aware of these macro 
level conditions. 
 
With regard to functional flexibility, Godard (2001: 799-800) suggests that strong unions 
should improve the working conditions of functionally flexible employees: “Such 
conditions largely do not exist at present in liberal market economies such as that of 
Canada (or, for that matter, the United States and United Kingdom), but they do exist in a 
number of European countries (for example, Germany and Sweden)”. More specifically, 
strong unions may provide greater protection for employees, for example, in the form of 
bargaining (extensive) training facilities and involvement in reforming work practices. 
Again, it is important to consider institutional characteristics in country-specific studies. 
 
Furthermore, regarding social policy preferences, research shows that domestic 
employment and economic conditions (partially) determine social policy preferences 
(Blekesaune, 2007; Fraile and Ferrer, 2005; Shivo and Uusitalo, 1995; Durr, 1993)26. 
Finally, as was pointed out earlier in this study, the cultural context is related to social 
policy preferences. For example, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries like the United 
States, the Dutch recognize the importance of state intervention (see, for example, 
Weaver et al., 1995; Pot, 2000). Individual support for social security therefore differs 
between countries due to deeply rooted cultural values.   
 
Overall, at the macro level, attention has to be drawn to the context in which workers are 
located. An objective of this study is thus to determine whether the empirical results hold 
across different macro level contexts.  
 
 
 
25 Workers in transitional and developing countries perceive relatively high levels of insecurity.  
26 In general, higher unemployment rates are related to more individual support for social security, while 
less favourable economic conditions are associated with lower support for social security.   
 
                                                 
1.4.5.2 Launching flexibility: empowerment versus control  
The organizational context is another issue. This applies most clearly to functional 
flexibility. Work contexts that provide learning opportunities and related training 
facilities may actually ‘empower’ workers; they are able to gain multiple skills, making 
them more ‘employable’ in the labour market. Looking at functional flexibility, several 
writers argue that functionally flexible work may provide employees with more varied 
and greater (semi) autonomous work, while others point to ‘low-road’ flexible work 
solutions. In a broader theoretical context, this relates to the issue of ‘empowerment’ 
versus insights from the labour process theory (Braverman, 1974). While the term 
‘empowerment’ encompasses employee involvement, autonomy and skill variety (cf. 
Wilkinson, 1998), thus rejecting ‘traditional’ scientific management27 work models, the 
labour process thesis implies that employment innovation such as functional flexibility 
inevitably leads to deskilling. It also emphasizes that management remains totally 
responsible for planning and work decisions. Regarding teamwork, one can think of the 
so-called ‘Toyotist’ or ‘lean’ production systems versus ‘socio-technical’ systems (see, 
for example, Steijn, 2001; Procter & Mueller, 2000; Benders and Van Hootegem, 1999)28. 
While both systems stress the idea of greater involvement by workers, their level of 
autonomy is considerably restricted under lean production systems. In both cases, the 
multi-skilled worker can carry out a variety of tasks, but in lean production systems the 
tasks remain fairly simple and involve no managerial functions or broader training 
investment. Rather, a first-line supervisor bears responsibility for work performance 
(Niepce and Molleman, 1998) and people are only trained ‘on-the-job’. Clearly, this 
restricts the opportunities for learning for individual workers. In other words, it can be 
argued that it is important to consider how functionally flexible work practices are 
implemented when explaining the impact of functional flexibility on worker outcomes.  
Furthermore, the potential ‘strength’ of functional flexibility depends on 
supportive HRM policies within organizations; if functionally flexible work practices are 
implemented as a part of the broader HRM strategy, this is likely to result in more 
beneficial outcomes for employees. It has been suggested that complementary HRM 
27 Scientific management, or ‘Taylorism’, is a management concept which involves a high division of 
labour, skills specialization and few opportunities for job-learning.  
28 Naturally, these two types of teamwork are ideal types (Benders and Van Hootegem, 1999).  
 
                                                 
practices, such as training and related pay schemes, improve skills, autonomy, job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment among functionally flexible workers (see, for 
example, Appelbaum et al., 2000; Bacon and Blyton, 2003; Osterman, 1995; 1994). 
Research has, however, not focused primarily on functional flexibility, HRM practices 
and perceived insecurities of individual workers.  
 
All in all, the section above implies that managers can choose how to implement new 
forms of work organization. At the company level, it is therefore important to assess the 
impact of the organizational context on labour flexibility and perceived risk. The 
assumption is that following a ‘high-road’ approach is beneficial for employees (e.g. 
lower risks), while following a ‘low-road’ is not.  
 
The various considerations of this study are integrated in Figure 1.2. In the empirical 
chapters, I will discuss the different pathways for each type of labour flexibility in more 
detail.   
 
Figure 1.2 Conceptual model, social policy preferences in the flexible working life 
 
Type of labour 
flexibility: 
-‘atypical’ 
employment; 
-functional 
flexibility; 
-self-
employment 
  
Perceived risk: 
-Job insecurity; 
-Employment 
insecurity 
 
Sense of 
community 
Social policy 
preferences 
Type of implementation: 
‘empowerment versus control’ 
 
 1.4.6 Research questions 
This study investigates the following research questions.    
The first research question addresses the issue of flexible employment and the individual 
perceptions of security: 
• Question 1a: What is the relationship between ‘atypical’ employment and 
perceived job insecurity? 
• Question 1b:  What is the relationship between ‘atypical’ employment and 
perceived employment insecurity? 
 
The second research question investigates the issue of functional flexibility and 
individual perceptions of security: 
• Question 2a: What is the relationship between functionally flexible employment 
and perceived job insecurity? 
• Question 2b: What is the relationship between functionally flexible employment 
and perceived employment insecurity? 
Third, I will investigate the relationship between different forms of labour flexibility and 
sense of community: 
• Question 3a: What is the relationship between ‘atypical’ employment and sense of 
community? 
• Question 3b: What is the relationship between functionally flexible employment 
and sense of community? 
 
In understanding social policy preferences, the individual perceptions of security and 
sense of community are considered as important determinants. The relationship between 
the individual perceptions of security and social policy preferences is addressed in 
research question 4a, while research question 4b addresses the link between sense of 
community and social policy preferences:     
• Question 4a: Do job and employment insecurity affect social policy preferences? 
• Question 4b: Does sense of community affect social policy preferences? 
 
 
Research question 5 concerns the impact of the organizational context on functional 
flexibility and perceived risk: 
• Question 5: Does the organizational context impact on the relationship between 
functional flexibility and perceived risk (e.g. job and employment insecurity)? 
 
The sixth research question asks whether the self-employed are really negatively 
disposed towards social security, as often is suggested: 
• Question 6: Are the self-employed less likely to support social security?  
 
The robustness of the findings will be investigated by research question 7: 
• Question 7: Do the findings hold across different macro level settings? 
 
Although not central to the main research question of the study, I will also explore the 
relationship between perceived risk and sense of community. As argued by De Swaan 
(1989), these two concepts may be connected. Further, I will explore the direct impact of 
labour flexibility on social policy preferences.  
 
1.5 Research strategy and data  
 
1.5.1 The Dutch context: social security, employment protection and industrial relations 
In this study, the relationship between labour flexibility and social policy preferences will 
be examined in the Netherlands, on the grounds that the Dutch labour market is one of 
the most flexible in Europe. Concerning all types of labour flexibility, the Netherlands 
ranks as one of the top European countries (De Vries and Wolbers, 2005; Delsen, 1995) 
and this is, therefore, a strategic area of study. With regard to self-employment, the 
Netherlands is also an interesting case, because the country has witnessed a large increase 
in self-employment over the last years, particularly in self-employed persons who do not 
employ any personnel. In the 2004-2007 period, the number of self-employed persons 
 
increased by 14.9% in the Netherlands29 (European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, 2010).  
All these flexible workers carry out their work in a specific institutional context. 
To understand the (possible) impact of country-specific Dutch characteristics on the 
empirical results in the following chapters, I will briefly address the institutional 
framework that applies in the Netherlands.   
 
According to Scruggs and Allan (2006), the Dutch social system is among the more ‘de-
commodifying’ in Europe. Figure 1.3 presents the level of public social expenditure in 
the Netherlands compared to the average OECD level. The data shows that the 
Netherlands, indeed, ranks (slightly) above the average OECD level.   
 
Figure 1.3 Public social expenditure: The Netherlands and the average OECD level 
(in % of GDP), 2000-2007 
17
18
19
20
21
22
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
OECD Netherlands
 
Source: OECD (see: http://stats.oecd.org/).  
 
Table 1.6 shows how countries differ in their active labour market expenditure (as a 
percentage of GDP). It appears that the Netherlands has a high rate of spending.   
 
29 This shows the percentage change in the number of self-employed workers (European Foundation, 2010).  
 
                                                 
Table 1.6 Level of active labour market expenditure (in % of GDP), 2004-
2005
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Source: OECD (2006a).  
 
Although there has been a shift towards a lower level of social protection and greater 
individual responsibility during recent decades (Van der Veen, 2009; De Beer and Koster, 
2009; Van Oorschot, 2006), the Netherlands spends more on social security than many 
other countries. These relatively high levels of spending seem to reflect some of the basic 
Dutch cultural values, such as a preference for state intervention and a strong orientation 
to (income) equality (Pot, 2000). This view is consistent with the findings of Becker 
(2005: 78), who shows that 69% of the Dutch would favour a further reduction of income 
inequality.     
In the next section, I will elaborate on working in flexible jobs in the Netherlands.   
 
In the Netherlands, the call for labour flexibility began in the early 1980s. Against the 
background of high unemployment rates, employers and employees signed the 
‘Wassenaar Agreement’ in 1982, which included the introduction of flexible working (the 
reduction of working hours and the promotion of agency work) and wage moderation. 
Since then, the Dutch labour market has been characterized by increasing labour 
flexibility. The ‘Flexibility and Security Act’ (‘Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid’) was 
 
introduced in 199930 to define the status of flexible work and combine greater labour 
flexibility with more security for ‘atypical’ workers. For example, temporary workers 
would automatically become permanent employees if the worker was employed 
temporarily for 36 months or if three consecutive temporary employment contracts had 
expired (this used to be after a second contract). Furthermore, the period between two 
consecutive flexible contracts was increased from 30 days to three months and a 
minimum pay entitlement for on-call workers was introduced. While the government has 
sought to combine more flexibility for employers and security for ‘atypical’ workers, 
‘regular’ employees still enjoy relatively high levels of employment protection, while 
‘atypical’ workers still experience a relatively low level of employment protection (Vis et 
al., 2008; OECD, 2006b; OECD, 2004)31. Table 1.7 shows the level of employment 
protection for ‘regular’ and ‘atypical’ employees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 The first collective agreements for temporary workers, which included a right to continued employment 
and pension insurance after 24 months, were introduced in 1995 (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997: 44).  
31 In a recent study on the Dutch ‘flexicurity’ regime, Houwing (2010) has also shown that at the level of 
collective bargaining “(…) flexibility is stressed rather than security” (Houwing, 2010: 251). 
 
                                                 
Table 1.7 Employment protection, 1980s-2003 
 Regular 
employment, 
2003 
Regular 
employment, 
1980s-2003 
Flexible 
employment, 
2003 
Flexible 
employment, 
1980s-2003 
Australia 1.5 +0.5 0.9 0 
Austria 2.4 -0.5 1.5 0 
Belgium 1.7 0 2.6 -2.0 
Canada 1.3 0 0.3 0 
Denmark 1.5 0 1.4 -1.7 
Finland 2.2 -0.6 1.9 0 
France 2.5 +0.2 3.6 +0.5 
Germany 2.7 +0.1 1.8 -2.0 
Ireland 1.6 0 0.6 +0.3 
Italy 1.8 0 2.1 -3.3 
Netherlands 3.1 0 1.2 -1.2 
Norway 2.3 0 2.9 -0.6 
Sweden 2.9 0 1.6 -3.5 
Switzerland 1.2 0 1.1 0 
UK 1.1 +0.2 0.4 +0.1 
US 0.2 0 0.3 0 
Average 1.9 0 1.5 -0.8 
Source: Vis et al. (2008: 342).  
The index ranges from 0 to 6 with a higher score representing stronger employment 
protection. 
 
In addition to the relatively low level of employment protection, a substantial proportion 
of ‘atypical’ workers do not qualify for unemployment benefits (Van Oorschot, 2004) 
and they lack a full occupational pension insurance due to interruptions in their career 
history. This shows that ‘atypical’ workers experience poor security, even after the 
implementation of the ‘Flexibility and Security Act’.     
 
 
Dutch self-employed workers are, to some degree, insured for risks such as old-age (basic 
pension system) and health care32, but not unemployment, the economic risks of sickness 
or occupational disability. In a comparative manner, the self-employed seem to enjoy 
(some) basic coverage in most European countries. While, naturally, differences in 
coverage still exist between countries, the Netherlands cannot be considered a true 
European ‘outlier’ concerning the level of social security coverage for the self-employed, 
especially after the trend towards more privatization in the social security system33. In 
‘inclusive’ systems, such as Sweden and Finland, the self-employed have basically the 
same rights as employees, while in other countries the self-employed are entitled to lower 
levels of protection (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions, 2010). The Netherlands lies somewhere in between, with a basic pension, 
insurance for medical treatment and paid maternity leave. However, the self-employed 
are not entitled to sickness benefits, unemployment and disability insurance. Table 1.8 
shows a ‘security index’ with regard to European full-time, self-employed workers34 in 
16 European countries (Tangian, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 In 2008, the Dutch government also introduced maternity leave for self-employed workers. 
33 For example, the Disability Insurance Act for self-employed persons (‘WAZ’) in 2004. In fact, it is 
countries such as Sweden and Finland that can be considered ‘outliers’. In both countries, self-employed 
persons and regular employees basically have the same social security rights (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2009). 
34 The self-employed in agriculture are not included. Tangian has analysed different aspects of security for 
the self-employed, such as entitlements to participation in public pension schemes, unemployment 
insurance and sick leave. The total security index is a weighted average of the six individual scores 
(100%=full security). 
 
                                                 
Table 1.8 Security for the self-employed, 2002 (weighted security in % security) 
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Source: Tangian (2004). 
 
In which way could these macro level conditions affect risk and support for social 
security? In general, I work on the assumption that due to the relatively low employment 
protection for flexible workers compared to ‘regular’ workers, flexible employees may 
feel more job insecure in the Netherlands than in some other European countries. Then, 
as Anderson and Pontusson (2007) have shown, there is a link between the level of active 
labour market policy and the perception of employment insecurity. Considering the 
relatively high level of active labour market expenditure, Dutch workers may feel less 
employment insecure than employees working in other countries. Finally, with regard to 
self-employment, the Dutch case can be considered as a more or less average European 
example with respect to social security coverage.  
 
As mentioned previously, organizations operate within an industrial relations context. 
The Dutch industrial relations system is characterized by an average (weighted) trade 
union density in the OECD area, while collective bargaining coverage is above the 
OECD average (OECD, 2004; European Foundation, 2007b)35. The latter is a result of 
state intervention by declaring collective labour agreements to be generally binding. 
Table 1.9 shows the average levels of coverage across European countries. 
35 In the Netherlands, trade union density is 21% in 2008 (see www.cbs.nl), while coverage has been stable 
at approximately 85% (SER, 2007).  
 
                                                 
 Table 1.9 Level of collective bargaining coverage (in %), 2003-2004 
Country Coverage Rates 
Austria 91-100 
Belgium 91-100 
France 91-100 
Slovenia 91-100 
Sweden 91-100 
Netherlands 81-90 
Denmark 81-90 
Finland 81-90 
Italy 81-90 
Spain 81-90 
Luxembourg 71-80 
Portugal 71-80 
Cyprus 61-70 
Germany 61-70 
Greece 61-70 
Ireland 51-60 
Malta 51-60 
Poland 41-50 
Slovakia 41-50 
Hungary 31-40 
United Kingdom 31-40 
Czech Republic 21-30 
Estonia 21-30 
Latvia 11-20 
Lithuania 11-20 
Source: Keune (2006: 13).  
 
Usually, collective bargaining coverage has been regarded as an indicator of the ‘real 
power’ of trade unions (OECD, 2004). With the high degree of coverage and substantial 
cooperation between government and social partners in the Netherlands, some label the 
 
‘Dutch model’ as a ‘consensus economy’ (a specific form of corporatism36; see SER, 
2007). This institutional context may well contribute, then, to more positive working 
conditions for Dutch functionally flexible workers: under conditions with strong union 
coverage and mandatory works councils37, functionally flexible work practices are more 
likely to promote the development of skills and knowledge among employees, because 
employers and employees have to balance mutual goals (cf. Godard, 2001)38. In the 
literature, this type of reasoning has also been referred to as differences in ‘production 
regimes’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001)39, in which the Netherlands comes closest to a 
coordinated market economy with generally more powerful bodies for employees 
(Anderson and Hassel, 2008; Katzenstein, 1985).  
 
In this study, I will focus on the Netherlands. The Dutch case is an interesting one 
because of its high level of labour flexibility. However, the nation-specific Dutch context 
may affect my findings. An important question, therefore, is whether my findings are 
valid across different settings. Section 1.5.2 focuses on how this will be done. 
 
1.5.2 Research design 
This section will briefly introduce the data sources for my research. In the empirical 
chapters, I will turn to the data and methods in greater detail. The study starts by focusing 
on the Netherlands and particularly on two different forms of labour flexibility: ‘atypical’ 
and functional flexibility. In a first step, the consequences of ‘atypical’ flexibility for 
social policy preferences will be considered, using three quantitative Dutch datasets: the 
2008 and the 2006 ‘Labour and Welfare Opinions survey’40 which were collected by 
36 Some researchers consider the Dutch welfare state as social democratic (see, for example, Vrooman, 
2010). 
37 In organizations of 50 or more employees. 
38 ‘Union strength’ is beneficial for the functionally flexible employee in particular. In general, the primary 
objective of unions is to protect permanent (functionally flexible) employees. ‘Atypical’ workers are not 
often members of unions and, therefore, receive less attention (De Jong, 2008).    
39 Basically, Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market 
economies (LMEs), which focus on different production strategies, skill requirements and, hence, different 
modes of coordination between the government, employers and employees. In coordinated market 
economies, there is relatively more labour market regulation and cooperation between employers, unions 
and employees (Soskice, 1999). 
40 See, for more information, Achterberg et al. (2010). 
 
                                                 
Erasmus University and a research centre at Tilburg University in the Netherlands41, and 
panel data collected by the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies (OSA) for the period 1998-
200442. This data will be used to examine research questions 1, 3a and 4.   
Second, the hypotheses about functional flexibility will be tested, again using 
Dutch survey data (the 2008 ‘Labour and Welfare Opinions survey’). The main focus is 
on research questions 2, 3b and 4.  
In a third step, self-employment is the main issue of analysis, using a subset of 
international data (the 2006 ‘International Social Survey Programme’). The findings will 
be discussed in relation to research question 6.  
Fourthly, the chapters on functional flexibility and self-employment will be 
supplemented by an analysis of qualitative data in two sectors of the Dutch economy: the 
manufacturing and services sectors. These outcomes will be discussed in light of research 
questions 5 and 6. The general objective of this qualitative part of the study is to learn 
more about how different workers make sense of, and deal with, risk under different 
working conditions. The qualitative results contribute to the earlier findings from the 
survey strategy. Various organizations were selected for this purpose. Regarding 
functional flexibility, one company was selected in the ICT-sector (services) and one in 
manufacturing. After preliminary interviews with experts in the field, these firms were 
chosen because they are well known for their implementation of functionally flexible 
work practices. The sectors seemed theoretically relevant. First, the objectives of Dutch 
managers to introduce functionally flexible work practices seem to differ between sectors. 
In the industrial sector (manufacturing), the introduction of labour flexibility seems to be 
more ‘reactive’ and market-driven, while in business (services) labour flexibility is 
predominantly seen as a way of improving people’s knowledge and skills (see the study 
conducted by TNO, 200643). This reflects some of the differences between the theme of 
‘empowerment’ and the labour process thesis; the latter draws less attention to 
‘humanistic’ principles of work innovation. As mentioned earlier, the literature suggests 
that the organizational context may influence the micro level response of workers, so it is 
41 See, for more information, www.centerdata.nl 
42 See, for more information, www.scp.nl 
43 This study included data from 1,240 employers of organizations with more than 100 employees in five 
different sectors of the Dutch economy: industry, transport & communication, finance, business and health 
care.  
 
                                                 
the question how these contextual conditions have an impact on the experiences of 
functionally flexible employees. Second, hardly any systematic empirical studies on the 
flexible work experiences of different occupational groups have been carried out (cf. 
Bacon and Blyton, 2003). Do different groups of workers handle their flexible work 
situations in similar ways? This is my second reason to explore the working experiences 
of functionally flexible workers in a variety of sectors in the Dutch economy.  
Furthermore, working with two contract agencies, a trade union and a popular 
magazine for self-employed workers without employees in the Netherlands, I was able to 
access self-employed people without employees in ICT and construction. In this part of 
the study, I will focus on self-employed workers without employees, because most of the 
self-employed workers in the Netherlands have no employees and, particularly within 
ICT and construction, a substantial proportion of workers fall into this category (Schulze 
Buschoff and Schmidt, 2009). Furthermore, the focus is on self-employed workers within 
ICT (services), because they are seen as the ideal-type of ‘free-agents’ in the academic as 
well as the popular literature (cf. Barley and Kunda, 2006; cf. Pink, 2001). I will compare 
this category of worker with self-employed workers in the construction industry. These 
are considered more financially dependent on one or two contractors (Jorens and Van 
Buynder, 2009; Böheim and Muehlberger, 2006; Van der Heijden et al., 1999) compared 
to the self-employed within ICT (services). This ‘vulnerability’ may influence an 
individual’s perception of self-employment, risk and social policy preferences. Again, the 
primary objective is to explore the different perceptions of social security in greater detail, 
among two theoretically contrasting groups in the labour market.     
 
Finally, as mentioned, cross-country variations may influence my findings (for example, 
employment protection levels and specific economic and labour market factors). 
Therefore, in the final step, I will use the 2001 ‘Eurobarometer dataset’ from 15 EU 
member states to see how ‘atypical’ employment affects social policy preferences in 
different national contexts. I will also use the 2006 ‘International Social Survey 
Programme dataset’ and the 2002/2003 ‘European Social Survey set’ to analyse social 
policy preferences among the self-employed across national heterogeneity. This section 
addresses research question 7. Unfortunately, no specific cross-national surveys have 
 
been carried out regarding functional flexibility, risk and social policy preferences. 
Clearly, this limits the empirical power of this part of the study. However, the 2005 
‘EWCS dataset’, which was conducted among employed persons and including all 27 EU 
member states, provides some opportunity to explore the relationship between functional 
flexibility and risk.     
 
1.6 Overview of the book 
 
In this book, several chapters are, partially, based on separate articles. Chapter 2 starts by 
exploring and testing theories on ‘atypical’ employment and social policy preferences, 
and is a revised version of earlier articles (Dekker, 2008; Dekker and Achterberg, 2008). 
Chapter 3 discusses functionally flexible work and its individual outcomes. This chapter 
is based on a version which has been accepted for publication (Dekker, 2010a). Chapter 4 
contains two case studies on functionally flexible work practices. One part of this chapter 
has been published (Dekker, 2009a). Chapter 5 reports the findings on self-employment 
and social policy preferences, and contains qualitative data on 40 respondents. Slightly 
different versions have been published (Dekker, 2009b; Dekker, 2010b; Dekker, 2010c). 
In chapter 6, cross-country results and implications are presented. One part of this chapter 
has been published (Burgoon and Dekker, 2010). A summary and the main conclusions 
are the focus of chapter 7.  
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2 ‘ATYPICAL’ EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES44 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the first chapter of this study, I have seen how ‘self-interest’ and sense of community 
are two important determinants of individuals’ support for social security. Furthermore, I 
have posed the central research question of whether labour flexibility influences social 
policy preferences. I have also discussed different forms of labour flexibility and its 
various consequences for social policy preferences. In this chapter, I will focus 
particularly on ‘atypical’ employment in the Netherlands. The chapter starts with a brief 
discussion on the subject. Then, the data and methods are presented. Finally, I will 
discuss the results. 
 
2.2 ‘Atypical’ employment and implications for workers  
 
In recent decades, certain labour market developments have occurred in most 
industrialized western countries. Against a background of rapid technological change and 
ongoing economic interdependence, the flexibilization of the labour market has been 
perhaps one of the most fundamental changes to affect work and employment conditions 
in western economies (Kalleberg, 2003; 2001; 2000; Burchell et al., 1999). Reflecting on 
this new flexible economy, some expect greater labour flexibility to lead to a decline in 
workers’ dedication levels (Sennett, 2006). Others, meanwhile, point to the joys and 
meaningfulness of contemporary work (De Botton, 2009). Labour flexibility is, however, 
a widely-used concept that can assume many different meanings. For example, the search 
for flexibility has resulted in more flexible or ‘atypical’ employment relationships. 
Nowadays, people’s working lives are frequently characterized by temporary contracts, 
agency work and part-time employment (De Grip et al., 1997; Delsen, 1995). Although 
the consequences of flexible employment for the society as a whole are not clear-cut (Zijl, 
44 Different versions of this chapter have been published as: Dekker, F. (2008). Flexibele arbeid, 
werkonzekerheid en gemeenschapsgevoel. Steun voor collectieve sociale zekerheid in een flexibel 
arbeidsbestel, Sociologie, 4(1): 38-52; Dekker, F. and Achterberg, P. (2008). Flexibel werken tijdens 
laagconjunctuur. De arbeidsmarktpositie van flexwerkers, Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken, 24(2): 
114-124. 
 
                                                 
2006)45, flexible work is of interest of employers and may also benefit individual 
employees, for example, helping them to combine work and caring responsibilities or 
improving their human capital. In this sense, labour flexibility has been embraced by 
(international) policy makers (Employment Taskforce, 2003). For the Netherlands, the 
percentage of flexible workers increased from 4,7 percent in 1970 (CBS, 1996) to 9 
percent in 2008 (CBS Statline, 2009)46. According to De Vries and Wolbers (2005: 505), 
the Netherlands is an interesting context for analysing labour flexibility because it is one 
of the European countries with the highest increase in flexible employment during the 
90s (whether this number is restricted to temporary employment or not). Storrie (2002) 
supports this statement by showing that the Netherlands has the highest share of 
temporary agency workers in the European Union.   
 
While the growth of ‘atypical’ work arrangements among countries may be influenced by 
institutional characteristics, such as the level of labour market regulation on the hiring 
and firing of ‘regular’ workers (Olsen and Kalleberg, 2004)47, particularly younger 
people, women and immigrants are working more often in flexible jobs (see, for example, 
Goudswaard, 2003; OECD, 2002). The figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show that, compared to 
regular workers, flexible employees are younger than other workers, they have less 
education than regular workers and there are more women than men among the Dutch 
flexible workforce48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 There are, for example, mixed results on the effects of flexible employment on employment levels. 
46 This excludes part-time workers. Furthermore, this number of flexible workers is different from 
European statistics, due to differences in definition.   
47 In this regard, the correlation between the incidence of temporary work and employment protection 
legislation for permanent contracts is 0.34 in 2002 (OECD, 2004). 
48 In these figures, the (small) category ‘unknown’ has been excluded.  
 
                                                 
Figure 2.1 Flexible and regular employees in the Netherlands, 2008 (age groups)  
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Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
 
Figure 2.2 Flexible and regular employees in the Netherlands, 2008 (education level)  
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Figure 2.3 Flexible and regular employees in the Netherlands, 2008 (gender)  
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Generally, flexible workers are seen as ‘precarious’ or ‘disposable’ workers, trapped in 
the secondary segment of the labour market involving poor working conditions (Hudson, 
2007; Kalleberg et al., 2000; Gallie et al., 1998). In this view, there is considerable 
agreement that flexible workers perceive their jobs as temporarily in getting the desired 
permanent, standard jobs (Silla et al., 2005). In other words, ‘atypical’ employment is for 
most workers ‘a stepping-stone’ towards ‘regular’ employment (Zijl, 2006; Moolenaar, 
2002)49. Looking closer at the individual consequences of ‘atypical’ employment, 
empirical evidence suggests that working flexible increases the possibility of finding a 
permanent job (see, for a review, Dekker, 2007), but also means lower wages, less 
security and less (on-the-job) training and/or career opportunities compared to permanent 
employees (Dekker, 2007; Mertens and McGinnity, 2004; Forrier and Sels, 2003; Booth 
et al., 2002; Kalleberg, 2000). Furthermore, previous research suggests that particularly 
job insecurity (the perceived risk of losing a job) is of key concern for temporary workers 
(Scherer, 2009). While many studies have investigated the individual consequences of 
‘atypical’ jobs, the implications for social policy preferences are mostly neglected. This is 
the central issue in the next paragraph.        
 
 
49 However, some have found evidence of higher skilled ‘boundaryless’ workers who prefer ‘atypical’ 
employment (see, for example, Marler et al., 2002). 
 
                                                 
2.3 ‘Atypical’ employment and social policy preferences 
 
Sociologists such as Beck (2000) and Castells (1996) consider the contemporary labour 
market as ‘fragmented’ and highly ‘insecure’. In this ‘brave new world of work’, 
‘atypical’ forms of employment result in insecure working lives (Beck, 2000) against the 
background of a more information-driven economy (Castells, 1996). Both authors seem 
to agree that the labour market has changed from a Fordistic one with standard 
employment forms, to a post-Fordistic labour market with an increased demand for 
flexibility. According to them, these developments threaten the job security of individual 
workers. Several studies, indeed, found a negative correlation between ‘atypical’ 
employment and perceptions of job security (see, for example, Clark and Postel-Vinay, 
2005; De Witte and Näswall, 2003; Green, 2003). But what are the consequences of 
‘atypical employment for social policy preferences?   
 
In general, the social security system provides ‘shelter’ for people in need. Following the 
line of reasoning based on self-interest, prior research demonstrates that particularly 
insecure people will demand social protection. Therefore, a number of commentators 
have posited that economic insecurity is one of the main explanations why social systems 
exist (see, for example, Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Rodrik, 1997; Katzenstein, 1985). 
They argue that economic insecurity leads to a political demand for social protection. 
While research has emphasized a link between de-industrialization and welfare state 
expansion (Iversen and Cusack, 2000) or between economic openness and welfare state 
spending (Rodrik, 1997), the effects of labour flexibility for the individual demands for 
social security are not clear yet. This is puzzling, because flexibilization is an important 
feature of the ‘modern’ labour market and might well be expected to have off-setting 
implications for support for social security.           
 
The connection between labour flexibility and social policy preferences may work 
through the factors ‘self interest’ and community feeling, as two important determinants 
of support for social security. The first determinant relates to individual economic 
motives, while the second one relates to affective and moral grounds for support (Van 
 
Oorschot and Komter, 1998). Looking at ‘atypical’ employment, it has become common 
ground that ‘atypical’ workers are less job-secure than other workers50, because of the 
predetermined duration of the contract. Relating to social security, this lack of job 
security can be countered by a social arrangement associated with the risk of job loss. 
While it is a well-established fact that class is related to welfare state opinions (Svallfors, 
1997), job insecurity is an innovative variable in understanding people’s attitudes. 
Another aspect of insecurity at work is employment security. While job insecurity relates 
to insecurity in the present job, employment insecurity relates to insecurity about finding 
another job in case of job loss. Based on the results of previous research, I expect that 
‘atypical’ workers experience less job security. Second, I suppose that ‘atypical’ workers 
also experience less employment security, because they receive less training possibilities 
by employers (Eurostat, 2004). Furthermore, having to work for relatively short periods 
does not allow them to develop their skills and credentials. This relation between 
‘atypical’ work and employment security has not been explored in previous analyses.  
Furthermore, I will look for significant differences in perceived insecurity among 
‘atypical’ workers in times of rising unemployment. It is possible that perceived risks 
associated with flexible work only become fully apparent under such conditions (Remery 
et al., 2002). During economic downturn and rising unemployment, ‘atypical’ workers 
are probably more vulnerable, for example, due to shorter dismissal procedures compared 
to ‘regular’ employees. In the context of the Netherlands, the years 2002-2004 can be 
described as a pronounced period of economic decline and rising unemployment51. After 
economic growth fell below the EU-average from 2000, the effect on the job market was 
delayed, with unemployment reaching a peak in the period 2002-2004. While it is true 
that unemployment in the Netherlands continually remained below the EU-average, the 
increase in unemployment in this period was many times greater (see figure 2.4). Much is 
unclear regarding the position of flexible workers on the job market in times of declining 
economic growth and rising unemployment (Remery et al., 2002). I expect that flexible 
workers perceive more job insecurity during periods of high unemployment, because 
50 Although some authors find no correlation (Böckerman, 2004). 
51 More recently, from the beginning of 2009, the Dutch economy has again witnessed a strong economic 
decline and rising unemployment level due to the international financial crisis. 
 
                                                 
companies usually vary their use of flexible labour due to economic fluctuations and 
changes in market demands (cf. Reilly, 1998). 
 
Figure 2.4 Level of unemployment, EU and the Netherlands, 1998-2006   
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Source: Eurostat; see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
Turning to the issue of social policy preferences, one can expect that people with higher 
levels of job or employment insecurity are, based on self-interest, more inclined to 
support social policies. To date, the implications of job and employment insecurity for 
policy preferences are an unstudied area of research. Furthermore, it can be expected that 
the (possible) links between insecurities at work and social policy preferences are most 
obvious with regard to unemployment related regulations. Therefore, my first two 
hypotheses are:   
Hypothesis 1a: Workers with flexible employment contracts experience lower 
levels of job and employment security than other workers.  
Hypothesis 1b: Workers with flexible employment contracts experience more 
insecurity in periods of rising unemployment. 
Hypothesis 2a: Experiencing job or employment security is negatively related to 
an individual’s support for unemployment benefits. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Experiencing job or employment security is not related to other 
social security programmes (pensions and healthcare). 
 
Other theorists rather stress the impact of labour flexibility on the sense of community 
feeling. In the first chapter of this study, we have seen that there has been an increase in 
workers in flexible employment situations. In his work, Bauman (2001) has underlined 
the precarious character of these flexible work arrangements. He argues that 
‘disconnected’ people are living in a world of constant and overwhelming insecurity. The 
present-day labour market leaves no room for long-term relations and gives rise to an 
‘uncommitted character’. Richard Sennett (1998) also points to this ‘new’ flexible 
character. In the ‘new economy’, mutual commitment, loyalty and long-term goals can no 
longer be pursued; flexible capitalism simply ‘corroses’ some one’s character. In other 
words, the erosion of long-term employment contracts undermines loyalty, trust and the 
sense of belonging to a wider collectivity. In the flexible economy, there is no ‘shared  
fate’ (Sennett, 1998: 147) which makes and understanding of community difficult. 
According to Bauman (2001: 24-25), the flexible labour market ‘(…) feels like a camping 
site which one visits for but a few nights and which one may leave at any moment if the 
comforts on offer are not delivered or found wanting when delivered (…)’. Furthermore, 
this kind of labour holds uncertainties and risks and is expected to be a strong 
‘individualizing force’: ‘It divides instead of uniting, and since there is no telling who 
might wake up in what division, the idea of ‘common interests’ grows ever more 
nebulous and in the end becomes incomprehensible’. While the work of Bauman and 
Sennett is well known, it has not been subject to systematic empirical research. For the 
purpose of this study, the discussion above suggests that ‘atypical’ workers will develop 
less community feeling than other categories of employees. This relation has not been 
examined by others52. Drawing on earlier studies, I also formulate that community 
feeling is an important variable in understanding social policy preferences (Van Oorschot, 
2002). Hence, my third and fourth hypotheses are:  
52 In this study, I refer to the experienced shared connection among citizens of a country. On an 
organizational level, Koster (2005) has shown that ‘atypical’ and permanent workers do not differ in their 
solidarity towards co-workers.    
 
 
                                                 
 Hypothesis 3: Workers with flexible employment contracts report lower levels of 
community feeling than other workers.  
Hypothesis 4: Community feeling is positively related to social security 
programmes (unemployment, pensions and healthcare). 
 
2.4 Data and methods  
 
My analyses are largely based on data from the ‘Labour and Welfare Opinions’ surveys, 
which were collected by the Erasmus University and a research centre at Tilburg 
University in the Netherlands in 2008 and 2006. These surveys contain information on 
the respondent’s labour market statuses and social policy opinions in the Netherlands. 
The 2008 dataset comprises 1.801 valid cases (a response rate of 77%), and the 2006 
dataset 1.972 cases (a response rate of 73.5%). For the analyses presented here, I have 
restricted the two datasets to the employed people of working age (16-64 years). After the 
deletion of the unemployed, retired, students and self-employed, a sample size of 875 
respondents in 2008 and 1.171 respondents in 2006 remained. The data has been 
weighted for gender (only the 2006 survey), age, education and income levels (both 
surveys). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to test the hypotheses.   
 
In addressing the hypotheses 1a, 2a, 2b, 3 and 4, the following central variables will be 
analysed: flexible employment, job security, employment security, community feeling 
and policy preferences. First, flexible employment includes employees with fixed-term 
contracts, agency workers and on-call workers (1); all other jobs are non-flexible, 
including fixed-term jobs that offer the prospect of permanence (0). While I am fully 
aware that flexible workers are not a homogenous group (Giesecke, 2009; Silla et al., 
2005; Connelly and Gallagher, 2004; Gallie et al., 1998), it was statistically not possible 
to distinguish different types of flexible employees. Furthermore, part-time work is not 
classified as flexible employment because this type of employment can no longer be 
considered as ‘atypical’ in the Netherlands (Schulze Buschoff and Protsch, 2008). 
According to Visser (2002: 33), ‘most part-time employees are covered by collective 
 
agreements and most part-time jobs (…) are standard jobs of indeterminate length, 
subject to full dismissal protection’ in the Netherlands. Job security was measured as the 
individual’s perception of the likelihood of remaining employed over the next 12 months: 
‘What is the probability you will lose your job in the next 12 months?’ (1=very high 
chance, 2=high chance, 3=neither high nor low chance, 4= low chance, 5=very low 
chance). I have used one central indicator of employment security. The respondents were 
asked the following question: ‘To what degree do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: I have enough skills and experience to find another job without any 
problem’ (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 
5=strongly agree)53. Community feeling was defined using the statement: ‘For me, 
paying social insurance premiums is something that I also do because I personally 
sympathize with the beneficiaries and their situations’ (1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 
3=agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=totally agree). This seems to be a common indicator for 
community feeling (Van Oorschot, 2002). Policy preferences are established by asking 
the respondents ‘Would you like to see more, the same, or less government spending in 
the case of unemployment/pensions/healthcare? Remember that if you say more, this will 
require an increase in taxation54’ (1=spend much less, 2=spend less, 3=spend the same as 
now, 4=spend more, 5=spend much more). Several statistical control variables are 
included. Job and employment security may be influenced by age, gender, education, 
household income level, ethnicity, sector and locus of control (see Sverke et al., 2006; 
Clark et al., 2005; Ashford et al., 1987). Age is measured using a continuous variable.  
For education I have created two dummy variables: one for secondary general and 
secondary vocational education, and one for higher vocational and university education. 
Workers with lower general and vocational education levels formed the reference 
category. Household income level is measured by using an open survey question, 
whereby people were asked to fill in their net household income. I have created dummy 
variables for ethnicity and sector (1=born outside the Netherlands; 1= working in the 
private sector). The external locus of control was measured by a scale of three items 
(alpha reliability= .77 in 2006, and alpha reliability= .75 in 2008), which focused on a 
53 This measure was only available in the 2008 questionnaire. 
54 In this way, people take the consequences in terms of their own income into account.  
 
                                                 
person’s perception that they have no control over their own personal life (1=totally 
disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=totally agree).  In addition, 
political preference is included as a control factor. In general, it can be expected that 
people on the political left adhere more to the collective than individuals on the right 
(Van Oorschot, 2002) (left/right self-scaling, in which 1=political left, 11=political right).  
 
In order to obtain an accurate impression of the perceptions of security of flexible 
workers during intensified unemployment levels (hypothesis 1b), I make use of the 
employee panel data collected by the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies (OSA 
Arbeidsaanbodpanel) for the years 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. This panel study, held 
once every two years, contains a reasonably representative random sample of those 
members of the Dutch population from the age of 16 up to and including 64 who are not 
in day-time education. The research population is restricted by the focus on workers in 
paid employment. This means that people who are not in search of a job (the ‘voluntary’ 
unemployed), the self-employed and spouses working in family businesses are not 
included. The survey of 2004 also includes school pupils and students in full day-time 
education, as well as people aged 65 and 66. Filtering these groups out of the data set 
makes the 2004 measurement exactly comparable with that of previous years. This 
resulted in the following sample sizes: 3.266 (1998), 2.964 (2000), 3.416 (2002) and 
3.104 (2004).  
 
The panel data file includes a survey question about the job security perceptions of 
employees with a flexible contract and those with a permanent contract. Flexible work is 
central to the analyses. In the OSA-data set, this variable is operationalized through 
employees with a temporary employment contract (with no prospect of permanent 
employment), people working through employment agencies and casual staff. The group 
of permanent employees consists of people with a permanent employment contract and 
those with a temporary contract combined with the prospect of a permanent contract. Job 
insecurity is measured by asking the respondents about the extent to which they expect to 
lose their job in the coming 12 months. The analysis also examines the effects of a 
number of relevant independent variables. As far as possible, I have included identical 
 
control variables in the different empirical tests. However, in estimating job insecurity 
during rising unemployment levels (hypothesis 1b), three other control variables are also 
included. Besides the focus on the economic period, the unemployment history of the 
respondents and functional flexibility (at the individual level) were used as control factors. 
It is generally argued that people with a history of unemployment are more job insecure 
(Campbell et al., 2007) and I will explore if functionally flexible workers are more job-
secure compared to other employees. The expectation is that functionally flexible 
workers can be redeployed more quickly and are therefore more valuable for 
organizations.  
A dummy variable is used to check for the situation in the labour market. The 
period before 2002 functions as a reference in this regard. I will incorporate an 
interaction term in the analyses with the economic period and the type of employment 
contract. The unemployment history of the employees is determined by an item which 
asks whether the respondent was unemployed two years ago. The employees who answer 
no to this question form the reference group. The degree of functional flexibility is 
measured by the question of whether the respondent considers himself/herself to be 
suitable for work within the company which actually belongs to another job profile or 
department. The measurement of the age variable is self-explanatory, while ethnicity and 
sex are used as dummy variables. Respondents born in the Netherlands and male 
respondents function as reference groups. Lastly, the level of education is measured as 
the highest level achieved up to a maximum of VBO/MAVO (lower secondary; reference 
category), and the categories MBO/HAVO/VWO (middle/senior secondary) and 
HBO/WO (higher). To shed light on hypothesis 1b, logistic regression analysis was 
conducted on the pooled data sets 1998-2004.  
 
2.5 Results 
 
Table 2.1, table 2.2 and table 2.3 display the statistical results.   
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Support for spending on social security programmes (2008) 
 Job 
security 
Employment 
security 
Community 
feeling 
Unemployment Pensions Health 
care 
Type of 
contract 
(1=flexible) 
-.28*** .01 -.00 -.02 -.00 -.02 
Age (actual 
age) 
-.09** -.12** .14*** .07* .07 .09* 
Education 
(ref=lower 
general and 
vocational 
education) 
      
Secondary 
general and 
secondary 
vocational 
-.12** .04 -.07 -.09* -.01 -.00 
Higher 
vocational 
and 
university 
education 
-.05 .10* -.06 -.16** -.21*** -.12* 
Gender 
(1=female) 
-.06 -.07 -.02 .00 .05 .04 
Sector 
(1=private) 
-.08* .02 -.02 -.09* -.02 -.10** 
Ethnicity 
(1=born 
outside 
Netherlands) 
-.08* -.02 -.05 .01 .04 .05 
Net 
household 
income 
.01 -.06 -.02 -.12** -.03 -.04 
External 
locus of 
control 
-.13*** -.17*** .03 -.04 .10** -.02 
Political   -.26*** -.14*** .01 -.09* 
 
preference 
(1=political 
left, 
11=right) 
Job security   -.10** -.08* -.02 -.04 
Employment 
security 
  .02 .03 .05 .04 
Community 
feeling 
   .25*** .08* .06 
N 782 772 747 707 712 712 
Adjusted R² .11 .05 .10 .15 .06 .04 
Significant coefficients (standardized effects): 
*** P < .001 
** P <.01 
* P <.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Support for spending on social security programmes (2006) 
 Job 
security 
Community 
feeling 
Unemployment Pensions Health  
care 
Type of 
contract 
(1=flexible) 
-.34*** .02 .03 .07 .03 
Age (actual 
age) 
-.01 .20*** .12*** .05 .06 
Education 
(ref=lower 
general and 
vocational 
education) 
     
Secondary 
general and 
secondary 
vocational 
.03 -.01 -.05 -.05 -.09* 
Higher 
vocational 
and 
university 
education 
.07 .02 -.05 -.15** -.09 
Gender 
(1=female) 
-.05 -.04 .02 .02 .04 
Sector 
(1=private) 
-.05 -.02 -.06 -.02 -.01 
Ethnicity 
(1=born 
outside 
Netherlands) 
-.02 .00 -.01 -.01 -.02 
Net 
household 
income 
.04 .04 .01 -.04 -.00 
External 
locus of 
control 
-.16*** .01 .05 .10** .12** 
Political  -.27*** -.16*** -.01 -.00 
 
preference 
(1=political 
left, 
11=right) 
Job security  -.01 -.15*** .02 -.01 
Community 
feeling 
  .22*** .06 .12** 
N 942 844 811 819 816 
Adjusted R² .14 .13 .17 .02 .03 
Significant coefficients (standardized effects): 
*** P < .001 
** P <.01 
* P <.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Estimated parameters (odds ratios) for the probability of perceived job 
insecurity, 1998-2004 
Independent variables   
Constant 0.02** 
Age ns 
Sex (1=female) ns 
Education (ref.cat=lo, VBO/MAVO) 
[lower] 
 
-MBO [middle/senior] 0.73** 
-HBO/WO [higher] 0.62** 
Unemployed two years earlier ns 
Functionally flexible ns 
Type of contract (1=flexible) 9.65** 
Sector (1=public) 0.67* 
Period (1= after 2002) 1.62** 
Period X type of contract ns 
 
-2Log Likelihood 3718.04 
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.08 
N 12.459 
** P <.01 
* P <.05 
ns  not significant 
 
The tables show that ‘atypical’ workers experience significant lower levels of job security 
compared to other workers.  This is an expected result and confirms the first part of 
hypothesis one. In table 2.1, I see that ‘atypical’ workers do not experience lower levels 
of employment security which does not confirm the second part of my expectation. In 
other words, ‘atypical’ employment is related to perceptions of job security but is no 
issue in understanding employment security. From a theoretical point of view, short-term 
labour relationships seem to be connected with short-term risks. An interpretation is that 
 
the risk of job loss may appear within the near future, while the risk of not getting another 
job is something that lies further ahead and is for ‘atypical’ workers a thing not yet to 
worry about. Furthermore, the tables also show that an external locus of control is 
consistently associated with lower perceived job security. Hypothesis 2a is also partly 
confirmed. As expected, job security is negatively related to support for unemployment 
related spending. However, employment security is not significant in explaining 
preferences towards unemployment spending. This may (again) be due to the fact that 
people give higher value to immediate risks instead of risks that take place in the future 
(see the discussion of the ‘endowment effect’ in paragraph 1.2.3). Hypothesis 2b seems to 
be validated: insecurities at work are not associated with opinions on other areas of social 
security, such as pensions and health care. Generally, younger people, higher educated, 
people at the political right and workers with an internal locus of control have lower 
demands for social spending.           
 Accordingly, the type of contract proves to be no important factor in explaining 
community feeling. This implies that, contrary to the assumptions of Bauman and Sennett, 
the level of community feeling is not eroding among ‘atypical’ workers. Age (older 
people) and political preference (people at the left) are important factors in shaping (more) 
community feeling. Overall, the third hypothesis must be rejected. An interesting finding 
is the negative correlation between perceptions of job security and community feeling in 
one of the two surveys. This means that community feeling may also be shaped by 
rational motives; job-secure individuals develop less community feeling. To be more 
precise, community feeling is thus not simply a matter of total altruism.  
 Finally, community feeling is, as predicted, closely related to support for social 
spending. This supports the fourth hypothesis.   
 
Table 2.3 also shows that people in flexible employment clearly have a higher probability 
of experiencing job insecurity in their own individual perception. Significant effects were 
also found for level of education (more highly educated respondents experience less job 
insecurity), sector (employees in the private sector experience greater job insecurity), and 
period (job insecurity increases in the period after 2002). No significant effects were 
found for the variables age, sex, experience of unemployment two years previously, and 
 
degree of functional flexibility. The interaction term was found to be not significant. This 
means that the probability of job insecurity for flexible workers does not increase during 
times of economic decline and rising unemployment, a finding that does not support 
hypothesis 1b. This result may demonstrate that employees with flexible labour contracts 
are more likely to experience job insecurity and unemployment in the beginning of 
economic downturn but, at the same time, they have the highest changes to become 
employed again when the economy starts recovering. In the end, the economic situation 
plays no significant role for perceptions of insecurity among this category of workers.  
 
2.6 Conclusions and discussion 
 
Drawing on different surveys in the Netherlands, this chapter has examined how people 
experience risks at work in a flexible economy. The central question is what the effects of 
flexible labour arrangements are for policy preferences. While labour market flexibility is 
an important feature of advanced capitalist societies, the implications for social policy 
preferences have yet to be studied. This research contributes to this lacuna. In the 
empirical part, I have found that ‘atypical’ workers are more likely to experience job 
insecurity than other workers. This perception of job insecurity is systematically related 
to more support for unemployment-related insurance. Turning to community feeling, 
another determinant of policy-support, ‘atypical’ workers do not develop less attachment 
to others. The analysis did reveal that perceptions of job insecurity may partly contribute 
to higher levels of community feeling. In this view, community feeling is partly a 
function of self-interest. Furthermore, the analysis, ranging from 1998 to 2004, shows 
that flexible workers have a higher probability of experiencing job insecurity, but this 
effect is independent of the social-economic context. 
 In short, in a flexible labour market there will be a stronger preference for 
unemployment-related spending. This preference is linked to higher perceptions of job 
insecurity and, more indirectly, through a stronger sense of community feeling. If we 
consider that public opinion is an important component in policy-making (Brooks and 
Manza, 2006), we may expect the introduction of (new) ways of finding a balance 
 
between flexibility and security across flexible economies. The current quest for 
‘flexicurity’ (Wilthagen, 2008) corroborates this argument55.   
 
2.6.1 Limitations of the study 
While these analyses give insight into how ‘atypical’ employment affects social policy 
preferences, more studies over time are needed to validate the statements. Another 
interesting point for future research is investigating different types of ‘atypical’ workers 
in more detail. For example, it can be argued that temporary workers are less insecure 
compared to on-call workers because they hold contracts of longer duration. Furthermore, 
this study has been conducted in the specific Dutch context. In the Netherlands, flexible 
workers are less protected in comparison to ‘regular’ employees (Vis et al., 2008). In 
countries with more generous protection systems for flexible workers, such as in several 
Nordic countries, it is likely that flexible workers experience smaller levels of insecurity 
at work. At the same time, in some Southern-European countries like Spain, flexible 
workers seem to be locked in an insecure employment situation (Polavieja, 2005: 252). 
Therefore, these workers may experience more insecurity at work compared to Dutch 
flexible workers. Clearly, more research is required to explore the outcomes across 
different institutional contexts.     
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3 FUNCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES56  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the impact of functionally flexible work on social policy preferences is 
assessed. While functional flexibility has become more important in most European 
countries, this type of flexibility is assumed to affect risk, community feeling and, as a 
consequence, social policy preferences in contradictory ways.  
 
In studies of workplace change, there is consistent evidence that labour flexibility is an 
important feature of the contemporary labour market (Kalleberg, 2009). For ‘atypical’ 
workers, many commentators have addressed the issue of rising employment instability 
and growing job insecurity in modern labour markets (Heery and Salmon, 2000; Gorz, 
1999; Sennett, 1998; Castells, 1996). However, working in the modern labour market 
also brings certain risks with regard to competences. In Ulrich Beck’s view, we are now 
living in a ‘risk society’, in which skills and knowledge are increasingly becoming 
obsolete (Beck, 2000:3). In this flexible economy, having multiple skills has become an 
important asset when it comes to staying in employment (Schmid, 2006; Collins, 2006). 
A key concern for employees is being able to continuously improve their (flexible) skills 
in order to remain employed. ‘Functional flexibility’ is one type of labour flexibility that 
could help employees to manage labour market risks. Functional flexibility involves new 
work practices, such as job rotation, task rotation, job enlargement, job enrichment and 
(semi-autonomous) team working, and emphasizes the development of multiple skills 
among employees. Clearly, this type of flexibility has the potential to lessen labour 
market risks.  
Even though many studies have examined the consequences of labour flexibility 
for how employees experience risk at work, most have looked at ‘atypical’ employment 
and ‘internal’ job security (see, for example, De Cuyper and De Witte, 2006; De Witte 
and Näswall, 2003). Studies that examine the relationship between functional flexibility 
56 A different version of this chapter has been published as: Dekker, F. (2010). Labour flexibility, risks and 
the welfare state, Economic & Industrial Democracy, 31(4): 593-611. 
 
                                                 
and different aspects of job security are, however, largely missing from the literature. The 
first aim of this chapter is therefore to examine the consequences of functional flexibility 
on employees’ experiences of security in the internal and external labour markets.  
 
Many political economists assume that job insecurity plays an important role in 
understanding social policy preferences (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). Social security 
programmes generally compensate for certain risks, thereby protecting individuals in a 
society. At an individual level, one might expect work-insecure people to have strong 
incentives for supporting broad social programmes. However, there is little empirical 
evidence with regard to the relationship between job security and individual perceptions 
of social security. The second aim of this chapter is therefore to focus on the specific link 
between security at work and the societal legitimacy of various policy arrangements. 
Although it is generally assumed that economic insecurity affects the need for social 
protection (Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1997; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Burgoon, 2001), 
at an individual level, this remains an open empirical question.  
 
Another key issue, when considering the relationship between functional flexibility and 
social policy preferences, is the idea of community feeling. I will examine whether 
functionally flexible work patterns affect individuals’ sense of community, which is an 
important reason for supporting social security arrangements (Van Oorschot, 2002a). 
Although the literature does provide us with several arguments concerning the possible 
effects of functionally flexible work on community feeling, to date, little empirical 
research has been undertaken.  
 
Overall, this chapter demonstrates how functionally flexible employees perceive different 
forms of security, and how their sense of community feeling has either increased or 
decreased in the contemporary labour market. Furthermore, this study helps to explain 
support for various forms of social protection in the new flexible working economy. 
Before introducing the data and results, I start by providing an overview of relevant 
theories on functionally flexible work and social policy preferences.  
 
 
3.2 Functional flexibility and social policy preferences  
 
It is generally agreed that the experience of working in the post-industrial economy is 
considerably different from past experiences of work. For a start, there has been a shift in 
the employment structure from manufacturing towards a service economy (see, for 
example, ILO, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1993), and employment relations have become 
more flexible (see, for example, Dekker, 2007; Auer and Cazes, 2003). Nowadays, 
people’s working lives are often characterized by ‘atypical’ forms of employment such as 
temporary contracts, agency work and part-time employment57. Another feature of 
working in the contemporary labour market is the growing need to offer multiple skills. 
Functionally flexible work practices can be extremely important when it comes to dealing 
with changing conditions in a more global economy. New flexible work arrangements, 
such as job rotation, task rotation and team working, are therefore increasingly being 
used in most European countries (OECD, 1999)58. In 2005, for example, 47% of all 
employees in the EU engaged in task rotation with colleagues, while 60% did part or all 
of their work in teams. Task rotation requires people to perform some tasks that lie 
outside the scope of their main jobs, while team working implies that more discretion is 
left to team members. Job rotation is another form of functional flexibility, and involves 
an employee moving from one position to another within an organization.  
I focus on the Netherlands on the grounds that the Dutch are some of the most 
flexible workers in Europe. As in many European countries, particularly due to the 
growing internationalization of labour and capital since the beginning of the 1970s, 
flexible labour has become a central feature of the Dutch labour market (De Jong, 2008). 
Regarding functional flexibility, approximately 62% of all Dutch workers engage in task 
rotation with colleagues, and approximately 75% participate in teams. Functional 
flexibility seems to be characteristic for different groups of people, although Dutch 
57 Taking the EU as a whole, 14.5% of the total workforce had limited duration contracts, while 
approximately 18% of the employees considered themselves to be employed on a part-time basis in 2007. 
58 Job enrichment and job enlargement are other characteristics of functional flexibility. However, the 
comparative surveys available contain no specific questions that relate to these two types of functional 
flexibility.  
 
 
                                                 
statistics show that men and persons aged above 25 years have a higher chance of 
working functionally flexible (see the figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.1 Working functionally flexible in the Netherlands, 2006 (age groups) 
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Source: Dutch Institute for Labour Studies (OSA, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.2 Working functionally flexible in the Netherlands, 2006 (education level) 
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Figure 3.3 Working functionally flexible in the Netherlands, 2006 (gender) 
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3.2.1 Functional flexibility, risk and social policy preferences 
It is widely agreed that social security policies embody some kind of solidarity between 
(future) recipients of benefits and people who are less dependent on social programmes. 
At an individual level, people can have different motives for contributing to such 
programmes. People may be motivated by self-interest, or by feelings of moral or 
emotional commitment to others (Van Oorschot, 2002a; 2002b; Van Oorschot and 
Komter, 1998). As previously noted, research that examines the implications of 
functional flexibility for social policy preferences is largely missing from the literature.  
I expect that functionally flexible workers experience more security at work than 
other workers. While most scholars focus on perceptions of internal job security among 
‘atypical’ workers, I will focus on functionally flexible workers and differentiate between 
two types of security: company-specific or ‘job security’, and ‘employment security’, 
which is the possibility of finding a job across a company. As suggested in the 
introduction, functionally flexible work practices may counter the risk of skill 
obsolescence. Authors such as Forrier and Sels (2003) and Kanter (1993; 1991) stress the 
importance of so-called ‘employability-security’ as a new form of security in ‘modern’ 
labour markets. According to these authors, the idea of ‘lifetime employment’ is being 
replaced with the notion of ‘flexible employment’. Nowadays, so-called post-Fordist 
regimes are characterized by flexible career structures and people can no longer expect to 
 
have a stable, predictable career within the same organization. In this view, workers are 
operating in a more unpredictable labour market and employability may provide them 
with a new form of job security (Forrier and Sels, 2003). In other words, people can no 
longer rely on organizations to provide them with traditional job security: ‘jobs for life’ 
are said to have disappeared and skills are becoming obsolete. Workers are increasingly 
reliant upon being able to offer multiple skills; that is, their employability (Kanter, 1993). 
One way to ensure ‘employability-security’ in the modern labour market is by creating 
challenging jobs and allowing employees to engage in assignment rotation (Kanter, 1991). 
The development of functionally flexible jobs could offer employees opportunities for 
acquiring multiple skills. As such, workers would be able to exercise more control over 
their work than in the past. Greater emphasis would be placed on problem-solving and 
undertaking different tasks and roles within an organization, encouraging employees to 
develop different skills.  
While some remain sceptical about functional flexibility and point to the possible 
exploitation of employees by employers (Hyman, 2004) or the ‘time-greedy’ nature of 
the high-performance workplace (Van Echtelt, 2007), functional flexibility does have the 
potential to offer employees new ‘employability-security’ in the labour market. This 
would mean that functionally flexible workers would experience more job security than 
workers without flexible job features59. Theoretically, functional flexibility can provide 
workers with multiple skills, which is related to perceptions of increased job security. 
Although the empirical evidence is scarce, a recent study by Kashefi (2007) shows that, 
in the United States, employees who are functionally flexible experience higher levels of 
job security in general. Again, my research distinguishes between two types of job 
security: ‘job security’ and ‘employment security’. I would expect functionally flexible 
work practices to be associated with increased feelings of security at work in both senses. 
First, functionally flexible workers are more adaptable in their response to demands and 
are therefore more valuable to organizations. Such workers would be unlikely to believe 
that they would be made redundant in the near future. Second, these workers are also 
59 One might consider the possibility of reverse causation here, by which job-secure workers might be more 
willing to participate in functionally flexible work practices. According to Smith (1999), however, there is 
no empirical evidence to support this assertion.  
 
 
                                                 
likely to feel more secure in the external labour market, because enhancing their 
knowledge and skills is likely to cause them to feel more ‘‘marketable’’. This, in turn, 
leads to my first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Functionally flexible workers experience higher levels of job and 
employment security than other workers.  
 
Several authors argue that social arrangements must be legitimized by the public to 
remain sustainable (see, for example, Burstein, 1998). An important motivational 
foundation of support for social security is self-interest (see, for example, Hechter, 1987). 
The basic idea is that there is a direct relationship between someone’s position in the 
stratification structure and support for social policy. Following this self-interested 
perspective, I would not expect secure workers to be likely beneficiaries of social security 
protection. In other words, people who are not facing labour market risks, such as 
unemployment, are unlikely to protect themselves by preferring social insurance. 
Building on this logic, I hypothesize that this is especially true with regard to 
unemployment benefits spending. Particularly this social policy scheme reduces the risk 
of unemployment, while insecurity at work is less significantly related to welfare 
programmes which are not aimed to the importance of income protection during working 
life, such as pensions or healthcare. The macro level research indeed indicates that 
economic insecurity affects public spending (Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1997; Iversen 
and Cusack, 2000; Burgoon, 2001). At the individual level, meanwhile, some studies 
provide information on specific labour market-risks and policy preferences. Cusack et al. 
(2006), Kramer and Stephenson (2001) and Iversen and Soskice (2001) point out that 
working in occupations with higher unemployment rates and the level of skill specificity 
spurs support for government redistribution60. Nevertheless, with these few exceptions, 
the micro level picture remains largely unstudied (see, for example, Scheve and Slaughter, 
60 See, for a critique on Iversen and Soskice, Emmenegger (2009). 
 
                                                 
2004), as does, in particular, the relationship between individuals’ insecurities about their 
jobs and policy preferences61. This, in turn, leads to two further hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Experiencing job or employment security is negatively related to an 
individual’s support for unemployment benefits. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Experiencing job or employment security is not related to an individual’s 
support for other social security programmes (pensions and healthcare). 
 
3.2.2 Functional flexibility, sense of community and social policy preferences 
Another factor that can explain support for social security is having a sense of community, 
or moral sentiments. Although individual support is most strongly affected by perceived 
self-interest (Van Oorschot, 2002a; 2002b), the experience of community is also a 
relevant predictor (Van Oorschot, 2002a; 2002b; Van Oorschot and Komter, 1998). This 
type of motivation is grounded in Durkheim’s classical approach to sociology (Durkheim, 
1964), which suggests that people feel an obligation to serve the collective interest. 
Particularly a perceived connection with others spurs solidaristic behaviour (Polletta and 
Jasper, 2001).  
Functional flexibility may improve the likelihood of people feeling a sense of 
community. In contrast to ‘atypical’ employment, functional flexibility concerns internal 
flexibility within organizations. Both Amoore (2002) and Ezzy (2001) argue that 
functional flexibility has brought more individual responsibility and an increasing shift 
towards self-management and individual performance (Amoore, 2002), making people 
less committed to others. However, most of the literature states that functional flexibility 
requires workers to cooperate and communicate more to achieve mutual goals than was 
the case in ‘traditional’ Taylorist organizations (Vogl., 2009; European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007a; Hempell and Zwick, 2005). 
While ‘Taylorism’ includes no extensive job-learning opportunities and a high technical 
division of labour, functional flexibility has its emphasis rather on the learning 
61 However, several other studies take ‘class position’ as factor in work on policy preferences (see, for 
example, Svallfors, 2003; 1997; 1995). 
 
                                                 
possibilities for employees and common goals. I therefore assume that working in a so-
called ‘holistic’ organization62 (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000) enhances an employee’s 
sense of belonging to a wider collectivity; people may learn more about co-workers and 
their work and experience more collective tasks and needs than other categories of 
workers. In other words, it can be expected that working in a functionally flexible work 
environment creates a sense of community feeling. I will call this the ‘integration 
scenario’:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Functionally flexible workers report higher levels of community feeling 
than other workers.  
 
Because previous research has shown that community feeling is positively related to 
support for social security arrangements, I also assume that community feeling positively 
affects individual support for different social security programmes: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Community feeling is positively related to an individual’s support for 
social security programmes (unemployment, pensions and healthcare). 
 
3.3 Data and methods 
 
The data in this study were drawn from the ‘Labour and Welfare Opinions’ survey, which 
were collected by the Erasmus University and a research centre at Tilburg University in 
the Netherlands in May and June 2008. This data set concerns a random sample of the 
Dutch population aged 16 and over. The sample comprises 1.801 valid cases, which 
corresponds to a response rate of 77%. After inactive people (the unemployed, students 
and retired workers) and the self-employed have been excluded from the sample63, the 
survey contains data on 875 respondents. The data have been weighted against figures 
from Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, or CBS). After weighting 
62 The ‘holistic’ organization is defined by a lower task specialization among workers, featuring job  
rotation, integration of tasks and learning across tasks (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). 
63 In explaining self-perceived job security, these groups are not included because they are not employed by 
organizations. 
 
                                                 
for age, education and income levels, the dataset can be considered representative for the 
Netherlands.  
 
The first step of the analysis was to test the hypotheses concerning functional flexibility 
and perceived security at work. Functional flexibility was measured using two single 
items, task rotation and job rotation, which cover important forms of functional 
flexibility64. Unfortunately, no items were dedicated to teamwork, job enlargement and 
job enrichment in the questionnaire. I measured task rotation by asking employees how 
often they had been shifted towards tasks that lay outside their own job descriptions 
during the last 12 months (1=never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=very often). Job 
rotation was measured by asking how often they had been shifted between jobs during the 
last 12 months (1=never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4=often, 5=very often). Job and 
employment security are defined as an individual assessment of an employment situation. 
While perceived insecurity may not reflect actual risks, ‘subjective insecurity’ is at least 
as severe as ‘objective insecurity’ (Lazarus, 1991). Job security was measured as the 
individual’s perception of the likelihood of remaining employed over the next 12 months: 
‘What is the probability you will lose your job in the next 12 months?’ (1=very high 
chance, 2=high chance, 3=neither high nor low chance, 4= low chance, 5=very low 
chance). I used one central indicator of employment security. The respondents were 
asked the following question: ‘To what degree do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: I have enough skills and experience to find another job without any 
problem’ (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 
5=strongly agree).  
 With regard to perceived job and employment security, several control variables 
were included in the analysis. I included flexible employment, because ‘atypical’ workers 
feel less secure than other workers (De Witte and Näswall, 2003). Furthermore, ‘atypical’ 
workers have a lower chance of working functionally flexible (OSA, 2006). The measure 
consists of employees with fixed-term contracts, agency workers and on-call workers (1); 
all other jobs are non-flexible, including fixed-term jobs that offer the prospect of 
64 These two items were factor-analyzed, which resulted in one factor accounting for 67% of the variance. 
However, the low number of items is not sufficient for producing a reliable scale (alpha: 0.50).  
 
 
                                                 
permanence (0). I included age as a control variable because levels of perceived job 
security might differ among age groups. Previous research has shown that older 
employees experience higher levels of job insecurity (Hartley, Jacobsen, Klandermans 
and Van Vuuren, 1991). Age was measured using a continuous variable. I anticipated that 
a person’s level of education might also be associated with perceptions of job security 
(Sverke, Hellgren and Näswall, 2006). I thus created two dummy variables: one for 
secondary general and secondary vocational education, and one for higher vocational and 
university education. Workers with lower general and vocational education levels formed 
the reference category. Gender is another factor that may influence perceptions of 
security at work, but this remains a point of debate (Sverke, Hellgren and Näswall, 2006). 
A dummy variable was used to measure gender (1=female). An individual’s sector was 
included, because working in the private sector decreases the likelihood of job security 
(Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005) (1=working in the private sector). I have created a 
dummy variable for ethnicity to determine whether immigrant workers feel more insecure 
(1=born outside the Netherlands). Furthermore, I was interested in the influence of 
household income levels on job security. One might expect people living in households 
with higher income levels to feel less insecure (Sverke, Hellgren and Näswall, 2006). The 
variable was measured using an open survey question, whereby people were asked to fill 
in their net household income. As for benefit dependency, I assumed that people who had 
received no social security transfers in the past were more work-secure than workers with 
a history of receiving benefits (1=received no benefit(s) in the past). Finally, one would 
expect people who feel that they have no control over their lives to be more insecure 
(Ashford, Lee and Bobko, 1987). This external locus of control was measured by a scale 
of three items (alpha reliability= .75), which focused on a person’s perception that they 
have no control over their own personal life (1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree nor 
disagree, 4=agree, 5=totally agree).  
 
In the next step of the analysis, I tested the hypotheses on community feeling. 
Community feeling was defined using the statement: ‘For me, paying social insurance 
premiums is something that I also do because I personally sympathize with the 
beneficiaries and their situations’ (1=totally disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree nor disagree, 
 
4=agree, 5=totally agree). Although the notion of ‘community feeling’ can be defined in 
various ways (McMillan and Chavis George, 1986), the measure seems to be common in 
research on attitudes to social security (see, for example, Van Oorschot, 2002a; 2002b). 
In addition to the other control variables, I have included political preference as a control 
factor. In general, it can be expected that people on the political left adhere more to the 
collective than individuals on the right (Van Oorschot, 2002a) (left/right self-scaling, in 
which 1=political left, 11=political right).  
To capture support for different social security programmes, the survey contained 
questions on support for unemployment benefits spending, pensions and healthcare. The 
following question was asked: ‘Would you like to see more, the same, or less government 
spending in the case of unemployment/pensions/healthcare? Remember that if you say 
more, this will require an increase in taxation’ (1=spend much less, 2=spend less, 
3=spend the same as now, 4=spend more, 5=spend much more). All effects were 
calculated using multiple regression models65. 
 
3.4 Results  
 
In table 3.1, the results of multivariate regression analyses are presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 Another way of investigating causal relationships is via ‘linear structural relations systems’ (LISREL). 
However, as long as all assumptions are met, path analysis is assumed to be accurate for recursive models 
(cf. Tacq, 1997). The data shows that all statistical assumptions are met. Only one outcome variable (job 
security) is skewed to the left. This seems to be a common problem when using self-reporting questions to 
measure security at work (De Witte, 2005; Steijn, 2000).    
 
 
                                                 
Table 3.1: Support for spending on social security programmes (2008) 
Dependent variable Job security Employment 
security 
Commu- 
nity 
feeling 
Unemploy- 
ment  
Pensions Health-
care 
Explanatory variables       
       
Task rotation -0.025 0.183*** -0.056 0.020 0.025 0.010 
Job rotation -0.018 0.075* 0.013 -0.015 0.046 0.023 
Type of contract 
(1=flexible) 
-0.288*** 0.006 0.019 -0.023 -0.011 -0.025 
Age (actual age) -0.079* -0.102** 0.154*** 0.075* 0.075 0.099* 
Education (ref=lower 
general and vocational 
education) 
      
Secondary general and 
secondary vocational 
-0.107* 0.021 -0.036 -0.101* -0.013 -0.006 
Higher vocational and 
university education 
-0.045 0.104* -0.038 -0.165*** -0.211*** -0.123* 
Gender (1=female) -0.068 -0.052 -0.024 0.009 0.061 0.043 
Sector (1=private) -0.069 0.025 -0.015 -0.095* -0.016 -0.103* 
Ethnicity (1=born 
outside Netherlands) 
-0.082* -0.021 -0.043 0.015 0.043 0.051 
Net household income 0.021 -0.065 -0.031 -0.119*** -0.037 -0.045 
Benefit dependency 
(1=no dependency) 
0.132*** 0.066 0.018 -0.013 0.034 0.046 
External locus of 
control  
-0.126*** -0.169*** 0.026 -0.044 0.102** -0.020 
Political preference 
(1=political left, 
11=right) 
  -0.253*** -0.141*** 0.013 -0.098* 
Job security    -0.084* -0.022 -0.051 
Employment security    0.031 0.039 0.041 
Community feeling    0.260*** 0.089* 0.067 
N 782 772 775 707 712 712 
Adjusted R-squared .12 .10 .09 .15 .06 .04 
Significant coefficients (standardized effects): 
*** P <0.001; ** P <0.01; * P <0.05 
 
 
In line with the first hypothesis, functionally flexible workers find themselves more 
‘employable’ in the external labour market, but there is no effect on their future career 
expectations in the internal labour market. A possible explanation is that these workers 
experience that functionally flexible work practices are primarily designed to make them 
more capable of switching between jobs, but has little to do with security in the internal 
labour market. Thus, this hypothesis is partly confirmed. Other significant predictors are 
type of contract (people with ‘atypical’ employment contracts feel less secure in their 
current jobs), age (older people feel less secure in the internal and external labour 
markets) and education (individuals who have completed secondary general and 
secondary vocational education feel less secure in their jobs than people with lower 
educational levels, a result that is somewhat unexpected). One possible explanation for 
this latter finding is that less well-educated workers have already accepted that they are 
more vulnerable in the internal labour market, as a way of coping with the situation. In 
addition, we found the following: individuals with higher vocational and university 
qualifications feel more secure in the external labour market; individuals who were born 
outside the Netherlands experience more job insecurity; not being dependent on benefits 
has a positive impact on an individual’s perception of their job security; and individuals 
with an external locus of control feel more insecure in both labour markets. In general, 
the findings on ‘job security’ are consistent with earlier observations. The most 
interesting finding is that functional flexibility is associated with a specific form of 
perceived security at work.  
With regard to the second and third hypotheses, I see that feelings of security at 
work are not related to individual support for welfare spending in the case of pensions or 
healthcare. These results thus support the third hypothesis. I also find that job security has 
a significant and expected effect on support for unemployment spending, in line with my 
second hypothesis. However, employment security does not affect support for 
unemployment spending. This result implies that different types of job security must be 
included in studies that explain people’s opinions on welfare spending. In previous 
research into economic insecurity and policy preferences, different forms of job security 
were not linked to support for different aspects of social security. 
 
 I now turn to the effects of functional flexibility on community feeling. The 
results show that the level of community feeling does not increase when individuals are 
functionally flexible; hypothesis four is thus rejected. In other words, there is no 
empirical evidence to support the notion that working in ‘holistic’ or integrative work 
settings is associated with a heightened sense of community feeling66. Older people show 
higher levels of community feeling, while individuals on the right of the political 
spectrum show lower levels of identification with others. Van Oorschot (2002a; 2002b) 
found similar results.  
 The results also show that community feeling is a significant source of motivation 
for supporting social security arrangements, although support for healthcare spending is 
significant at the 10%-level (not shown). This means that my last hypothesis is confirmed, 
in line with the existing literature. The data also reveal the effects of age (older people are 
more inclined to support social security spending in most policy areas); education (more 
highly-educated individuals show lower levels of support for unemployment, pensions 
and healthcare); sector (private sector workers show less support for spending in the areas 
of unemployment and healthcare); household income (higher net household income 
levels negatively affect support for spending on unemployment benefits); locus of control 
(individuals with an external locus of control are more in favour of spending in the case 
of pensions); and political preference (people on the political right are less inclined to 
support spending on unemployment and healthcare). These results are in accordance with 
the findings of earlier studies on attitudes towards welfare state policies (see, for example, 
Yang and Barrett, 2006; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Shivo and Uusitalo, 1995; 
Pettersen, 1995). 
 
3.5 Conclusions and discussion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the impact of functional flexibility on job and 
employment security, levels of community feeling and social policy preferences. 
Although these links have been widely discussed in the literature, very little empirical 
66 Using another measure (‘I regard it as a moral duty towards the less well-off in society’) produces similar 
results. 
 
 
                                                 
research exists to support such discussions. Based on the analyses in this part of the study 
as well as the findings in chapter two, the results now show that job security is related to 
the type of employment contract, while employment security is related to functional 
flexibility. At a theoretical level, these findings suggest that labour flexibility creates 
different categories of workers: ‘atypical’ (internal) insecure employees and a multi-
skilled workforce that perceives (external) security at work. This finding corresponds to 
the different strategies employed by ‘the flexible firm’ (Atkinson, 1984); that is the 
notion that flexible organizations feature a functionally flexible core and an ‘atypical’ 
peripheral workforce. Differences also exist with regard to types of job security and 
support for social security spending. I found job security to have a significant effect on 
support for spending on unemployment benefits. This negative link between job security 
and preferences for unemployment benefits spending can be seen as a rational decision 
made by job-secure people. However, a comparison of employment-secure and -insecure 
individuals revealed no significant differences in support levels. One possible explanation 
for this that draws on cognitive decision theories is that people give more attention to the 
(consequences of) risks in the near future (the chance of becoming unemployed in the 
next 12 months) than to long-term risk situations (the possibility of finding a new job) 
(for the literature on evaluating risks, see Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). I also presented 
evidence that shows that functional flexibility is not related to community feeling. Taking 
into account the findings of chapter two, this suggests that community feeling is neither 
being eroded (‘atypical’ employment) nor increasing (functional flexibility) in a more 
flexible economy.  
 
In sum, I can now suggest that labour flexibility brings both opportunities and risks for 
employees. As far as the welfare state is concerned, meanwhile, labour market flexibility 
spurs support for unemployment spending, due to higher levels of job insecurity. While 
public opinion seems to matter when it comes to the expansion of the welfare state 
(Brooks and Manza, 2007; 2006; Burstein, 1998; Page and Shapiro, 1983)67, it can be 
67 According to democratic theory, opinion on policy can have a direct influence (for example, through 
voting), or a more indirect influence (for example, through demonstrations). 
 
                                                 
expected that in times of increased labour flexibility, individuals are likely to demand 
higher levels of spending on unemployment benefits. 
 
3.5.1 Limitations of the study 
It is likely that economic developments and labour market conditions, such as the level of 
unemployment, influence people’s perceptions of their security at work (Berntson, 
Sverke and Marklund, 2006)68. Future research should thus incorporate a longitudinal 
design in order to investigate these factors. Future studies should also include other 
countries, on the grounds that domestic institutions, such as the type of welfare state 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999), production regime (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or 
unemployment welfare regime (Gallie and Paugam, 2000) might play an important role 
in people’s experiences of job security, and thus social policy preferences. For example, 
coordinated market economies, such of that of the Nordic countries and the Netherlands,  
emphasize cooperation between government, employers and employees (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), which may result in higher levels of security among functionally flexible 
workers in contrast to workers in liberal market economies, like Great Britain or the 
United States. In the latter, I expect that the interests of workers are less extensively 
incorporated in functionally flexible work practices (Godard, 2001: 799). A previous 
study by the European Foundation (2007b: 53) has shown that ‘advanced’ forms of 
functional flexibility are, indeed, mostly found in northern European countries. All in all, 
it is important to include institutional differences in future studies. The research would be 
further improved by repeating the analyses while including more indicators on functional 
flexibility. Another relevant avenue for future research would be to focus on how labour 
flexibility can provide workers with opportunities to use a variety of skills. For example, 
it can be hypothesized that flexible workers in the ‘new’ service-economy develop more 
generic skills (for example, communicative and analytical skills)69, thereby enhancing 
feelings of job and employment security70, while functionally flexible employees 
working in ‘traditional’ sectors of the economy develop more industry-specific skills (for 
68 I do, however, not expect the global economic crisis to have influenced my findings. The research was 
carried out in the first half of 2008. In the Netherlands during this period, the crisis had not yet affected the 
real economy (DNB, 2008) and the unemployment rate remained low (CBS, 2008). 
69 Cf. Marks and Scholarios (2008). 
70 Cf. Iversen and Soskice (2001). 
 
                                                 
example, operational skills that are specific to certain industries). These specific skills are 
valuable within a firm, but probably less ‘‘marketable’’ in other organizations or sectors. 
Future analyses should also take this issue into account.  
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4 WORKING FUNCTIONALLY FLEXIBLE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN 
TWO ORGANIZATIONS71 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I found statistical evidence of an insider/outsider division 
between core, secure workers and peripheral, insecure workers (cf. Atkinson, 1984). In 
this chapter, I will focus more closely on the organizational context which may shape the 
perception of risk and social policy preferences. While human resources activities are 
generally referred to in understanding employee work experiences and well-being, little 
attention has so far been devoted to the way of implementing new forms of organizing 
work such as functional flexibility, and the consequences of this for perceived security at 
work and individual support for social security. The purpose of this chapter is, thus, 
twofold. First, I will examine perceptions of security among functionally flexible 
employees within two different work contexts. Second, I will discuss the implications for 
social policy preferences.  
 
Several authors argue that labour flexibility is important for both employers and 
employees in dealing with volatile market demands, technological change and needs 
within and outside the workplace (see, for example, Chung, 2007). Regarding labour 
flexibility, one can distinguish different types of flexibility: numerical, functional, 
working time and pay flexibility (cf. Standing, 1999). Particularly the use of numerical 
and functional flexibility appears to be well established across countries. Numerical 
flexibility refers to employment relations that ‘deviate from full-time open-ended wage 
employment’ (Delsen, 1991:123), while functional flexibility is aimed at increasing the 
skills of workers over occupational boundaries, tasks and activities, involving practices 
such as job enlargement, job enrichment, job rotation, task rotation and (semi-
autonomous) teamworking (European Foundation, 2008; Cordery, 1989). While job 
enlargement implies an increase in the number of tasks, job enrichment may provide 
71 A part of this chapter has been published as: Dekker, F. (2009). De calculerende kenniswerker? 
Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken, 25(4): 456-471. 
 
                                                 
employees more work autonomy. Rotation implies switching a person from one job/task 
to another job/task, while (semi-autonomous) teamwork refers to the setting up of 
(temporary) groupings of employees. These teams can be responsible for scheduling and 
the setting of targets. In theory, functional flexibility can have a range of organizational 
and employee benefits. Looking at the incidence of functional flexibility, survey evidence 
in Europe and the U.S. reports widespread workplace change (EWCS Survey Results 
2005; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994).    
 
At an individual level, numerical flexibility has been extensively studied with respect to 
perceived job insecurity. This is an important object of study, because it is expected that 
workers no longer enjoy high levels of job security in today’s flexible labour market (cf. 
Schmid, 2006), while job insecurity clearly matters for one’s well-being (see, for 
example, Wichert, 2002). Far less attention has been paid to the individual consequences 
of functional flexibility for reported insecurity at work. This is surprising, given that a lot 
of commentators suggest positive outcomes of functionally flexible work practices for 
employees (cf. Kanter, 1993; 1991). In theory, functionally flexible work can provide 
workers with multiple skills, which contributes to higher levels of perceived job security. 
Because multi-skilled workers can operate in different work settings, they experience a 
lower risk of unemployment. There are some studies which show, indeed, positive 
outcomes of workplace innovation for perceived job security among workers (Kalmi and 
Kauhanen, 2008; Ramsay et al., 2000). On the other hand, several studies show less 
positive results with regard to diverse worker outcomes such as increased stress and work 
intensification (Harley, 2005; Smith, 1997; O’Reilly, 1994). These differences in worker 
outcomes are usually attributed to the specific industrial relations system (Kalmi and 
Kauhanen, 2008; Godard, 2004; 2001) or production regime (Hall and Soskice, 2001) at 
the macro level. However, the organizational context may also shape worker experiences.  
 
Looking at the organizational context, it is logical to assume that employers generally 
invest more in training and informal learning opportunities for their core workers (see, for 
empirical evidence, Maximiano and Oosterbeek, 2007). For example, because temporary 
workers are expected to leave the organization firms have less time to benefit from their 
 
investments. This also implies that full-time workers are generally more frequent 
functionally flexible compared to other workers (see, for empirical evidence, OSA, 2006). 
By offering core employees more challenging jobs and opportunities for skills 
development, employers are able to secure their talented workers and at the same time 
respond to short- or long-term market needs. At the employee level, functionally flexible 
workers face lower risks of losing their current jobs. Through obtaining multiple skills, 
functionally flexible workers enhance their ‘marketability’ within and outside the 
organization. In principle, this relates to the literature on dual labour market theory 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971) which argues there is a primary and a secondary segment 
within the labour market. In other words, there are high-quality jobs with high wages, 
good working conditions and learning possibilities, and low-quality jobs with less of 
those characteristics (cf. Tilly, 1996)72. Workers in the primary segment can be portrayed 
as functionally flexible core workers experiencing good security, while those in the 
secondary segment are peripheral workers experiencing lower working conditions, such 
as lower wages, less training and low security (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005; cf. 
Mangum and Mangum, 1986)73.  
On the basis of this line of reasoning, functionally flexible workers are said to 
experience high levels of job security. However, as I have pointed out earlier, this claim 
lacks much empirical validity. Furthermore, employers can choose whether they 
implement functional flexibility following a ‘high-road’ or a ‘low-road’ approach. It can 
be argued that the introduction of functional flexibility in a work environment which 
offers no real employee autonomy and corresponding training programmes but, instead, 
is more directed to improving organizational efficiency, will provide no room for 
increased perceived security among employees. In other words, functional flexibility that 
entails low working conditions, such as no autonomy and/or opportunities to obtain 
higher qualifications and skills, is not expected to increase perceived security at the 
workplace. This kind of labour flexibility is often described as an example of the so-
called ‘low-road-strategy’ (Michie and Sheehan, 2003; Milkman, 1998). Following this 
view, employees are more likely to see functional flexibility as a new way of labour 
72 Hudson (2007), however, shows that many jobs combine primary and secondary labour market 
characteristics. 
73 See, for a review on the ‘core-periphery’ and dual labour market models, Kalleberg (2003). 
 
                                                 
control by employers. Simultaneously, an environment which emphasises employee goals, 
such as workers’ autonomy and learning opportunities, is more likely to promote a 
greater sense of security among workers; they will recognize the opportunities for skill 
development. In other words, I would expect that working in a ‘low-road work context’ is 
less in the interest of employees.  
 
In this study, I assess perceptions of security in different work settings. I will examine 
whether functionally flexible workers actually feel secure, like the dual labor market 
theory would predict. Furthermore, by focusing on different ways of implementing 
functional flexibility, I am able to find out the impact of differences in implementation at 
the company-level.  
 Second, while experienced job security is an important characteristic of a person’s 
employment status, I will also consider another component of perceived security at work: 
employment security (or employability), which is the possibility of finding a job outside 
the current company (European Foundation, 2008; Schmid, 2008; see also Finn, 2000). 
This kind of security becomes more important in modern flexible economies (cf. Schmid, 
2006), but experienced employment security in a flexible work context is not well 
documented in the literature.   
 
In a next step, I will discuss the implications for supporting social security. As we have 
seen in the previous empirical chapters, self-interest is clearly an important factor in 
understanding social policy preferences: job-secure people are less willing to support 
unemployment spending. This self-interest perspective can also be found in the so-called 
‘Asset Theory’ by Iversen and Soskice (2001; see also Iversen, 2005). According to these 
authors, the socio-economic views of individuals are determined by the degree of 
specificity of their skills. In the literature, commentators suggest that functional 
flexibility leads to multi-skilled employees with more generic skills such as management 
and problem-solving skills (Delarue et al., 2006). Because these generic skills entail less 
danger of unemployment, on the basis of self-interest, flexible workers will have less 
interest in collective social security arrangements. In other words, ‘Asset Theorists’ 
assume that self-interest will contribute to flexible categories of employees being 
 
unfavourably disposed towards collective social security. Therefore, I will examine 
whether this self-interest argument has indeed empirical value in understanding social 
policy preferences among functionally flexible employees.             
 
To gain more detailed insight into the impact of the work setting on perceptions of 
security and support for social security, I have selected two specific cases in the 
Netherlands that represent different ways of implementing functional flexibility. The 
study attempts to make three contributions to the literature. First, it contributes by 
focusing on perceived security in different work contexts which is, in view of the existing 
literature, an underdeveloped area of study. Second, it contributes by analysing two 
different aspects of perceived security among functionally flexible workers: the perceived 
security within (job security) and outside the organization (employment security). 
Generally, the relation between (functional) flexibility and job security is of central 
concern. Third, while Iversen and Soskice (2001) have shown a negative relation between 
having generic skills and a preference for collective solutions for social risks, the 
theoretical claim of ‘asset specificity’ has not been examined in detail. Put differently, is 
it true that self-interest exclusively explains why people support government intervention 
as the ‘Asset Theory’ predicts? The majority of studies on social policy preferences have 
shown that individual support for social security is associated with self-interest as well as 
moral and affective principles (De Beer and Koster, 2007; Van Oorschot, 2007). By using 
another, qualitative, research method I am able to learn more about people’s meanings to 
risk and the process by which they form their policy preferences.       
 
In this study, the Netherlands has been chosen as research area because this country is 
among the most functionally flexible ones in Europe (European Foundation, 2007)74 and 
therefore particularly interesting.  In the next part of this chapter, I will briefly discuss the 
74 Approximately 62% of all Dutch workers engage in task rotation with colleagues, and approximately 
75% participate in teams (EWCS Survey Results 2005; see www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/). At 
the EU27 level, 48% of the employees rotate tasks, while 60% work in teams (European Foundation, 2007). 
Furthermore, according to the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies (OSA), 80% of all Dutch workers 
perceive that they are capable of performing multiple tasks or working on different departments in 2006 
(OSA, 2008).  
 
                                                 
literature regarding (organizing) functional flexibility, security and social policy 
preferences.               
 
4.2 Functional flexibility, risk and social policy preferences   
 
Functional flexibility includes work arrangements such as job rotation, task rotation, 
teamwork, job enlargement and job enrichment. In all these ways, a multi-skilled 
workforce can move between different parts within the organization and/or perform a 
broader or enriched range of activities, hereby improving their skills, while employers 
benefit from the increased internal flexibility as well, for example with regard to 
organizational productivity and reduced labour costs (Friedrich et al., 1998). In the 
literature, functionally flexible work practices are sometimes covered by the term ‘high-
performance workplace’. It appears, however, that most of the literature in this field is 
not aimed at the consequences for individual workers (see Kalmi and Kauhanen, 2008; 
Bacon and Blyton, 2001). Researchers are rather interested in organizational outcomes 
(see, for an overview, Wood, 1999). Nevertheless, several studies concentrate on the 
issue of innovative workplace practices and different worker outcomes. For example, 
Mohr and Zoghi (2008) show higher levels of job satisfaction among workers in 
‘participatory jobs’75 in Canada, Kalleberg et al. (2009) discuss the impacts of autonomy, 
consultation in decisions and teamwork on job stress among Norwegian workers, Gallie 
et al. (2004) suggest a link between different forms of employee involvement76 and 
higher levels of task discretion and Appelbaum et al. (2000) point to job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment and intrinsic rewards in the U.S. manufacturing industry.   
 
Research on perceived job security among functionally flexible workers has played a less 
crucial role in the literature. This is puzzling because, for employees, job security is 
probably one of the most important qualities of work. As we have seen, the dual labor 
market theory gives reason to believe that functionally flexible (core) workers feel more 
job-secure than other employees. Particularly core workers who are capable of doing 
75 They include job rotation, quality circles, teamwork, training practices and suggestion and information 
sharing programmes.  
76 They selected teamwork, quality circles and consultative involvement as indicators. 
 
                                                 
multiple tasks are ‘valuable’ for organizations to secure. Studies by Kalmi and Kauhanen 
(2008) indeed found positive effects of workplace innovations, such as information 
sharing and training on job security among Finnish workers, while Ramsay et al. (2000) 
show that high performance workplace practices77 are related to perceived job security 
among workers in the UK. Bacon and Blyton (2001) question these positive findings by 
showing that job insecurity may still exist across high performance work systems in the 
international steel industry, although their study is based on the reported job insecurity 
among union representatives instead of the experiences of functionally flexible 
employees themselves. While there are a few studies on perceived security among 
functionally flexible employees, the impact of functionally flexible work on security is 
still subject to speculation. While some more critical commentators state that employers 
will always look for ways of reducing costs and maximizing labour input instead of 
improving security (Thompson, 2003), most seem to agree that functional flexibility 
provides an opportunity for skills development and, hence, more job security for 
employees (European Foundation, 2009). This will be my first expectation. 
 
It is often said that the company-strategy with regard to work innovation may influence 
employee outcomes (see, for example, Peccei, 2004). In this matter, one can distinguish 
two opposite ideal-typical78 approaches related to the introduction of functional 
flexibility. The so-called ‘high-road approach’ states that employees will benefit from 
functionally flexible work arrangements that involve high levels of task discretion, varied 
tasks and opportunities for career development. These work practices are usually 
accompanied by high levels of formal training and will therefore increase workers’ skills 
and security (Michie and Sheehan, 2003). An alternative view is the so-called ‘low-road 
approach’, which includes none of these ‘humanistic’ features and opportunities for 
increased security at work. This perspective is largely related to the arguments from 
labour process theory (Braverman, 1974), which emphasizes ‘new’ ways of managerial 
control and monitoring (Harley, 1999; Sewell, 1998). In this debate, it seems that the 
extent to which companies meet a ‘high-road approach’, and in turn improve levels of 
77 This includes a series of variables, such as problem-solving groups, employee consultation, profit-sharing 
schemes and different forms of communication.  
78 Cf. Benders and Van Hootegem (1999).  
 
                                                 
security, is an important variable when studying employee outcomes. However, in much 
research, limited attention has been given to this assumption. There are only a few 
systematic studies that examine the work context and employee outcomes. According to 
Bacon and Blyton (2000), teamwork via a ‘high road-strategy’, such as a variety of tasks 
and power for employees to make decisions, leads to a higher motivation of workers and 
more satisfying jobs. Another empirical study by Kelliher and Riley (2002) reveals that 
functionally flexible employees in the hospitality industry fare better due to thorough 
training facilities. Overall, these findings indicate that a ‘high-road approach’ indeed 
improves worker outcomes. Based on these considerations, my second expectation is that 
functionally flexible workers will experience more job security in a ‘high-road work 
context’, compared to working in a ‘low-road context’.   
 
Furthermore, while some research focuses on the relationship between (different forms of) 
functional flexibility and perceived job security, these studies are not interested in 
perceptions of employment security, which is the possibility of finding a job outside the 
organization. In a period where lifetime employment within one organization comes more 
under pressure, it is necessary to investigate factors, such as functional flexibility, that 
may influence employment expectations among workers (cf. Forrier and Sels, 2003). 
Therefore, I would argue it is important to understand the experienced employment 
security among functionally flexible workers as well.  
By changing between (‘richer’) jobs and tasks and/or getting more control to 
complete work tasks, functional flexibility may enable employees to accumulate new 
skills, and their labour market ‘value’. It is very reasonable to expect that for employees 
who possess multiple skills it is easier to find another job outside the company. They are 
more attractive for the labour market. Therefore, my third expectation is that functionally 
flexible employees experience employment security. Following the earlier logic on the 
implementation process, I also expect that functionally flexible workers will perceive 
more employment security in a ‘high-road work context’, compared to working in a ‘low-
road context’.   
   
 
In the introduction of this chapter, I have pointed to the idea that people with generic 
skills are less inclined to support social security. Iversen and Soskice (2001) base this 
assertion on the human capital approach (Becker, 1964), whereby a distinction can be 
made between generic skills and trade-specific skills. In contrast with trade-specific skills, 
generic skills are transferable between occupations and/or sectors. For example, generic 
skills include socio-communicative, problem solving, learning or self-management skills. 
One can easily imagine that skills like these could be useful in several occupations and/or 
sectors. This is less the case with technical skills that are, for example, used for specific 
software programmes. Iversen and Soskice describe how those with mainly generic skills 
are less supportive of government spending on collective goods and services. The idea 
behind this is that citizens with skills that are relatively more ‘marketable’ are in essence 
more mobile in the labour market, and so they experience greater job security. On the 
basis of a survey taken in 1996 and 1997 in eleven countries, Iversen and Soskice (2001) 
conclude that the relative degree of specificity of skills, controlled by variables such as 
age, sex, income, type of working relationship, trade union membership and political 
ideology, is indeed a central factor in explaining individual support for social security 
arrangements: “(...) workers with specific skills are more inclined to support a high level 
of protection than are those with general skills” (Iversen and Soskice, 2001: 889) This 
approach to support for social security arrangements emphasizes that socio-economic 
views can largely be explained by individuals striving exclusively for short-term self-
interests. Therefore, my last expectation is that functionally flexible employees with 
generic skills are less supportive of social security, which can be understood by the logic 
of self-interest.   
 
In the next section, I will discuss the data and methods for the analysis.  
 
4.3 Methodology: two case studies 
 
I have chosen for a qualitative research design. The reason is twofold. First, by using in-
depth (semi-structured) interviews with functionally flexible workers, one cannot only 
ask if workers feel (in)secure at work, but also why? In this way, I am bringing the voice 
 
of workers back into the field of industrial sociology (Simpson, 1989). Second, from the 
answers in surveys it is more difficult to deduce the quality79 of functionally flexible 
arrangements used within specific workplaces. To examine the consequences of 
functional flexibility for workers, I have chosen two organizations: one organization 
within the ICT sector and one within the printing industry. The empirical part of the study 
is located among these two sectors because, in these branches functional flexibility plays 
an important role (see figure 4.1) and, more importantly, they represent different 
rationales for introducing functional flexibility. According to a study by the Dutch 
knowledge institute TNO, functional flexibility is predominantly seen to improve 
people’s knowledge and skills within ICT, while flexibility seems to be introduced in a 
more ‘reactive’, market-driven way in order to handle change within industry (TNO, 
2006)80. This is most likely a good start for selecting different work settings. Further, I 
selected two companies on the basis of a number of exploratory talks with senior-
researchers within these two specific sectors. The reason is that they have considerable 
knowledge and understanding of the different branches. According to my informants, 
particularly within the selected organizations I can find the information that I need. 
Therefore, I selected a company within the ICT-sector which can be characterized as a 
functionally flexible organization representing the ‘high-road approach’; forthwith 
described as the ‘Soft Service’ organization. Of the ‘Soft Service’ employees I spoke to, 
all of them were better educated. Furthermore, I selected one organization within the 
printing industry, representing the ‘low-road approach’; described as the ‘Printing 
Industry’ case. In contrast to ‘Soft Service, this sample consists of medium and lower 
skilled employees. In total, 48 people were interviewed (see Appendix). 
 One could argue that the selection of the two cases brings in differences in the 
implementation process but also contextual variation, such as different employee and 
sector characteristics, which limits the possibility of defining the specific effects of the 
work context. However, it is demonstrated over and over that employees working in a 
‘high-road work context’ are generally higher skilled, they are working in professional 
occupations and receive more training possibilities than blue-collar employees working in 
79  Think, for example, of different types of teamwork and associated skill requirements. 
80  This study included data from 1.240 employers of organizations with more than 100 employees in five 
different sectors of the Dutch economy. 
 
                                                 
a ‘low-road work context’ (cf. Guest, 2000; Osterman, 1995). In other words, the two 
specific cases are chosen because they represent the polar types of implementing 
functional flexibility.         
 
Figure 4.1 Functional flexibility: job and task rotation in the Netherlands, 2006 (in % of 
employees) 
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Source: OSA (2008: 122) 
 
Soft Service 
The ‘Soft Service’ organization is an international company with 4.600 workers 
employed in the Netherlands, of which 79% male and 21% female. The average age of 
the staff is 38. During recruitment and selection, Soft Service only screens people with 
higher education qualification (a degree from a university or a university of applied 
sciences). The company mainly offers its clients services that are characteristic of the 
commercial ICT-sector: consultancy (including management consultancy), education and 
training programmes, maintenance and outsourcing. According to national employee 
satisfaction surveys, ‘Soft Service’ is a leader in terms of staff career development, via 
both education and training programmes, and functionally flexible work practices. The 
company has a high staff turnover, which is normal for this sector. In 2006, turnover was 
more than 15% (Soft Service annual social report, 2007). According to ICT-Office (a 
Dutch trade association), companies within ICT are increasingly facing a demand for 
 
qualified professionals (ICT-Office, 2008: 71). This is particularly due to a decreasing 
number of new students. Therefore, according to the HRM-director of ‘Soft Service’, the 
training facilities and functionally flexible work arrangements are not only necessary to 
get the job done, but also to attract and commit talented people. I approached people 
working in this company for my research. To ensure heterogeneity in age, sex and type of 
work (these factors could conceivably influence views on security), extra attention was 
paid to these factors during the random selection. This means that all of the ‘Soft Service’ 
business units were included in the selection, and within each unit a stratified selection 
was made on the basis of age and sex. The selected employees were then informed of the 
research via an internal memo. A total of 27 employees were eventually interviewed. At 
this point, no new theoretical information was found. This means there is most likely 
‘theoretical saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1976). Of the 27 respondents, 19 were men 
and 8 were women and all had attended higher education. A characteristic of these 
respondents was that most of them did not have a sector-specific educational background 
in ICT. The branch of study followed is apparently of minor importance at ‘Soft Service’. 
Although there were respondents with specific ICT backgrounds, the predominant picture 
was one of diversity, as is illustrated by studies such as: social pedagogics, natural 
sciences, international fashion management, teacher training colleges (Pabo), sociology, 
quantum physics, business economics, and management, economy and law. The age of 
the respondents varied from 25 to 59 and most of them had permanent full-time contracts. 
Almost all the interviews were taken at the workplace. The interviews took place in 2007.  
 
Printing Industry         
‘Printing Industry’, which started as a family company, has grown to the largest printing 
company in the Netherlands, with 2.200 workers employed in 2008. In the Netherlands, it 
provides printing services on five different locations. In the company, 86% is male and 
14% female. This research considers one of the locations of ‘Printing Industry’, which 
includes around 400 employees. Most of them are between the age of 45 and 65. In the 
graphic industry, employment levels have particularly fallen between 2000 and 2004 
(GOC, 2007). First, this was due to the economic downturn in these years and, second, 
increasingly international competitive pressures placed an emphasis on cost control. The 
 
nature of work has also shifted during the last years. The Dutch knowledge Institute for 
the Graphic Industry (GOC) reports that a lot of older workers are expected to leave the 
firms in a couple of years, because they reach pension. That’s why companies became 
increasingly focused on functionally flexible work practices in order to remain 
competitive in the future (GOC, 2007). In this sense, fewer employees can perform more 
tasks in different work situations. So, the adoption of functionally flexible arrangements 
can be largely viewed to secure efficient labour deployment. A total of 21 interviews 
were (randomly) conducted among functionally flexible workers who are involved in 
printing magazines and brochures, bindery work, packaging and customer service 
activities. The age varied from 27 to 59, 18 were men and 3 were women. Most of them 
completed lower and medium levels of vocational education related to the graphic 
industry. All interviewees within ‘Printing Industry’ are working on permanent 
employment contracts. The data were collected in 2008, after the employees were 
informed via an internal memo. During the interviews I have focused on issues of 
working in a functionally flexible work environment and perceptions of (in)security. The 
interviews were taped and transcribed for further analyses81. 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Functional flexibility and risk 
 
Working functionally flexible 
Increasingly, ‘Soft Service’ and ‘Printing Industry’ have both introduced functionally 
flexible work practices, such as expanded job designs, rotation and teamwork. However, 
the organizational embedding of functional flexibility may provide an important context 
for studying worker outcomes. In the next section, I will present two different work 
contexts. 
 
 
81 To minimize potential bias during the translation of the quotes into English, I have worked with a 
translator.  
 
                                                 
‘The high-road’ 
With regard to flexibility within ‘Soft Service’, it is salient that almost all job 
descriptions are subject to continuous change. Many employees are confronted with 
changing competency and flexibility requirements, partly influenced by outsourcing 
processes and market developments. The workers appeared to be very willing to change 
between roles within the organization (in this sector, ‘job positions’ are known as ‘roles’) 
to develop new competencies. In short, they emphasized the need to fulfil more 
requirements:  
 
“Specialized knowledge is becoming less important, today it’s all about 
management, the processes that use this knowledge (...) these are ‘soft’ skills, 
which we use alongside the basic technical expertise that of course we all have. 
You learn that if you want to keep up, if you want to keep the jobs coming in, you 
need to move with the market, between roles, reaching for a higher level” 
(male, 39 years, service manager) 
 
While workers are expected to be more flexible due to market pressures, they are also 
willing to be functionally flexible because this helps in developing their knowledge and 
skills: 
 
“At the moment I’m alternating between seven different roles, from team leader 
to staff member. Several roles I have created myself (…). In this way, I can 
improve my position in the labour market and my job remains challenging”  
(female, 45 years, application management consultant) 
 
Employee flexibility is thus mainly expressed in the development of generic skills, such 
as socio-communicative skills, the ability to plan and organize and the ability to take on 
several roles simultaneously. Particularly, the flexibility of employees is increased when 
they rotate between departments. Employees should be able to take on roles that do not 
directly fall under their core competencies or individual requirements, such as switching 
between ICT and marketing roles: 
 
 “You have to be like a chameleon in this industry, which is great. You need to 
adapt to changing circumstances (...) if you need expertise in another field, you 
can take training and the next day you will be the guru!”  
(female, 25 years, core banking consultant)  
 
Stories of task-based teamwork were also found among my respondents within ‘Soft 
Service’. Mostly for several months, the most suitable employees at the time are working 
in project teams in order to fulfill particular customer needs. The team-members are 
together responsible for planning and customer contact. According to my respondents, 
they receive adequate support through diverse HRM practices, like training programmes 
and periodic meetings with their supervisor and other members within their department. 
Another example is the set up of an in-house learning centre where employees obtain 
training in skills. Many respondents felt this makes it easier to increase their skills by the 
introduction of functional flexibility, like this consultant reports: 
 
“At ‘Soft Service’, there is a good training and development climate, which I am 
very pleased with. These facilities expand the possibility of learning and doing 
your job in a better way”   
(male 57 years, ict-consultant)        
 
‘The low-road’ 
I now turn to ‘Printing Industry’. The flexibility within ‘Printing Industry’ is mainly 
facilitated through task rotation and teamwork. Noteworthy is that functional flexibility 
seems to be introduced to meet fluctuations in production, for example, due to sickness or 
variation in market demands. The different forms of functional flexibility usually imply 
small levels of autonomy and/or short-cycle, routine tasks. One respondent says: 
 
“Today, workers from the after-press department are working on the press 
department. This means they are helping the printing operators with smaller tasks, 
 
like the piling up and transportation of magazines to other departments (…) those 
tasks are normally carried out by workers from our press department”   
(male, 44 years, project analysis department) 
 
Another respondent provides an example of task rotation on the so-called after-press 
department, where the folding and stitching of magazines and brochures takes place:  
 
“Especially when someone is off sick, we step in and learn how to operate 
different after-press machines (…), which for the most of us really implies doing 
different things than usual” 
(male, 59 years, after-press worker) 
 
The respondents within ‘Printing Industry’ report no real opportunities for 
‘empowerment’. Forms of functional flexibility entail tasks at the same skill level and 
reflect no increase in responsibilities, such as a delegation in decision-making. On the 
printing department, an operator expresses the use of teamwork:  
 
“We work in teams around six printing machines. Each team consists of five or 
six persons. We all operate in various tasks around a machine. I hang in the right 
paper in the feeders, but I am also monitoring the printing throughout the run and 
make corrections if necessary. Furthermore, I sometimes look after the piling up 
of finished pages (…).  These tasks used to be done in a more standardized way, 
where each task was divided (…). This means you have to learn different 
techniques (…). However, the responsibility for scheduling is always done by one 
of the supervisors”       
(male, 54 years, press worker) 
 
Furthermore, and contrary to ‘Soft Service’, the interviewees are referring to almost no 
opportunities for career planning and training. As one respondent puts it: 
 
 
“Within ‘Printing Industry’ you mainly learn on-the-job. There are no training 
facilities”   
(male, 32 years, customer services) 
 
These first results provide insights into some different forms of functional flexibility in 
two contrasting companies. An expected finding is that more ‘advanced’ forms of 
flexibility (more varying jobs with higher levels of autonomy) are found in ‘Soft Service’. 
I also found, as expected, that workers within ‘Soft Service’ experienced far more 
organizational support, such as formal training. So, in accordance with my expectations, 
these two organizations seem to represent different models of functionally flexible work. 
In the next part, I will focus on the impact of functional flexibility on perceived security.    
 
Job security: doing the job ‘right’ 
The functionally flexible respondents within ‘Soft Service’ and ‘Printing Industry’ were 
asked whether they felt more secure in the internal (job security) and external 
(employment security) labour market. Interestingly, most interviewees faced no increased 
job security. Although all respondents perceived themselves as job-secure, employees did 
not feel more secure under circumstances of being functionally flexible. This finding is 
not (totally) in line with the insights from the dual labour market theory, which supposes 
there is a functionally flexible core workforce (or ‘insiders’) that perceives increased 
levels of job security.  
 
Most of the respondents experience that their job security is linked to their central job 
description. Doing the job ‘right’ where they are initially hired for contributes to 
increased security at work. Being functionally flexible does not go hand in hand with 
increased job security. It appears, the employees experience that the risk of losing a job is 
still related to their core job description: 
 
“Although you may switch between departments, eventually you are mostly tied 
to your own department (…) I think your performance within that department 
offers real security” 
 
(male, 39 years, ict-consultant)  
 
Or, as an after-press worker says: 
 
“I have experienced it during my annual job interview. You are financially 
rewarded for the productivity within your own department, not for the extras you 
have done (...) you need to be more flexible, but it is clear your job is not more 
secure by dealing with problems outside your own expertise”  
(male, 35 years, after-press worker) 
 
A matter of economic performance at the company-level 
Several employees within ‘Printing Industry’ I spoke to also mention the issue of 
economic performance of the company. In their opinion, not functional flexibility but the 
economic situation of the company is of crucial importance in understanding the 
experience of job security. As a worker commented:     
 
“In my perception it is not my position in this organization (…) whether or not I 
can change between departments, but rather the fact how the organization is 
performing as a whole. This determines the risk of losing a job. If the company is 
performing poorly, jobs are at stake, including mine” 
 (male, 40 years, press worker) 
 
The fact that the perception of job security has to do with the overall performance of the 
company is in line with the argumentation of Van Vuuren (1990) that the objective 
situation of the company is a relevant predictor. Although the workers within ‘Printing 
Industry’ experience no risk of losing their jobs, the fact that these workers point to the 
objective situation of the company may still reflect some uncertainty about working in 
manufacturing. Particularly this sector has witnessed declining employment levels during 
the last decades  (Cusack et al., 2006).  
 
 
 
Job security for younger workers 
For some, mainly younger workers, functional flexibility does lead to more perceived job 
security. I found that younger workers, in ‘Soft Service’ as well as within ‘Printing 
Industry’, have higher mobility expectations and embrace functional flexibility as an 
opportunity to improve their skills in getting desirable job positions. This result may be 
understood by the importance of finding a suitable job in the early working life (Topel 
and Ward, 1992).     
 
A key finding is that no differences in job security are observed between workers in ‘Soft 
Service’ (the ‘high-road’) and ‘Printing Industry’ (the ‘low-road’). Contrary to ‘Printing 
Industry, the ‘advanced’ approach within ‘Soft Service’ should enhance the possibility 
for extensive skill development and job security. However, I have found no distinct 
results. In a later section, I will explore the possible explanations for this finding. First, I 
will focus on another type of security.  
 
Employment security 
The findings on employment security show another pattern. From an employee’s 
perspective, functional flexibility gives most of them a stronger feeling of employment 
security. Through involvement in functionally flexible work, they remain competitive in 
the external labour market. In other words, they are completely confident about their 
employment security. Several respondents exemplary explained:   
 
“Working in different departments or teams makes it possible for workers to stay 
in work, across occupations. (…) Now, my skills are transferable to other sectors. 
(…) I might be a marketer, but I don’t have an M stamped on my forehead!” 
(male, 25 years, consultant marketing strategy) 
 
“By enhancing my skills, technical and more general, I can find work not only 
within the ICT-sector”  
(male, 39 years, service manager) 
 
 
Workers within ‘Printing Industry’ also seem to benefit from functional flexibility, 
although the more low-skilled character limits the employment expectations to the 
specific graphic industry. As an employee describes: 
 
“Rotating between press machines improves your work prospects. I think there is 
a widespread demand for press workers who can operate a number of machines 
(…) but still within the area of printing” 
(male, 48 years, press worker) 
 
Do the old get ahead? 
I found no evidence of differences by personal characteristics. Only age (particularly 
aged 50 and older) seems to function as a relevant determinant with respect to perceived 
employment security. Older workers within ‘Printing Industry’ feel less employment-
secure compared to other groups:  
 
 “If my current job ends, it doesn’t matter whether or not I can perform more tasks.  
You disappear from the labour market (…) the position of older workers is simply 
lower than average”  
 (male, 52 years, press worker) 
 
This finding is consistent with earlier studies on security at work (see, for example, 
Sverke et al., 2002). However, I found no differences in the perception of employment 
security between older and younger workers within ‘Soft Service’. That older workers 
within ‘Soft Service’ are optimistic about their employment security may reflect their 
higher education levels, which favours career changes.    
 
In summary, the results show that only perceived employment security is related to 
functional flexibility. Functionally flexible people did not express more job security. To 
my knowledge, different types of experienced security have not been linked to functional 
flexibility in earlier empirical studies.  
 
Again, the organizational context seems to play no distinguishing role which does 
not fit my expectations. An important result is that individuals in a ‘low-road company’ 
do not assess their employment situation as less positive compared to workers in a ‘high-
road company’. While their perception of employment security is more restricted to the 
sector in which they are working, they perceive functional flexibility still as quite useful 
in acquiring different skills and improving security. How can we understand this finding? 
According to commonly held views, these workers should report less opportunities for 
improving security.        
 
The role of expectations 
The dominant view among workers within ‘Printing Industry’ is that functional flexibility 
is necessary today, to maintain employment. This seems to echo the Dutch attention 
which has been given to the popular concept ‘employability’ since the 1990s. According 
to workers within ‘Printing Industry’, functionally flexible work should entail routine and 
non-managerial practices. In this, they substantially differ from workers within ‘Soft 
Service’. These employees only wanted to participate in more ‘meaningful’ work. As one 
worker within ‘Soft Service’ typifies:     
 
“I want responsibilities in my job, no narrow range of tasks and hereby making 
my own decisions” 
(female, 29 years, ict-consultant)     
 
For workers within ‘Printing Industry’, functional flexibility should not mean a 
decentralization of responsibilities to the work floor. For these employees, more mentally 
demanding tasks are not part of their desired job description. They seem to be satisfied 
with rotating and working in teams, as long as it is related to their (low-skilled) 
production work. When asked about the need for more ‘advanced’ forms of flexibility 
they commented: 
 
“It is normal that people have to respond to changing circumstances. That’s good. 
However, we have an, I would argue, ‘manufacturing-mindset’. Many of us have 
 
participated in traditional, lower, education and wish to work manually, without 
the need to follow training. To achieve more demanding forms of flexibility, I feel, 
you need another type of worker”       
(male, 35 years, after-press worker) 
 
“I have been working here for five years now. In these years, they have asked me 
once if I was looking for more managerial tasks. I said no, this is my favourite 
place”   
(male, 34 years, press worker) 
 
The data has further indicated that there are no differences in the abovementioned 
considerations between younger and older workers within ‘Printing Industry’. One could 
now easily criticize that these lower-skilled workers simply have no choice than to reflect 
to their employment situation and management rhetoric, so employers can increase direct 
control and make employees work even harder. An alternative, I would argue more 
realistic, view is that in order to understand employee perceptions of functionally flexible 
work arrangements, one must consider the different expectations workers have. The 
functionally flexible workers within ‘Soft Service’ are oriented towards personal 
development, they seek for greater autonomy and wish extensive training facilities. In 
this way, they can enhance their skills and security at work. However, workers within 
‘Printing Industry’ are not seeking for more autonomy through functional flexibility and 
do not desire more training. Their expectations of functional flexibility are also directed 
towards improving their skills and security, but in a ‘low-road’ way.         
 
4.4.2 Risk and social policy preferences 
 
In this last empirical section, I will turn to the consequences for people’s social policy 
preferences. We have seen that rapid changes in technology and/or market place great 
demands on flexibility. From a worker’s point of view, functionally flexible work can, 
indeed, improve their perceptions of employment security. But how is employment 
security related to social policy preferences? I have pointed out that the ‘Asset Theory’ 
 
relies on the assumption that workers with generic skills rationally evaluate social risks. 
Therefore, these workers would not advocate social spending, but favour individual 
savings accounts for themselves instead. According to the empirical results in this chapter, 
the role of self-interest in understanding policy preferences should be particularly 
important in the case of ‘Soft Service’. These workers seem to have a considerable level 
of generic skills which are ‘marketable’ across sectors (think of the so-called ‘soft skills’ 
or planning and learning skills). In ‘Printing Industry’, workers face pressures to be 
functionally flexible as well but the obtained skills are limited to one industrial sector 
(think of the technology skills to operate different printing machines). In sum, it can 
therefore be expected that particularly in the case of ‘Soft Service’, self-interest should be 
found as a strong predictor of policy preferences, as the ‘Asset theory’ would predict. 
This category, in other words, acts as a critical case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). I will hereby focus 
on the risk of unemployment, because this risk is most obviously linked to risks in the 
labour market. The respondents were asked to react to different semi-structured questions 
on social security and the perceived need for more individual responsibility and freedom 
of choice in the social security system to accommodate differences in individual 
preferences82. In the following part of this section, I will discuss the outcomes regarding 
the social policy preferences of respondents in ‘Soft Service’. 
 
Solidarity in social networks  
Although the respondents in ‘Soft Service’ clearly feel that they run little or no risk of 
becoming unemployed in the future, they do seem prepared to pay premiums for 
collective and uniform unemployment insurance. Generally speaking, the vast majority 
believe in the importance of a social system with the aim of providing assistance to 
citizens who are not able to provide for themselves. This view is widely held and 
transcends political and ideological boundaries, as well as age groups. The first notable 
detail is that a number of respondents, when giving their views on unemployment, refer 
to people in their own social network, such as an acquaintance or family member, who is 
or has been faced with involuntary unemployment. This experience seems to be related to 
a resistance to more individualized arrangements and is not consistent with the picture 
82 See for a discussion in the Netherlands, for instance, Hosseini (2006). 
 
                                                 
painted of a cost-benefit balancing individual. One of the respondents made the following 
remark: 
 
“More individual responsibility and freedom of choice? Many sectors are faced 
with staff shortages, and still there are people unemployed. Why would this be? 
My brother is unemployed at the moment and can’t find a job. I’m sure it’s not 
because of any unwillingness on his part. What I mean is: you can’t always 
explain these things.” 
(male, 26 years, public & health consultant)  
 
Moral conviction 
The majority of the respondents allude to cultural factors as potentially playing an 
important role in explaining different socio-economic views. The interviews reveal that 
the respondents have an ideal of a social care system for groups that need it. The idea 
behind this is that some people simply cannot help becoming unemployed. Despite the 
fact that their individual labour market position does not give them any cause for concern 
about the future, many respondents do not react in the actively individualistic manner that 
would be expected of them. The reason for these respondents reacting as they do is not 
the pursuit of self-interest, but a moral conviction; there are many reasons why a person 
could become unemployed, and thus they deserve the support of society. I will provide 
two examples that illustrate how these moral convictions, that form the basis of this view 
on social security, are formed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In the second example, too, I find a collective sense of responsibility for others: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first case concerns a male consultant of 51 years. He is academically trained, 
married, and has one child who lives at home. He joined ‘Soft Service’ in the 80s and 
since that time has developed an impressive career, from programmer to all-round ICT 
consultant. During his career he has carried out a considerable number of assignments 
in various sectors, not only in the Netherlands but in Germany, England and Sweden 
too. His knowledge has been his best asset: 
 
“I grabbed every opportunity I could, that’s the kind of person I am (...) my 
strength lies in my ability to see the big picture; the larger patterns and 
structures. I am the type of person who keeps an overview. My talent is finding 
solutions at the strategic level (...) and so my career unfolds.” 
 
He has never been faced with unemployment and he is convinced that this will never 
happen, but if it should:  
 
“(..) I won’t be applying for a benefit, because I’ll soon have a new job 
[laughs].” 
 
Nevertheless, he strongly rejects proposals to create more leeway for own risk and 
freedom of choice in social security, as embodied by an ‘unemployment savings 
scheme’:  
 
“Of course there’s little risk of me becoming unemployed, but there are others who do 
need this security. It is good that we have such systems in the Netherlands to 
safeguard normal living standards for those that need help (…) it’s no more than 
common decency.” 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The subject of the second case is a 26 year old female consultant. She has an academic 
education, lives together with her partner and has no children living at home. After her 
graduation she decided to place her CV on the internet, hoping to find a company with 
the right development opportunities. She has been with ‘Soft Service’ for two years 
now. She is responsible for process management in the implementation of change in 
information systems. She has a positive view of her position in the labour market:  
 
“Alongside my technical background I have good social skills. You need good 
social skills if you are continuously in touch with both your client and your 
colleagues (...) these skills give you a stronger position in the labour market.” 
 
She has never been unemployed and she too is sure that she need not be concerned 
about becoming unemployed: 
 
“I am not tied to ‘Soft Service’. Should things go wrong, and Soft Service 
were to lose all its clients, I would happily look for new work with other 
companies and in other sectors. Nothing to worry about; I have built up 
diversified skills during my education and career.” 
 
Again, I could find no relation between a strong position in the labour market and a 
preference - based on the pursuit of self-interest - for a less solidary society. When 
asked about her views on greater individual responsibility via the introduction of 
savings elements for unemployment insurance, she remarked:  
 
“People become individually responsible for the costs of becoming unemployed...? 
That sounds oversimplified to me. Although I believe that people should always take 
an active stance in the labour market, unemployment is something that can happen to 
anyone, certainly if you haven’t got a degree. Then it’s good to know that you live in 
the Netherlands.” 
 
 
 
 
When I place stories like these alongside each other, I see that a strong labour market 
position (a high level of education coupled with an experience of autonomy, flexibility, 
generic skills and subsequent employment security) is incongruous with the idea of the 
calculating actor who strives for less government intervention and a growing desire for 
freedom of choice where it concerns the unemployment risk. Although the group of 
interviewed employees does not seem likely to profit from public intervention in case of 
unemployment, the idea of a more individualized unemployment benefit system does not 
fit in with the world view of these employees.  
 
Choice stress 
The ‘choice stress’ phenomenon, too, is a reason behind respondents not taking the 
expected calculating stance. The idea is that the current labour market has not only 
become more changeable – in terms of employment relationships and requirements with 
regard to the type and quality of the work – but that people are also in a better position to 
influence the development of their careers. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1996:29) coined 
the idea of the homo optionis in this context. However, this increased freedom to make 
choices can also lead to stress (Schwartz, 2004; 2000). According to a number of 
respondents, the interest in individual security arrangements is overestimated. For some 
respondents, policies aimed at freedom of choice actually sooner lead to frustration than 
satisfaction: 
 
“Way too much is expected of people. They don’t want a choice. I used to be a 
manager with a pension fund, where I saw it happening with the ‘cafeteria’ 
system of individualized employment conditions: people get dead tired of it! OK, 
some people like it, but they are absolutely in the minority. People can’t, or don’t 
want to have to make choices about so many things. The professionals involved 
with the concept fail to appreciate this. People have got other things on their 
minds. A uniform package, please!” 
(male, 59 years, business risk manager) 
 
 
 
Conflicting views 
However, two persons in ‘Soft Service’ showed clearly different views with regard to the 
unemployment risk. In these cases, the respondents did specify a preference for 
individualized arrangements against risks such as unemployment and less public 
influence. The question is why would this be? It is striking that both respondents strongly 
believe that all people, whether highly or poorly qualified, are responsible for their own 
position in the labour market. They maintain that employees are themselves responsible 
for keeping their knowledge and skills up to date to actively develop their individual 
careers. This is what they do themselves, after all. More in general, they assert that 
people who, apparently, have not given this enough attention should also carry at least 
some of the financial consequences. This view is expressed in the following remark:  
  
“I believe that an individual has a great individual responsibility. You have the 
obligation to continue developing, as long as you can (...) Unemployed people 
must be helped; this is a great public good. However, there is nothing wrong with 
the combination of basic coverage and a financial stimulant. You are responsible 
for your own career, and if you don’t take that responsibility... well that’s too 
bad.” 
(male, 38 years, ICT consultant) 
 
While existing research does not show a significant increase in support for more 
individual responsibility in the Netherlands (Hoff and Vrooman, 2002) and socio-
demographic variables do not appear to be important factors underlying these 
abovementioned conflicting opinions, it is more likely these attitudes refer to individual 
expressions of ‘justice’.  
 
As a more general conclusion, views on social security are far less founded on calculating 
processes than is thought in the ‘Asset Theory’. This does not support my last expectation. 
Moral and affective mechanisms clearly affect policy preferences as well. This finding 
may partially explain why feelings of employment security are not related to declining 
levels of support for unemployment benefits, as we have seen in chapter 3. Referring to 
 
this issue, I have found evidence of an additional factor that may be related to the 
acceptance of social security among employment-secure employees. This factor is 
predominant visible in the ‘Printing Industry’ case, which will be discussed in the 
remainder of this subsection. 
 
Sectoral uncertainty 
In ‘Printing Industry’, all interviewees expected to be still in employment over 12 months; 
within or outside ‘Printing Industry’ but within one single sector. For most employment-
secure respondents in ‘Printing Industry’, they do perceive uncertainty. A lot of the 
employees worry about working in the industrial sector, like this print operator:  
  
“We are working in an era of cost-cutting and global competition. In my 
experience industrial, lower skilled workers are always less well off (…) right, I 
can carry out some different tasks, but that is still within the graphic industry (…). 
Chances of getting a job outside the graphic industry are not very high, I am a 
graphic worker (…), we will see.”  
(male, 29 years, press worker)   
  
Another person told me:   
  
“Working in this sector means being work insecure as a way of life, you never no  
what will happen.” 
(male, 40 years, press worker)  
  
So, while these workers perceive opportunities to obtain work across companies and, in 
this way, expect to be in employment in the short-term future, this is still in the relatively 
insecure industrial sector. The continued expansion of employment in the services sector 
and loss of employment in the traditional industrial sector (see, for example, European 
Commission, 2005) has led to uncertainty among blue-collar workers. Because most of 
the workers have industry-specific skills, they do not think there is a possibility of 
making it outside the industrial sector. This uncertainty fuels a demand for collective risk 
 
sharing, even though they feel, at the moment, secure in the external labour market:  
  
“If something goes wrong, the idea of social security is reassuring  
(…) you simply can not say: it is your own fault that you do not have a job”   
(male, 48 years, press worker)    
 
These observations indicate that, although these workers feel they can change from 
employer, they also perceive uncertainty about the long-term future that awaits them. 
Many respondents argue this sectoral uncertainty can always result in (short) periods of 
unemployment. This suggests that risks in the future are simply more difficult to predict. 
On the whole, long-term uncertainty may also explain why employment-secure people 
still support social security.  
 
4.5 Conclusions and discussion  
 
A key aspect of the dual labour market theory is a segmentation of the workforce in 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. In short, ‘insiders’ are core workers who experience stable 
careers within organizations, while peripheral workers enjoy less security. Today, a 
substantial part of the core workforce is functionally flexible. Because functional 
flexibility allows workers to improve their skills and competencies, I stated that these 
workers in particular are considered to be job and employment-secure. Furthermore, I 
expected that functionally flexible workers in a ‘high-road’ company enjoy the highest 
levels of job and employment security.  
 
Surprisingly, functional flexibility does not seem to have an effect on perceived job 
security. While research shows that temporary workers (numerical flexibility) feel more 
job-insecure compared to other workers (De Witte, 2005), functional flexibility is not 
linked to perceptions of job security. This is not in line with the expectations derived 
from dual labour market theory. However, my research reveals that functional flexibility 
increases the perception of employment security. Being mobile within the organization 
and/or learning from others though teamwork enhances skills and security in the external 
 
labour market. Therefore, it is likely that functional flexibility will eventually result in a 
higher level of labour market segmentation between numerical flexible ‘outsiders’ who 
experience low job security and functionally flexible ‘insiders’ who experience high 
employment security.   
 
One of the central questions of this chapter is whether the organizational context has an 
effect on the level of experienced security among employees. I have seen that functional 
flexibility is advantageous for feelings of employment security in two different cases. In 
other words, functional flexibility seems to ‘empower’ employees in distinctive work 
environments. This result can most likely be explained by the expectations among 
workers towards functional flexibility. It can be expected that a ‘low-road approach’ is 
disappointing for workers who expect increased opportunities for task discretion and 
intensive skill development. In other cases, such as ‘Printing Industry’, a ‘low-road 
approach’ towards functional flexibility is in line with worker’s capabilities and 
expectations. This is consistent with the findings by Vidal (2007), who shows that 
individual orientations towards work are important in understanding worker satisfaction. 
My findings add to this literature by focusing on other work-related outcomes, such as 
employment security. Furthermore, it questions assumptions concerning ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
work practices. Concerning the implementation of functional flexibility, there is no ‘on-
size-fits-all’ solution. To understand the impact of functional flexibility for workers, one 
has to give more priority to the subjective expectations of different groups of workers.  
From a HRM-perspective, functional flexibility can take different pathways. A 
‘high-road approach’ is beneficial for workers who expect autonomy and want to 
participate in education, training and decision making. On the other hand, in settings with 
personnel who do not expect ‘high-road changes’ regarding functional flexibility, HRM 
professionals can better rethink their approach in order to enhance performance.  
 
Further, this study examined social policy preferences of functionally flexible employees. 
Iversen and Soskice’s reasoning implied that functionally flexible workers with generic 
skills do not support government intervention in the economy. To test this assumption, I 
focused on the flexible workers within ‘Soft Service’ in particular.  
 
Having generic skills does not necessarily contribute to an understanding of social 
policy preferences. Based on reasons of rational self-interest (or: pure economic 
instrumentalism)83, I would expect a low acceptability of public intervention. Instead, 
these workers like to point to an affective or moral tradition of helping the needy in 
society. The major argument among the highly (and generic) skilled respondents to 
support collective social security arrangements is that society should always support 
unemployed people. This finding calls for including more factors than the risk factor in 
explaining social policy preferences. Finally, I would also claim that, while people report 
that they feel employment-secure, feelings of long-term uncertainty may explain why 
people still support social security. Particularly in high-risk sectors, such as the graphic 
industry, perceptions of uncertainty have implications for social policy preferences. 
Therefore, the perceived sectoral unemployment risk should be included in future welfare 
state research in order to explain social policy preferences even more accurate.     
 
4.5.1 Limitations of the study 
This part of the study is a first attempt to explore the link between functional flexibility, 
different types of security in specific work contexts and social policy preferences. Clearly, 
more detailed (and longitudinal) research is needed to further explore my statements and 
to improve the external validity of the study. First, I have looked at very small groups of 
populations. Therefore, the two case studies need to be followed by (statistical) research 
in order to be more representative for larger populations. Second, I have focused at two 
polar types of implementing functional flexibility. Future research should try to give 
more attention to the ‘middle-path’. For example, employers may achieve functional 
flexibility by introducing the ‘high’- and ‘low-road’ approach at the same time, targeted 
at different groups of workers. Identifying different types of functional flexibility and 
organizational mechanisms in various contexts would be an important next step.        
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Appendix  
Information on Respondents 
 
Number Gender Age Education 
(lower=vbo/mavo) 
Political 
preference 
(1=left;10=right) 
1 Female 45 Higher 6 
2 Female 30 Higher 4 
3 Male 38 Higher 8 
4 Male 57 Higher 6 
5 Female 42 Higher 7 
6 Male 51 Higher 3 
7 Male 39 Higher 4 
8 Male 52 Higher 7 
9 Male 25 Higher 8 
10 Male 37 Higher 8 
11 Male 39 Higher 7 
12 Male 36 Higher 7 
13 Male 50 Higher 8 
14 Male 59 Higher 6 
15 Female 41 Higher 4 
16 Female 25 Higher 8 
17 Male 44 Higher 7 
18 Male 39 Higher 5 
19 Male 26 Higher 7 
20 Male 26 Higher 7 
21 Female 29 Higher 4 
22 Male 26 Higher 7 
23 Male 25 Higher 8 
24 Male 25 Higher 7 
25 Female 26 Higher 7 
26 Female 25 Higher 8 
27 Male 25 Higher  8 
28 Female 46 Middle 4 
29 Male 56 Middle 4 
30 Female 53 Lower 7 
31 Female 51 Lower 3 
32 Male 34 Middle 4 
33 Male 32 Middle 4 
34 Male 55 Middle 4 
35 Male 37 Middle 6 
36 Male 59 Lower 8 
37 Male 35 Lower 8 
38 Male 43 Middle 7 
39 Male 35 Middle 5 
40 Male 52 Lower 4 
41 Male 40 Lower 8 
42 Male 55 Lower 4 
43 Male 48 Middle 8 
44 Male 30 Middle 4 
45 Male 46 Middle 4 
46 Male 27 Lower 3 
47 Male 29 Lower 8 
48 Male 54 Lower 4 
 
 
5 SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES84 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The job market in the Netherlands is home to an increasing number of self-employed 
workers. The biggest increase is to be found in the category self-employed without 
personnel, referred to in Dutch as ‘zzp’ers’. A number of authors describe this trend as 
the ultimate expression of the ongoing socio-cultural process of individualization. 
According to this view, modern-day citizens value having as much individual freedom as 
possible to determine the course of their own careers. In the Netherlands, the number of 
self-employed was 12.9 percent of the working population in 2009 (Statistics Netherlands, 
consulted on 1 March 2010; this group includes people who work for their own company 
(or possibly that of their partner or parents) and other self-employed workers, including 
freelancers. While this proportion does not put the Netherlands in the international 
‘vanguard’ in this respect, it does put the Netherlands among the European countries with 
the largest relative increases in self-employment in recent years (European Foundation, 
2009). Policy makers are wondering whether these developments on the job market pose 
a threat to the future sustainability of the social security system. It is pertinent to ask how 
the functions served by our system of social security – which developed historically on 
the basis of a breadwinner family and ‘traditional’ work relations – can be guaranteed in 
a more flexible work society. In other words, is it advisable to adapt the social security 
system to the changes in the structure of the job market? This question is central to a 
policy advisory report soon to be published by the Social and Economic Council of the 
Netherlands (SER).  
 
In the social-scientific literature to date, surprisingly few attempts have been made to 
specifically examine the relationship between self-employment and support for social 
security. This is odd given that the literature on the development of social policy shows 
84 Different versions of this chapter have been published as: Dekker, F. (2009). Opvattingen van 
zelfstandigen over sociale zekerheid, Economisch Statistische Berichten, 94(4558): 246-248; Dekker, F. 
(2010). Opvattingen van zelfstandig ondernemers over sociale zekerheid, Tijdschrift voor 
Arbeidsvraagstukken, 26(2): 146-161; Dekker, F. (2010). Self-employed Without Employees: Managing 
Risks in Modern Capitalism, Politics & Policy, 38(4): 765-788. 
 
                                                 
that public opinion is a significant factor (see, for example, Brooks and Manza, 2007; 
Burstein, 1998). In studies that focus on social-economic preferences to the welfare state, 
researchers generally assume that the self-employed are – by definition – not well-
disposed towards social security: “The self-employed are expected to favour free markets 
and a low level of social protection because they depend on flexible labour markets and 
often on relatively low-paid workers” (Iversen and Soskice, 2001: 883). This assumption 
has been empirically confirmed in a number of studies (see, for example, Iversen, 2005; 
Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Svallfors, 1995), while a number of other studies find no 
difference (Lee, 2007; Svallfors, 1997). For instance, Iversen, Iversen and Soskice and 
Svallfors show a negative correlation between self-employment and support for social 
security. However, Lee shows that the self-employed in the United States are not 
unfavourable towards collective spending in the field of health care, while in another 
study Svallfors makes it clear that in Germany and Norway there is no relationship 
between self-employment and redistribution. One problem with these studies is that self-
employment is often included as a control variable in the research model, which means 
that the limited attention devoted to the effects discovered do not provide sufficient basis 
for a sound interpretation. In this chapter, I therefore use a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative research methods to find an answer to the central research question of 
whether a self-employed job status does indeed lead to a more limited support base for 
social security, and if so, why?  
 
The Netherlands occupies a central position as a case study due to the fact that it is 
increasingly being confronted with the phenomenon of self-employment. In the first 
instance, I will use data from the International Social Survey Programme 2006 (ISSP – 
see Ganzeboom and Opdam, 2008). In this questionnaire, the respondents were asked, 
among other things, to answer questions on the characteristics of their job market status 
and their opinions on government spending. I will then examine 40 in-depth interviews 
with zzp’ers in the ICT and industry sector and analyse the various motives they might 
have to support or not to support social security. In this second phase of the study, I am 
interested in the motivation of this specific category of the self-employed, since the 
majority of the self-employed in the Netherlands do not employ personnel. Furthermore, 
 
the rationale to include these two sectors is for two reasons. First, within these two 
sectors one can witness a substantial part of zzp’ers. Second, these sectors most likely 
represent different types of self-employed persons without personnel. Within ICT, the 
self-employed are expected to be highly-skilled and they would enjoy high levels of 
autonomy. Within ‘traditional’ sectors (such as industry) the self-employed are expected 
to possess less labour market skills and they would be more economically dependent 
from one or two firms (Böheim and Muehlberger, 2006; cf. Van der Heijden, 1999).  
I will begin by looking at the development of self-employment in the Netherlands 
and the various ways in which the literature interprets this phenomenon. 
 
5.2 Self-employment: developments and the social security system 
 
Looking at how self-employment has been developing, I can see from Table 5.1 that the 
percentage of self-employment increased from 11.7 percent in 1996 to 12.9 percent in 
2009. It is particularly noticeable that the proportion of the self-employed without 
personnel rose in relative terms to 66.1 percent in 2009. In research based on two life-
course studies, Blumberg and De Graaf (2004) mapped out the various determinants of 
the transition towards self-employment in the Netherlands. One striking finding is that 
men more frequently opt for self-employment than women. In cases where women do opt 
for self-employment, one of the motivating factors would appear to be the desire to 
achieve a more effective combination of work inside and outside the home (Carr, 1996). 
Furthermore, the majority of the self-employed first tend to build up several years of 
work experience before going it alone. There is also a correlation between a person’s 
decision to opt for self-employment and both their level of education and their parents’ 
socio-economic class. People who are more highly educated and who have a father in a 
higher professional position have a greater chance of becoming self-employed. These 
typical characteristics can also be found in the Statistics Netherlands figures for 2009: 
68% of the self-employed (including familial co-workers) were male, only 19% of the 
self-employed were under the age of 35, and approximately 80% had completed 
vocational or higher education (Statistics Netherlands, consulted on 1 March 2010). 
These findings correspond with the results of international research into the determinants 
 
for self-employment, although the correlation with level of education is less clearly 
defined in the international context (see, for example, Sikora, 2006; Le, 1999).  
 
Table 5.1 Self-employed in the Dutch labour market, 1996-2009 (in % of the total 
working population) 
Year Self-employment Without personnel 
1996 11,7 54,5 
1997 11,8 54,8 
1998 11,1 55,2 
1999 10,7 55,0 
2000 11,5 55,5 
2001 12,1 55,1 
2002 12,1 60,0 
2003 12,5 60,8 
2004 13,0 60,8 
2005 13,2 61,0 
2006 13,3 62,0 
2007 13,3 63,1 
2008 13,2 65,2 
2009 12,9 66,1 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
 
According to Ulrich Beck (2000), the development from ‘traditional’ work relations to 
what might be termed ‘atypical’ work relations – such as flexible work and self-
employment – reflects a modern post-industrial working society. Under the influence of 
rapidly expanding information and communication resources and increased international 
competition, companies are feeling an ever greater need to structure their production 
flexibly. Traditional full-time jobs with a high degree of job security are losing ground to 
less secure relations on the job market. Other authors place the rise in the proportion of 
the self-employed in a more post-modern framework. The concept of post-modernism 
refers to the process of ongoing change – for example of identity, lifestyle and socio-
 
cultural context – and the increased scope for making individual choices (cf. De Jong, 
1997). According to Ester and Vinken (2000:16), self-employment perfectly symbolizes a 
number of core values in this post-modern school of thought: “personal autonomy, 
freedom, personal development, sovereignty and directorship over the conditions of one’s 
own existence”. From the perspective of thinkers such as Zygmunt Bauman, ‘atypical’ 
work relations can also be associated with post-modernity, although he – in contrast to 
Ester and Vinken – places greater emphasis on the higher degree of uncertainty on the job 
market. A durable career with an employer is a thing of the past. Bauman characterizes 
the current job market as “a camping site” (Bauman, 2001: 25) in which people are no 
longer strongly attached to a specific employment contract. In other words, people 
nowadays no longer adopt a ‘standard’ work relationship by definition but also view 
‘atypical’ relations such as self-employment as an increasingly available option. The 
work of the authors cited gives rise to a variety of images regarding self-employment. For 
example, Beck and Bauman argue that ‘atypical’ employment relations primarily 
symbolize a farewell to solid values such as regularity and security within the Fordistic 
era of employment, while Ester and Vinken emphasize the freedoms of flexible working.  
 
Previous empirical research in the Netherlands provides particular confirmation of the 
freedom of self-employment. A small proportion of the self-employed were shown to 
have taken the step on the basis of ‘negative’ motives, such as unemployment or the 
bankruptcy of their employer (EIM, 2003). People who make the transition to self-
employment under such negative circumstances are characterized by lower levels of 
income and less satisfaction with their situation than other categories of the self-
employed (Kautonen et al., 2010). However, the majority seem to make the move for 
primarily ‘positive’ reasons such as seeking greater autonomy in their work (Van 
Gelderen and Jansen, 2006). In this framework, Van den Born (2009) calculates that 
‘only’ 15 percent of the self-employed in his study provide so-called ‘push’ factors as 
reasons to start their own business (for an overview, see also RWI, 2009). Thus far, I 
have seen that analyses of self-employment are taking place against the background of an 
employment system that is gradually becoming post-modern. But in concrete terms: what 
does this mean for society’s support base for our collective social security schemes?  
 
 Previous general studies of the legitimacy of social security distinguish between various 
motives for supporting the system (see, for example, De Beer and Koster, 2007; Van 
Oorschot, 2006; 2002). First, people can see the social system in terms of self-interest. 
Since they are exposed to comparable risks, people are in favour of social expenditure or 
they regard such spending as a useful way of combating all kinds of social problems such 
as disease, begging and crime (De Swaan, 1989). A second motive relates to the 
community-argument. Support for the system occurs because people have a sense of 
belonging to the same society. What can we assume with regard to present-day self-
employed people? First, it might generally be expected that the self-employed will attach 
less importance to social security compared to regular employees. For the self-employed 
with personnel, collective social security arrangements result in higher employment costs 
due to the payment of social premiums (Iversen and Soskice, 2001), while the 
predominantly higher educated self-employed without personnel are exposed to lower 
risks on the employment market and so they too have no direct self-interest in collective 
social security arrangements. In both cases there is little reason to support social security 
out of self-interest. This undermines the legitimacy of the social security system. Second, 
De Swaan (1989) points out in his study of the development of the modern welfare state 
that the self-employed are traditionally distrustful of collective arrangements. In his view, 
they experience this kind of collectivity as a limit to individual sovereignty. De Swaan 
(1989: 176) therefore says of self-employed people: (...) “they formed the ‘brake’ on 
social reform: social security had to be established in the face of their resistance”. From 
this perspective, it does not seem plausible that such a “free-agent” (Pink, 2001) will 
experience a sense of collective solidarity with others as a major motive for supporting 
the social security system. This notion also corresponds with previous research into the 
personality traits of the self-employed. Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven (2005:159) 
conclude on the basis of large-scale international survey-based research that 
“Entrepreneurs are more individually oriented than the rest of the population. Individual 
responsibility and effort are distinguishing characteristics”. The image that emerges from 
the literature is one of a self-employed individual who desires the greatest possible 
measure of individual freedom and who is not predisposed to experiencing any self-
 
interest or collective realization with regard to social security. In summary, he or she will 
endeavour to avoid collective regulations as much as possible.  
 
The findings above lead to the central proposition that the self-employed do not favour 
social expenditure. However, it also makes sense to suppose that the strength of this 
negative correlation between self-employment and opinions on social security will vary 
according to the personal scope of the social security regulations. In addition to publicly 
funded employee insurance schemes in the Netherlands such as the Unemployment 
Insurance Act (‘Werkloosheidswet, WW’) or the Work and Income/Capacity for Work 
Act (‘Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen, WIA’) which are not open to the self-
employed, there are also social insurance schemes which do include the self-employed, 
such as the Healthcare Insurance Act (‘Zorgverzekeringswet, ZVW’) or the General Old 
Age Pensions Act (‘Ouderdomswet, AOW’). Given that the legislation in these cases is 
also geared towards covering the risks of the self-employed, they will be less negative to 
oppose this type of social expenditure. All of this results in the following hypothesis: 
 
The self-employed take a more negative view of social security than employees (1a). 
However, the self-employed are less negative towards social security if they are covered 
by a social security arrangement (1b). 
 
5.3. Data and procedure quantitative research 
 
First of all, I will test the hypothesis on the basis of the International Social Survey 
Programme 2006. This is an annual international survey which polls the opinions of 
citizens on certain themes. In 2006, the theme of the survey was ‘the role of the 
government’. For my research, I will make use of the statistics for the Netherlands. A 
total of 993 people took part in the survey, (a response rate of 41%). The data were then 
weighted on the basis of post-stratification for variables including gender, age, level of 
education, marital status and main activity, and the groups that were not active on the job 
market (students, pensioners, housewives/house husbands and those on disability benefit) 
were removed from the dataset. This resulted in a data file of 615 respondents. In terms 
 
of the proportion of self-employed people, this data set would appear to provide a 
reasonable reflection of the research population. The share of self-employed in the 
sample is 10%, compared to 13.3% in the population as a whole in 2006. 
 
The concept of self-employment was operationalized by asking a question about the job 
status of the respondent. People who worked for their own account (their own company) 
made up the group of the self-employed. People who worked for government 
organizations, semi-government organizations or private companies formed the reference 
group. Unfortunately, it was not possible to make a finer distinction between those self-
employed with personnel and those without. While the survey does ask a question about 
the number of personnel, the limited size of the sample (and the notion of heterogeneity) 
makes it more or less pointless to seek to establish statistical links. In order to establish 
what the respondents thought about collective regulations, I made use of the question on 
the desired level of collective expenditure in three different policy areas (health care, old 
age and unemployment). For each theme, the respondent was required to indicate on a 
sliding scale from 1 to 5 whether the government should spend much less (1) or much 
more (5). The survey question suggests that higher government expenditure may be 
accompanied by a tax increase. If the self-employed are indeed conservative with regard 
to collective schemes, it follows that they are less likely to support higher collective 
expenditure. In order to test the effects of self-employment on policy opinion, a number 
of control variables were added which may correspond to socio-economic opinions and a 
self-employed job status (cf. Sikora, 2006; Blumberg and De Graaf, 2004; Blanchflower, 
2000; Le, 1999). In general, the likelihood of a self-employed job status is greater for 
men and people who are more advanced in years. Level of education is another relevant 
predictor. All of these factors also have a bearing on opinions about social security 
(Becker, 2005). I also expect the self-employed to be more likely to advocate a liberal 
ideology (Houtman, 2000) and that a higher household income is more likely to facilitate 
the transition to self-employment (i.e. the higher household income functions as a 
financial buffer against the risks of self-employment). In other words, if both partners 
participate in the job market, future risks can be more effectively absorbed. People 
oriented towards the political right and with a higher household income will subsequently 
 
be less supportive of greater social expenditure. Gender was measured using a dummy 
variable in which men form the reference group. Age was determined using an open 
survey question, while the level of education was determined using a quasi-interval 
variable with eight categories, ranging from primary education (1) to university (8). 
Political self-assessment was operationalized using a Likert item (1= very left-wing, 5= 
very right-wing). Lastly, the net monthly household income in euros was estimated on the 
basis of the incomes of the respondent, partner and other members of the household. 
Multiple regression analyses were carried out to gain an understanding of the 
relationships between self-employment and individual support for social security.   
 
5.3.1 Results 
 
Table 5.2 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Determinants of support for government spending in three policy areas 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Determinants Health care  Old age Unemployment 
Self-employment 
(1=self-employed) 
-.04 -.05 -.11** 
Gender (1=female) .16*** .07 .09* 
Age -.04 .06 .25*** 
Education level 
(1=primary 
education, 
8=university)  
-.16*** -.25*** -.01 
Political ideology 
(1=left, 5=right) 
-.03 -.04 -.23*** 
Net monthly 
household income  
-.11* -.07 -.02 
R² .09 .10 .15 
N 497 496 498 
***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05 
 
First of all, it appears that self-employment correlates negatively with opinions on 
expenditure aimed at the unemployed: in comparison with salaried personnel, the self-
employed are in favour of lower collective expenditure. People with a right-wing political 
preference are also in favour of lower expenditure on the unemployed. Women and older 
respondents favour higher expenditure with regard to unemployment. The results also 
indicate that a self-employed job status does not influence the desired level of collective 
expenditure in the areas of health care and old age. The variables gender, level of 
education and net monthly household income do have an influence on the policy area of 
health care: women are in favour of higher expenditure while the more highly educated 
and respondents who report a higher than average net household income show less 
support for higher social expenditure. Turning to the theme of old age, it emerges that the 
more highly educated are once again less in favour of higher expenditure.  
 
 In relation to the central hypothesis, differences are indeed apparent in the opinions of the 
self-employed towards various types of social security regulation. The results show that 
there are no significant differences between the policy preferences of the self-employed 
and regular employees with regard to the policy areas of health care and old age. In other 
words, a self-employed job status does not necessarily lead to lower support for social 
security. However, this is not the case with regard to the risk of unemployment, where the 
self-employed are geared towards lower collective expenditure. How should these 
findings be interpreted? Why do the self-employed apparently make a distinction 
between various regulations? The most obvious explanation lies in the above-mentioned 
motive of enlightened self-interest: in the Netherlands certain social risks such as illness 
and old age are covered or partially covered by publicly financed schemes which also 
include the self-employed. Given that the self-employed fall within the scope of these 
regulations, it is to be expected that they will not favour lower expenditure in these 
specific areas. In order to find out whether this interpretation is indeed correct, I 
interviewed a range of self-employed without personnel. This part of the study will be 
presented below.          
 
5.4 Data and procedure qualitative research 
 
In addition to the analysis of the statistical results, I made use of in-depth interviews 
among the self-employed without personnel. The reason for deploying this research 
method is that it allows me to distinguish between the underlying motives which play a 
part in supporting or not supporting social security. Such motives are not brought to light 
by the statistical analysis. A qualitative research design seems to be particularly helpful 
because I want to understand the risk strategies of individuals (see Appendix A for the 
basic empirical interests of the study). The choice of self-employed without personnel is 
an obvious one given the fact that they form the largest group within the category of self-
employed people and that by all accounts their number is continuing to grow. The 
respondents came from the ICT and the construction industry. In these sectors one can 
find high levels of self-employed persons without personnel (see figure 5.1).  
 
 Figure 5.1 Businesses without personnel in the Netherlands, 2009 (in %) 
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Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
 
Three different strategies were used for data collection: an e-mailing was carried out by 
two contract agencies specialized in self-employed workers in ICT and construction, a 
Dutch trade union for self-employed workers in construction placed information about 
the research on its website and, finally, a magazine for self-employed workers in 
construction included a small call for participation. By combining different sampling 
strategies, I am able to define possible differences in risk strategy between heterogeneous 
categories of self-employed persons. Because of client confidentiality, the two contract 
agencies selected random samples from their database and distributed the invitations for 
participation themselves. In making this selection, the greatest possible attention was paid 
to representing a number of background characteristics in the population: the Statistics 
Netherlands figures for 2009 show that 65% of the zzp’ers were male, 79% were over 35 
years of age and almost 80% had completed vocational or higher education (Statistics 
Netherlands, consulted on 1 March 2010). This process ultimately resulted in 40 
interviews; 25 in ICT and 15 in construction. Once this threshold was reached, no new 
respondents were approached, given that sufficient theoretical explanations were supplied 
for the quantitative results found previously (cf. Charmaz, 2006). Of the 40 interviews, 
 
30 were located through the two contract agencies, 5 through the trade union and 5 
through the use of the magazine (see Appendix B for some information on the 
respondents). While the aim is, of course, not statistically generalizing to all self-
employed workers in these sectors, this diverse research strategy resulted in a variety of 
people and individual stories and perspectives. In the ICT-sector, the respondents are 
aged between 32 and 63 years. Among this group are 19 men and 6 women, most of them 
with higher tertiary education levels. The construction-industry includes interviewees 
aged between 36 and 58 years. In this sample, most of the interviewed people are men 
with lower secondary vocational education levels. In both sectors, the number of people 
with and without children is roughly even. Although there is a considerable degree of 
similarity in background characteristics between my data sample and the larger group of 
self-employed in the Netherlands (it includes more men than women, the majority holds 
higher educational degrees and the mean age is around 44 years), the sample, 
unfortunately, includes no self-employed immigrants. This makes it impossible to study 
the experiences of this specific group. Nevertheless, the case study provides an 
interesting opportunity to learn more about the meanings and risk strategies of self-
employed workers. 
 
The interviews with the self-employed in ICT were conducted in 2008, while the 
interviews with the self-employed in construction were carried out a year later. It is 
important to mention that the Dutch economy was hit by the economic crisis in 200985. 
So, in order to avoid possible systematic differences in risk behaviour between the self-
employed in ICT and construction due to economic conditions (cf. Blekesaune, 2007), 18 
of the 25 self-employed workers within ICT were re-questioned by e-mail in 200986. In 
this way, one can detect possible variation in answers due to the economic context. Most 
interviews lasted 1 to 1.5 hours and took place at home, work or in a coffee house87. The 
interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and analyzed. Regarding the coding of risk 
management, the transcripts were coded by general themes such as ‘risk management’. 
85 While the unemployment rate is relative low at 3.9 percent in 2008, unemployment has risen to 
approximately 5% of the Dutch labour force in July 2009 (CBS/Statistics Netherlands, 2009).  
86 ‘Lack of time’ and ‘everything has already been said’ were the most frequent reasons for non-response. 
87 Four people were interviewed by telephone or by e-mail. 
 
                                                 
Second, text segments were further differentiated to specific risk strategies, such as 
‘disability management’. Finally, these risk strategies were specified to different 
categories of self-employed persons and circumstances. In this study, the provision of 
collective welfare arrangements (social security schemes) and/or risk strategies by 
smaller collective associations (trade unions or small scale networks) are defined as 
collective risk strategies, while private insurance schemes and/or other strategies by 
individual workers and their households encompasses individual strategies (cf. Schmid, 
2006)88.   
   
5.4.1 Results 
 
Being self-employed and making an assessment of the risks 
Most participants of the study have been self-employed for a number of years. With a few 
exceptions in construction, the respondents stated that they made a deliberate choice89 in 
becoming self-employed so that they could be their own boss. Van den Born (2009) has 
also shown that for most self-employed workers in the Netherlands, ‘pull-factors’ seem to 
dominate. The vast majority of the self-employed have previously been in ‘regular’ paid 
employment. This observation is also in accordance with earlier findings in the 
Netherlands (RWI, 2009). Many said that they had not felt as though they had been 
properly appreciated, that their work no longer offered them any satisfaction, or simply 
that the terms and conditions of employment were not attractive. They also made mention 
of ‘always being able to enjoy yourself’, being able to arrange their own working hours 
and the large degree of autonomy in deciding how to carry out their work. Also of note is 
that the distinction between the security of a ‘regular’ employment contract and being 
self-employed would appear to be less and less clearly defined, according to a number of 
those taking part in the study. This arguably makes it easier for people to decide to 
become self-employed: 
88 One could argue that an individual decision to join a collectivity is an example of individual risk 
management. However, collective risk strategies are dictated by the idea of collective interests of all the 
individuals involved (such as trade union membership or the social security system), in contrast to 
individual risk schemes.     
89 The choice was labeled as ‘deliberate’ if the respondent has not changed career as a consequence of 
(possible) unemployment, and if he or she expressed the importance of self-determined work.    
 
 
                                                 
 “Even if you have a regular paid job you can still find yourself on the street (...) 
social security for employees is no longer the great safety net that it once was – 
nothing is certain, even for employees, so it really doesn’t make any difference.” 
(male, 54 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
The respondents obtain their business orders mostly through personal networks. They 
form part of a household in which the partner is often either employed in a ‘regular’ job 
or also self-employed. The fact that some partners have ‘regular’ jobs does not appear to 
be the result of a deliberate risk strategy operated by households, but simply that that is 
where their preferences lie, according to the answers given by the respondents. However, 
there are signs that where both partners in a household are self-employed, they are 
prepared to share the burden of risk (“If things go wrong for one party, the other can 
always get a regular job, if necessary”).  
  
The actual nature of the work of the interviewees in ICT ranged from IT consultancy and 
project management, testing, application management and website maintenance to 
software implementation. In construction, the work included renovation and repair work, 
demolition work and painting jobs. Furthermore, it also appears that, apart from two 
respondents, nobody was directly exposed to the risk of unemployment. Almost every 
interviewee had one long-term or more short-term assignments to work on at the time of 
the interviews or stated that they had sufficient human capital to be able to ‘sell’ 
themselves in the long-term. However, most ICT-interviewees who responded to the 
‘follow up’ round in 2009, report that the consequences of the economic crisis are more 
noticeable than a year before:  
 
“I am worried, because you notice that the self-employed are the first victims 
when companies start cutting their spending.”  
(male, 54 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
 
In construction, the respondents also seemed to worry about the economic crisis, although 
a clear distinction has to be made between workers in the small scale construction market 
(residential painting and renovation jobs) and workers in the large scale construction 
market (construction of new buildings or large scale renovation work). The latter group is 
often hired for longer periods. The first group of workers is not worried at all, particularly 
during the economic crisis, there is a constant demand for small scale renovation work 
and painting jobs: 
 
“Particularly at this moment, people do not move but, instead, start renovating 
their houses. Consequently, self-employed workers on the small scale 
construction market benefit, they are highly attractive now. I have no problems in 
finding work, I am booked till next year!”  
(male, 58 years, construction worker)   
 
For the respondents in the large scale construction market, however, several work 
projects are ending. A 57-year old construction worker echoed this:  
 
 “My working is ending in two weeks. After that, I will see. Right now, it is  
difficult to find new projects. I do hope my contract agency is able to ensure work 
(…) but I am worried.”  
(male, 57 years, construction worker)  
 
Furthermore, it appeared that the respondents in the large scale construction market were 
more dependent upon one principal and/or one contract agency, and seemed to have less 
freedom than other respondents in the construction industry. For example, one of the 
interviewees told that he was forced to work on hours set by the project manager and was 
doing more work than was actually agreed on. Also, for most respondents in this sub-
sector a lack of prosperity ‘pushed’ their transition into self-employment. In this way, 
these respondents can be seen as ‘dependent self-employed workers’ and it questions 
 
whether these workers really enjoy the autonomy and satisfaction that self-employment 
entails90.           
 It was striking that everyone who participated in the study was aware of the risks 
associated with being self-employed, such as the lack of social security provisions. The 
possibility of being unable to work as a result of disability or long-term incapacitation 
and having no welfare state provision was deemed to be the worst potential problem – 
after all, being ill for a long time means loss of income and perhaps bankruptcy in due 
course. However, it emerged from the interviews that self-employed people with young 
children considered the financial consequences of such risks to be greater than those 
without: 
 
“You think about it more because you also have your children to consider. My 
partner is not working now but if I were to find myself without work she would 
have to go out and look for work, or I would have to take a regular job again, even 
though I rather would not.”  
(male, 39 years, ICT-consultant) 
  
What is illustrated in this section is that self-employed workers recognize that self-
employment embodies risks, such as the lack of social security rights. These risks are 
both felt in ICT as in the construction sector, while the feelings of insecurity seem to be 
stronger among individuals with young children and more vulnerable workers in the 
large-scale sub-sector of construction. In the following, I will examine in more detail the 
different ways of dealing with risks.    
 
Dealing with risks  
In the Netherlands, the self-employed have to pay premiums towards the AOW (old-age 
pension), to which they gain entitlement on reaching the age of 6591 and they are insured 
for the costs of medical care. These social security arrangements are obligatory for 
90 See Andersson (2008). 
 
91 Recently, the Dutch government has announced to raise the age of retirement to 67 years in 2025. 
 
 
                                                 
‘regular’ as well as self-employed workers. As a matter of self-interest, there seems to be 
support for collective intervention in these policy areas. As they are all paying towards 
particular schemes, they also expect to be entitled to cover against the relevant risks. This 
is true for 32 of the 40 respondents, belonging to ICT as well as construction. Three other, 
highly-educated young, respondents said that they are simply not thinking about different 
strategies in avoiding future risks. In their words, they are rather focused on ‘the here and 
now’. Therefore, these respondents feel comfortable with the basic collective welfare 
schemes as their main risk strategy. Further, I found that another important motive to 
support collective intervention is the perception that the social security system is less 
expensive than other risk strategies. Or, as one puts it:  
 
“I think the social security system offers me a relative inexpensive possibility of 
insuring against risks.”  
(male, 54 years, ICT-consultant) 
  
While the collective coverage of the risks of old-age and health care by a national 
insurance scheme is highly appreciated, some interviewees build up supplementary 
pension rights through investments, life insurance or private savings. These arrangements 
are particularly recognized by the highly educated in the ICT-sector. In construction, 
workers are more likely to participate in a collective pension scheme on the basis of a 
Dutch trade union membership for self-employed workers (‘FNV Self-employed’) while 
painters and carpenters are insured by a collective, mandatory pension scheme. Three 
workers within construction are, however, relatively unprotected. While they are included 
in the basic state pension system and will receive some benefits related to their working 
history in paid employment, they have built up no additional pension.  
Overall, the findings reveal that most respondents are relying on collective ways 
of dealing with risks, such as the risk of old-age. They seem to embrace the basic 
collective arrangements by the government or collective insurance schemes by a smaller 
community (pension schemes by ‘FNV Self-employed’ or obligatory pension schemes 
for certain categories of self-employed workers). However, a comparison between 
workers in ICT and construction produces somewhat different profiles. For the self-
 
employed individuals in construction (in both sub-sectors), an important reason to 
support collective risk strategies is –besides being formally entitled to social insurance 
schemes– the perceived lower cost. This is particularly true for those who have not built 
up supplementary pension rights and the (two) persons currently facing unemployment:   
 
 “For me, pension coverage on the private insurance market is too expensive.  
 I am pleased there is at least some basic coverage at my retirement age”.  
(male, 45 years, construction worker) 
 
 “For me, it is simply no option to insure against risks on the private market. (…) I  
 am suffering unemployment (…) Insurance through trade-union membership is  
 than a financially acceptable form of protection.”  
(male, 40 years, construction worker) 
 
As I have seen that particularly the highly-educated workers within the ICT-sector build 
up supplementary individual pension rights in the private domain, while some of the self-
employed in construction are not additionally insured or choose for collective risk 
strategies instead, one can expect this variation in coping with risk is related to 
differences in people’s socioeconomic position (cf. Cooper, 2008). While all interviewees 
were aware of different risks, the results indeed seem to indicate that the material 
circumstances are important to consider in understanding risk strategies. While both 
groups support and achieve protection by the provision of (basic) collective insurance 
rights, the lower-paid people in construction are considerably more inclined to favour 
additional collective strategies. While in ICT the earnings per hour range between 80 and 
125 euro, most respondents in construction point to an average of 35 euro per hour. This 
condition clearly affects the possibilities to take out (additional) individualistic protection 
measures: 
 
 “Reducing risks through, for example, personal investments would be a nice way,  
 but that is no option with a small amount of money.”  
(male, 51 years, construction worker)  
 
       
A particularly prominent feature of the interviews is a sense of community feeling shown 
by a large number of the self-employed as justification for collective risk schemes. In this 
way, the self-employed are willing to pay premiums and engage in collective schemes. 
The statements are made as expressions of community feeling without there being any 
discernible trace of self-interest. Central to this concept is an experienced emotional 
connection or empathy among citizens of a country92. From the data, it appears there are 
no clear gender, education or age differences evident. One respondent says:  
 
“Social security is precisely for those who are in a vulnerable position, if they fall 
ill for a time, for example. In my opinion there should always be a wide enough 
safety net. Fortunately, we have a good social security system in place in our 
society.”  
(male, 39 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
Others describe the social security system as follows: 
 
“The welfare state is ultimately a form of civilization that you should not curtail – 
you have to dare to be generous to the weak.”  
(male, 33 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
In the Netherlands, the self-employed are not covered by social security provisions when 
it comes to inability to work through illness or disability93. Most of the respondents in 
ICT have taken out private disability insurance, with one or two having continued their 
cover with the UWV (the Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes) on a voluntary basis. 
There were just two respondents who had not taken out any cover whatsoever: in one 
case, the value of the house of the person involved was to provide any cover that may be 
needed in case of disability, while the other person was simply unconcerned about the 
92 See for other uses of the concept ‘sense of community’, McMillan and Chavis (1986). 
 
93 A separate collective scheme – governed by the Self-Employed Persons Disability Insurance Act – 
existed until 1 August 2004. The rationale behind its abolition was that the private market was better placed 
to meet the needs of the self-employed (see Aerts, 2007).   
 
                                                 
matter. In our sample, it appeared that most construction workers (in both sub-sectors) 
are not insured against the risk of disability. The main problem is that they cannot afford 
private insurance94. This finding can, again, be related to their less privileged economic 
position. Those in the study who complained about the high premiums payable for private 
cover are – as a matter of self-interest – particularly inclined to the introduction of a state-
run disability insurance scheme for the self-employed, as long as the premiums are lower 
than those expensive private schemes, as one ICT-worker said: 
 
“Collective disability insurance schemes would definitely be worth considering, 
as long as it would work out cheaper for me than what I pay now.”  
(male, 32 years, ICT-consultant)    
 
Or, in the words of a 58-year old construction worker:  
 
“For most of us, private disability insurance is usually too expensive (…) a public  
scheme is very welcome.”  
(male, 58 years, construction worker) 
 
In my sample, 31 self-employed workers, in both economic sectors, also wonder in 
particular why no state disability insurance scheme is available for them, based on a 
sense of community:  
 
“I find it strange that as a group we are not entitled to a basic state scheme for 
certain risks such as disability insurance. Whether you are in ‘regular’ 
employment or not, we all face the same risk. It should not be forgotten that we 
are real people too!”  
(male, 54 years, ICT-consultant)   
 
94 There are possibilities of insuring against disability through, for example, a trade union. However, these 
schemes do not have the same advantages as a public disability scheme.  
 
 
                                                 
Again, this community orientation influences the preferences concerning collective risk 
management. This view cannot be attributed to one’s socio-demographic characteristics 
or economic position. In sum, in line with previous research on motivations to support 
collective welfare schemes among ‘regular’ workers (see for example Van Oorschot, 
2002; 2007), support for collective risk strategies among self-employed workers can be 
grounded in self-interest as well as in a sense of community feeling. While the economic 
self-interest argument is particularly prominent among the self-employed in the 
construction sector, a collectivistic orientation was remarkably visible across the 
heterogeneous sample of self-employed workers (across differences in sector, age, gender, 
income, education and political beliefs). Although most higher-educated self-employed 
workers develop (additional) individual risk strategies, the findings clearly show that an 
individualistic perspective is a too restrictive way of looking at the risk behaviour of self-
employed workers without personnel: the majority emphasized that collective strategies 
are necessary in minimizing risks. Hence, one has to conclude that the supposedly typical 
notion of an individual risk taker going it alone without any attachment to society is 
difficult to sustain.  
Given that this study was largely conducted in 2009, it might be suggested that 
the economic recession simply spurs a demand for collective social protection. Therefore, 
I have compared the data of the self-employed within ICT who were questioned in 2008 
and 2009. The key question is whether opinions on risk sharing change during a period of 
economic decline. From the results of the interviews, this does not seem to be the case. In 
both periods, there is a high level of approval for collective intervention, with the benefits 
of a basic pension scheme and a (new) publicly run disability insurance scheme being 
prominently aired: 
 
“Our society is still firmly focused around a social system that is based on the 
employer/employee relationship. It is still difficult for the self-employed to get 
insurance, such as for disability.”  
(female, 49 years, ICT-consultant)   
 
 
 
The risk of unemployment: a manufactured risk 
As soon as I started discussing questions relating to the degree to which the risk of 
unemployment should be a collective matter, I noticed that the interviewees suddenly 
became much more reluctant. The predominant feeling is that they prefer less expenditure 
in this area. Regardless of whether the respondents were to the left or right of the political 
spectrum95, they felt that the risk of unemployment is something that can be controlled by 
individuals themselves – in other words, it is a manufactured risk (Giddens, 1994). Here 
are two typical quotes:      
 
“I favour a system that rewards hard work (...) whether you are unemployed is 
largely down to yourself. Of course, you can always find people who are 
genuinely unable to help themselves, but my view is that anyone who wants to 
work, can. The role of the government should be minimal.”  
(male, 33 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
“It sometimes gives me the shivers when I see how the government spends money. 
I am of the opinion that you do not have to be unemployed. There are some 
women in my street who are supposedly unable to work. It’s too easy to claim 
social security in the Netherlands. And I’m not referring to those who are 
genuinely unable to work but those who are simply unwilling.”  
(female, 38 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
Given that the current welfare state is fundamentally based on the idea of external risk 
management (that is, it provides collective protection against risks that are not the result 
of choices that people make; cf. Giddens and Pierson, 1998), a further increase in the 
proportion of the working population that is self-employed could place a strain on the 
level of support in society for protection against this risk. In other words, in the 
perception of our interviewees, unemployment is not something that simply happens to 
people. However, this does not mean they do not advocate any protection against 
95 I asked all respondents to fill in their political ideology, using a 10-point scale ranging from 1= “left” to 
10= “right”. 
 
 
                                                 
unemployment, but that extensive social security benefits in this area are not desirable in 
their view: 
 
“I support a basic safety net for people who find themselves out of work as a 
result of circumstances, but the aim should be that they start work again as soon 
as possible.”  
(male, 39 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
In contrast to their position regarding the risk of disability, the respondents have no wish 
to see a publicly funded scheme for insuring against the risk of unemployment for the 
self-employed. Most of those taking part in the study have built up a financial reserve on 
which they can call, should it be necessary. Although they are conscious of the financial 
risks associated with a temporary absence of orders, none is in favour of a scheme to help 
the self-employed who find themselves without work. Various respondents, such as this 
34-year-old man, regard it as an occupational hazard: 
 
“Being self-employed is sometimes a question of sinking or swimming. You run 
risks if your order book is thin, but that’s all part of the game.”  
(male, 34 years, ICT-consultant)       
 
A striking result is that even the self-employed with currently insecure conditions of 
work, such as the unemployed, hold a strong preference towards individual protection 
against the risk of unemployment.  
 
Exceptional case: ‘the individual self-employed’ 
By analysing the qualitative data material, there were some respondents within the ICT-
sector who were not typical of the descriptions given above. Three respondents claimed 
to have no need for social security provisions at all, and pointed out to others the need for 
individuals to take responsibility wherever possible. The respondents concerned are 
former employees in ‘regular’ paid jobs who have now become self-employed. Being 
their own boss is, for them, the most important reason for their choice, and all three 
 
emphasize their desire to be free of the constraints of an employer and immediate 
colleagues. Using their high-value ICT-knowledge and skills they see only opportunities 
in what is a flexible employment framework. These respondents have never had any 
dealings with social security. The interviewees appear to match the description of a ‘new’ 
type of worker who has more affinity with an individualistic social system: 
 
“I am allergic to unions and government bodies – they are just relics from a 
bygone age. It’s no surprise that so many people are self-employed. No longer can 
it be said that ‘we know what is good for you’ (...) It is not the government that 
should be active, but people themselves.”  
(male, 39 years, ICT-consultant)                     
 
“What I think we are seeing is a shift from a collective to an individualistic 
system. An excellent development. I am anti-collective in fact: I look after myself, 
I don’t need other people to help me.”  
(male, 32 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
It seems that these respondents have a wish to have as much choice as possible – in 
accordance with their particular phase in life – in deciding whether or not to insure 
themselves against the various risks associated with loss of income:  
 
“The government should stop seeking to organize everything. You often notice 
that everything is averaged out to the same level from which it is difficult to stray. 
That’s not something you want in today’s society: that does not benefit anybody.” 
(male, 36 years, ICT-consultant) 
 
Although the above group of respondents does not yet appear to be a particularly large 
one in the Dutch labour market96, there are self-employed people who have a clear 
96 From large-scale questionnaire-based research among the adult population of the Netherlands, the Dutch 
Institute for Social Research (SCP) has concluded that there is limited support for a system of social 
security benefits that involves greater individual choice (Hoff and Vrooman, 2002).  
 
 
                                                 
individualistic view on risk management. Given that such opinions cannot easily be 
traced back to certain personal requirements or relevant aspects of the backgrounds of the 
people concerned, it seems more likely that they are based on motives of justice principle.     
 
5.5 Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this chapter, I have investigated how self-employed workers manage different risks in 
the Netherlands. While some researchers point to the possibility of collective risk 
strategies, most of the literature is focusing on an individualistic approach to risk 
management among the self-employed. However, this statement needs to be qualified. It 
is true that being self-employed negatively affects people’s support for social security, 
and is this effect most visible with regard to social insurance schemes which do not 
include the self-employed? Empirical research is scarce. This study contributes to the 
discussion.  
 
The results of the research show clearly that people who are self-employed would prefer 
to see less expenditure on protection against unemployment. They have no desire for 
collective strategies. Not for themselves and only to a small extent for ‘regular’ workers. 
I have seen that the respondents ascribe this risk largely to factors that are controllable: in 
their view, being unemployed is not simply a matter of bad luck. A possible explanation 
of this opinion is that the idea of unemployment runs counter to the traditionally strong 
work ethic of the self-employed (Claes, 1995). At the same time it was also clear that a 
more collective scheme against other risks like illness, old age and disability, and more 
generally the risk of ‘need’, does have the support of the self-employed. This is an 
interesting conclusion, given the dominant belief that self-employed workers reject social 
security. In the qualitative part of the study, I have seen that while some develop 
(supplementary) individualistic risk strategies, there is in most cases a strong popularity 
for collective guarantees. The views of the proponents of collective schemes may be 
derived from self-interest or altruism: collective risk strategies are perceived as cost-
beneficial, while the self-employed are also convinced that helping one another is a 
collective responsibility. The motive of self-interest is, however, most strongly true for 
 
the lower-skilled self-employed workers in the construction sector of the labour market. 
For most of them, private insuring against risks, such as old-age or disability, is too 
expensive. In this way, they can be seen as ‘outsiders’ who will promote collective risk 
strategies, for example through collective welfare schemes or through trade unions, 
which benefits their interests. 
 In sum, what we should avoid are simplistic notions to the effect that the rise in 
the number of self-employed means that the end of the legitimacy of social security 
schemes is imminent. In other words, the fact that the Dutch employment market is 
changing does not necessarily mean that collectivism will no longer have a significant 
role to play (cf. Duyvendak and Hurenkamp, 2004).  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the self-employed seem to favour collectivist risk 
strategies, but not for ‘manufactured’ risks, such as the risk of unemployment. In their 
perspective, unemployment is a ‘manufactured’ risk and, therefore, must be calculated by 
the individual. Therefore, I suggest a distinction between employment-related risks and 
other risks in understanding the nature of coping by self-employed workers. While this is 
a first attempt to explore the risk perceptions and strategies of self-employed workers, 
welfare state researchers should try to connect self-employed workers to various 
attitudinal outcomes in future studies on welfare support. Furthermore, sociologists 
whose work involves class-related voting behaviour usually assume that the self-
employed tend to vote for more right-wing parties (see, for example, Houtman, 2000; De 
Graaf and Steijn, 1997). Why is this the case? When it comes to support for social 
security, opinions appear to be less conservative in a number of cases than we might 
expect. 
 
The results have implications for social policy-making as well. I would argue that policy 
makers should place more emphasis on the collectivistic nature of risk strategies by self-
employed workers. It is clear that the self-employed enhance innovation and economic 
growth in a country (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004) but these workers, at the same time, 
face different income risks and have fewer social rights than ‘regular’ employees. 
Apparently, collective solutions are being appreciated by the self-employed to cope with 
 
these insecurities. This research study, but also the increased collective interest 
representation of self-employed workers by trade unions (Pernicka, 2005; EIRO, 2002)97, 
supports this argument. Following this logic, new collective guarantees may well boost a 
further increase in self-employment (cf. Hemerijck, 2002). In other words, individuals 
want to participate in a flexible labour market, as long as there is a basic level of 
collective protection to manage risks. For political parties, the results seem to indicate 
that the time is ripe for a renewed discussion about a basic package of social insurance 
schemes for the self-employed. This would not extend to risks that are inherent to being 
self-employed, such as unemployment, but cover only those risks over which they have 
less influence, such as disability and old-age. While the self-employed are largely 
covered by the same (basic) pension schemes as ‘regular’ employees (OECD, 2009), in 
many countries they are entitled to less generous or no social rights in the case of 
disability (cf. European Foundation, 2009). Drawing on the theoretical argument of this 
study, self-employed workers may well demand a public insurance scheme against this 
risk.                  
 
5.5.1 Limitations of the study 
Nevertheless, more research is needed in order to improve a number of the limitations 
from this study. First, more survey data on self-employed workers and their policy 
preferences towards social security is needed to extrapolate the results. Also, findings 
should be disaggregated according to various groups of self-employed people. For 
example, the module of the ISSP-survey makes no allowance for self-employed persons 
with and without personnel. Perhaps it is precisely those who do have employees that feel 
the ‘burden’ of collective schemes most keenly. Second, social democratic countries, 
such as the Netherlands, emphasises collective intervention and less market dependency 
(Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). It is possible that this institutional context influences 
the findings on support for collective risk management. Therefore, cross-country research 
is relevant in order to reveal possible national differences in values towards risk and 
coping strategies among the self-employed. Third, future studies should try to explore the 
97 In the Netherlands, the trade union ‘FNV Self-Employed’ represents more than 10.000 self-employed 
workers without personnel in 2009 (see www.fnvzzp.nl). 
 
 
                                                 
risk perceptions of self-employed immigrants. In the Netherlands, approximately 20 
percent of the self-employed without employees is an immigrant worker (RWI, 2009). 
Most of them are lower-educated and, for them, self-employment may be a ‘second-best’ 
choice (Kanas et al., 2009). This (marginal) position may influence their policy 
preferences regarding collective assistance. Specific sampling is needed to assess the 
experience of risk and coping mechanisms among this group. Finally, with respect to the 
relationship between social policy preferences and public policy,  social policy 
preferences is only one determinant of policy-making. The position of political parties, 
sudden shocks external to the political system and the influence of the media may be 
associated with policy-making as well (see, for example, John, 2006; Korpi, 2006). 
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Appendix A 
Basic topic guide qualitative interviews 
(0) Introduction round 
 
(1) Work (history) 
-previous job(s) and experiences; 
-self-employment: duration; 
-motives, expectations self-employment; 
-working conditions (such as working hours, income and level of autonomy); 
-work (history) partner. 
 
(2) Risk 
-advantages and difficulties associated with self-employment; 
-perceptions of risk (is the respondent aware of risk and if not, why); 
-reasons experienced risks;  
-is this something the respondent worries about and why. 
 
(3) Coping 
-way of avoiding risks (is the respondent planning and if not, why); 
-way of coping within household;   
-attitudes to private insurance (ask for reasons);  
-attitudes to public insurance (ask for reasons). 
 
(4) Background variables 
-age, gender, education level, ethnicity, family characteristics (married-partner-divorced-
single-number of children) and political views. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B  
Information on Respondents 
 
Number Gender Age Education 
(lower=vbo/mavo) 
Political 
preference 
(1=left; 
10=right) 
1 Female 40 Higher 5 
2 Female 36 Higher 7 
3 Male 39 Higher 4 
4 Female 36 Higher 7 
5 Female 38 Higher 8 
6 Male 60 Higher 5 
7 Male 48 Higher 8 
8 Male 33 Higher 8 
9 Male 54 Higher 4 
10 Male 39 Higher 3 
11 Male 50 Higher 4 
12 Female 42 Higher 7 
13 Female 49 Higher 7 
14 Male 36 Higher 8 
15 Male 32 Higher 8 
16 Male 34 Higher 3 
17 Male 33 Higher 5 
18 Male 42 Higher 4 
19 Male 44 Higher 3 
20 Male 39 Higher 8 
21 Male 34 Middle 4 
22 Male 42 Higher 7 
23 Male 42 Higher 6 
24 Male 32 Higher 7 
25 Male 63 Higher 6 
26 Male 56 Higher 4 
27 Male 40 Lower 6 
28 Male 51 Lower 7 
29 Male 58 Lower 4 
30 Male 58 Lower 5 
31 Male 48 Lower 9 
32 Male 45 Lower 6 
33 Male 41 Lower 7 
34 Male 45 Lower 7 
35 Male 52 Middle 5 
36 Male 36 Lower 8 
37 Male 55 Lower 5 
38 Male 57 Middle 7 
39 Male 53 Lower 8 
40 Male 40 Lower 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 LABOUR FLEXIBILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES: CROSS-
NATIONAL ANALYSES98 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, I have analyzed individual support for social security among 
different groups of workers in a flexible labour market. In a nutshell, I can say that people 
working on flexible labour contracts face greater odds of being job-insecure, while 
employment security is mostly held by functionally flexible workers. There are no 
indications that the organizational context plays a decisive role in shaping perceptions of 
security and the self-employed have reasons to support social security, although most of 
the literature states otherwise. One thing to be noted, however, is that my results are 
found in a specific institutional context. In the first chapter of this study, I have argued 
how the specific Dutch context may shape my results. Therefore, the objective of this 
chapter is to examine the generalizability of my findings across cross-cultural 
heterogeneity and institutional diversity in social security and industrial relations systems. 
To do so, I will start with the social policy preferences of workers in ‘atypical’ 
employment.  
 
6.2 Understanding flexible employment and social policy preferences 
 
Flexible or ‘atypical’ employment can be defined as work that differs from a traditional 
full-time, indefinite employment relationship. This includes part-time work and all kinds 
of temporary or fixed-term contracts (Schulze and Protsch, 2008; De Grip et al., 1997; 
Delsen, 1995). The use of temporary jobs is especially high in Spain and Portugal. The 
high levels of ‘atypical’ work in Spain and Portugal can be attributed to the relatively 
stringent employment protection for permanent employees. In this way, limitations on 
layoffs influence the use of temporary work (Delsen, 1995). The highest rates of part-
time employment are found in the Netherlands and Germany. As Figure 6.1 shows, the 
98 A part of this chapter has been published as: Burgoon, B. and Dekker, F. (2010). Flexible employment, 
economic insecurity and social policy preferences in Europe, Journal of European Social Policy, 20(2): 
126-141. 
 
                                                 
temporary and part-time components of flexible employment do not necessarily hang 
together – suggesting that they might have distinct political and economic origins.  
 
Figure 6.1 Temporary and Part-time employment in Europe in 2006 (in % of total 
employment) 
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What those origins are is an important, researched question. Both temporary and part-
time employment may well be driven in part by those seeking means of combining work 
with family (Gustafsson et al. 2003). And adjustments to international trade and 
technological developments may entail all kinds of flexible employment (Raess and 
Burgoon 2006; Burgoon and Raess 2009; Houseman and Okawa 2003). But studies have 
also found flexible employment to reflect the need for replacing staff on short leave, 
fluctuations in product demand or the need for specialist skills, employer reactions to 
employment protections, and more generally to the bargaining strength of employers 
relative to workers (Golden and Appelbaum 2006; Smith and Neuwirth 2008).  
Whatever their origins, patterns of flexible employment can be expected to have 
meaningful implications for welfare state politics. In previous chapters of this study, I 
have seen that ‘atypical’ forms of employment spur more than soften risks. And the 
extensive literature on the welfare state, in turn, suggests that such risks might well drive 
substantial political support for the social policies. These patterns motivate my central 
expectations that flexibility ought to spur more than dampen subjective economic 
 
insecurity and, hence, also support for social policies, particularly those addressing 
unemployment risks. I develop each expectation in turn. 
 
6.2.1 Flexible employment and economic insecurity 
The direct human consequences and the more down-stream policy implications of 
flexible employment should have a lot to do with how flexible contracts influence not 
only objective risks but subjective economic insecurities. Objective economic risks 
involve risk of actual job loss and/or of long-term unemployment, and/or of falling into 
poverty. Subjective economic insecurity, meanwhile, refers to a worker’s own experience 
and judgment of such risks, what amount to worry that his/her job is under threat or that 
he/she might fall into poverty (Sverke and Hellgren, 2002).  
Extensive research in political economy suggests that flexible employment might 
well have plenty to do with economic insecurities. A broad range of labor market 
conditions have been linked theoretically and/or empirically to feelings of job insecurity. 
Older people, blue-collar workers, and unskilled people face higher risks of and longer 
spells of unemployment and income loss or poverty, and these groups also report higher 
levels of insecurity (Näswall and De Witte, 2003). Net of such conditions, those 
employed in sectors exposed to international trade and foreign investment face similar 
such risk of unemployment spells, and tend to express job insecurity (Scheve and 
Slaughter, 2004; Aldrich et.al. 2001). Furthermore, those with skill endowments specific 
to particular firms or sectors – as opposed to more general skills – tend also to face higher 
unemployment risk and longer spells of unemployment, making them more insecure 
about their jobs and incomes (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006). And closer 
to the present study’s focus on flexible employment, unemployment and poverty risks 
may also accrue to labor-market ‘outsiders’, those who are either unemployed or in non-
standard work contracts (Rueda 2006a, 2006b). Net of such conditions, finally, those with 
previous unemployment experiences are less positive about their future job opportunities 
(Erlinghagen, 2008). These can all be interpreted as labor-market conditions with 
objective implications for risk that can also be expected to show up in the thinking of 
workers, to increase their subjective or perceived economic insecurity.  
 
 
Whether this applies for flexible employment per se, and not just as part of a broader 
group of labor-market ‘outsiders’ (including the unemployed), is not obvious. As an 
empirical matter, a few studies have found some measures of flexible employment to 
have little effect on or to even lower some measures of insecurity. Böckerman (2004), for 
instance, analyzes ‘worry about job security’ among European respondents (as opposed 
to self-reported job insecurity), finding temporary and part-time work to lessen rather 
than spur such worry – mainly on grounds that workers self-select into such jobs taking 
account their objective levels of insecurity. But many more studies, focused on various 
countries and measures of flexible employment and insecurity, have found that temporary, 
part-time or other features of flexible employment increase job insecurity (Clark and 
Postel-Vinay, 2005; Green et al., 2001; Näswall and De Witte, 2003; Sverke et al., 2000).   
Although flexibility’s implications for insecurities remain controversial, I expect 
both temporary and part-time employment to spur a worker’s job insecurity and his or her 
broader income insecurity. First, consider the implications of temporary or fixed-term 
contracts.  Reflecting how temporary jobs are more sensitive to business cycles than 
permanent jobs, temporary employment ought to spur subjective judgments of job 
insecurity (as opposed to worry about or dissatisfaction with insecurity) (Näswall and De 
Witte, 2003).  I also expect, however, that temporary employment will tend to spur more 
than reduce dissatisfaction with own job insecurity. A number of studies have shown that 
a high proportion of temporary workers prefer more stable contracts (Beard and Edwards 
1995; De Wolff, 2000; Gash and McGinnity, 2007). So even if temporary workers see 
their temporary jobs as stepping-stones to permanent employment, they can be expected 
to feel broadly dissatisfied with the temporary nature of their current employment.  
Finally, temporary contracts, via job insecurity and the generally less-favourable pay and 
working conditions associated with such contracts, may also spur general concerns about 
income insecurity, such as the risk of falling into poverty (Houseman 1997; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Serrano-Padial, 2005). 
Part-time employment can also be expected to spur economic insecurities, though 
perhaps less completely than temporary employment. One can expect part-time work to 
spur job insecurity or dissatisfaction with own insecurity, to the extent that the former 
selects for workers who are not core to a given company or organization, and tend not 
 
have as certain or bright futures with such (Francesconi, 1991; Connolly and Gregory, 
2008).  However, women seem to prefer working part-time in the Netherlands (Portegijs 
and Keuzenkamp, 2008). Whatever the reasoning, it is significant that Eurostat reports 
16% of all European part-timers in 2007 to consider their part-time employment 
‘involuntary’99; especially in Spain (32%), Italy (28%), Portugal (27%) and France (27%) 
part-timers strongly prefer full-time work (European Commission 2005). As implied by 
such percentages, part-time work need not entail subjective or actual marginalization 
within a firm. Hence, I consider that part-time employment will have more uncertain 
implications for job insecurity or satisfaction with own job security than does temporary 
employment. With respect to poverty risk, however, part-time workers likely have 
earning profiles closer to subsistence and to have lower access to job-related income than 
do full-time workers – together spurring subjective and objective risks of income 
insecurity or poverty (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; Gregory, 2002).  
 
What this all means for economic security is complicated by the diversity of flexible 
employment across national contexts– varying in terms of culture and of public and 
private economic development. Amidst such variation, I nonetheless expect a general 
trend in how part-time and temporary employment affect various faces of economic 
insecurity. I expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Workers in temporary employment and/or part-time employment report 
more economic insecurity (job insecurity and poverty risk) than do other workers. 
 
6.2.2 Flexible employment and social policy preferences 
With respect to social policymaking, if labor flexibility indeed leads to increased feelings 
of economic insecurity among workers, then those insecure workers ought to support 
collective welfare programmes providing social protection. Such support can be 
interpreted as a form of rational self-interest, an important motivational factor for voting 
or mobilizing to set up and pay contributions to social insurance (Van Oorschot, 2002). 
The particular link between subjective insecurities and social policy assistance has been 
99 See Eurostat employment data: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/  
 
                                                 
subject to plenty of study, but less is known empirically (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004). 
More directly relevant, a few (unpublished) studies show that subjective economic 
insecurity tend to influence people’s opinions towards compensatory benefit programmes, 
particularly unemployment insurance (Aldrich et al.1999; Kramer and Stephenson, 2001).  
This all implies that economic insecurity ought to significantly increase support for social 
policy programmes which mitigate or compensate for risks of unemployment – most 
obviously active and passive unemployment programmes, though perhaps programmes 
indirectly addressing such risks, such as poverty relief, might also be relevant.  
Assuming rather than investigating this link, there is a substantial empirical and 
theoretical body of scholarship investigating how labor-market conditions affect support 
for social policies, via economic risks and insecurities. Broad developments like 
economic internationalization and de-industrialization have been shown to affect social 
policy provision (Cameron, 1978; Garrett, 1998). And the specificity of human capital in 
industrialized economies has been shown to affect support for both passive and active 
unemployment assistance and broader redistribution (Iversen and Soskice, 2001). 
Furthermore, studies of insider-outsider dynamics have shown that those in outsider 
status, such as the unemployed, face economic risks that give them a particularly strong 
preference for programmes targeted at compensating for or mitigating such risk, such as 
passive unemployment insurance and active labor market programmes (Rueda, 2005; 
2006).   
Rueda and others looking at dual labor markets, suggest that such workers may actually 
be at the margin more tepid towards unemployment assistance where job protections for 
core workers imply that the actual risks of unemployment are disproportionately 
shouldered by the outsiders and, hence, that the actual beneficiaries of passive and active 
unemployment assistance are again the outsiders (Rueda, 2006; Saint-Paul, 1998). Such a 
logic suggests all the more reason why part-time and temporary workers – not just the 
unemployed – ought to be more supportive of unemployment assistance than other 
workers.   
 
 
This forms the basis for judging how flexible employment shapes demand-side politics of 
social policy. The focus on individual risks facing those in flexible employment relative 
to other workers suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Workers in temporary employment and/or part-time employment report 
more individual support for welfare programmes aimed at providing social assistance to 
address unemployment than do other workers. 
 
An additional, third, hypothesis is that controlling for measures of economic insecurity 
ought to appreciably lower, perhaps explain away, how support for unemployment 
assistance increases in flexible employment. I will offer all these expectations, in any 
event, fully aware that temporary and part-time employment might play out differently 
for welfare state politics across different individual and national economic, demographic, 
and political contexts. The claim here is that those implications to play-out similarly 
enough across such settings as to allow the above broad expectations as a first cut into 
unearthing how flexible employment shapes welfare politics.   
 
6.2.3 Data and methods 
 
The rest of this study tests the above hypotheses on survey data administered to a sample 
of adult respondents in 15 European countries in 2001 (Eurobarometer 2002).100 The 
survey includes a measure of preferences on unemployment assistance and other social-
policy interventions, and provides bases for capturing variation in flexible employment 
and other economic conditions, economic insecurity and demographic factors that 
plausibly influence policy preferences. 
 
To gauge the social policy effects of flexible employment I first consider two measures of 
subjective economic insecurity. One is Job insecurity, a respondent’s subjective judgment 
of whether his or her own current “job is secure” (answers ranging from 1=very true; 
100 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West and East), Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 
                                                 
2=quite true; 3=a little true; and 4=not at all true)101. Second, I explore another measure 
of broader economic risk, what I will call Income insecurity, judgments of the statement 
“I feel that there is a risk that I could fall into poverty” (answers ranging from 1-4, 
recoded to 1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree). 
To measure individual support for unemployment-related social policy, I focus on 
the following question: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The 
government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed.”  Answers on 
a 1-5 scale are recoded as follows: 1=strongly disagree; 2=slightly disagree; 3=neither 
agree nor disagree; 4=slightly agree; 5=strongly agree.102 Such a question surveys 
support for policies to address living standards of unemployed people – most obviously, 
unemployment insurance or services targeted at those losing their jobs.  These aspects of 
welfare states are directly relevant to redressing insecurities associated with flexible 
employment contracts. 
 
The explanatory variables measure flexible employment, in particular part-time and 
temporary employment. The Eurobarometer 56.1 asks many questions about the nature of 
work. The measure of flexible employment focuses on separately-asked questions that 
capture part-time employment and temporary employment. For Part-time employment I 
focus on answers to the question “My job is a part-time job”: 1=yes; 0=no (don’t 
know=missing). And for temporary or fixed-term employment I combine “I work for a 
temporary employment agency” and/or describing one’s job as “seasonal, temporary or 
casual”. From answers to these two questions I create Temporary employment: 1=work in 
temporary employment; 0=neither (Don’t know=missing).  
I focus on how these perform independently and together in two composites. One 
is a simple composite categorical variable Flexible employment (categorical): 0=neither 
part-time nor temporary worker; 1=either part-time or temporary worker; 2=both. Such a 
composite allows me to judge the possible extra risk associated with both temporary and 
part-time contracts, as opposed to simply one of these aspects of flexible employment. 
101 The perceived possibility of job loss, or ‘cognitive’ job insecurity, is most likely related to objective 
circumstances on the labour market, while ‘affective’ job insecurity is more connected to psychological 
factors (De Witte, 2005). Therefore, cognitive insecurity seems to be the best measure of job insecurity.      
102 “Don’t know or refused” (412, or 2.6 percent, of the 15,943 respondents) are coded as missing. 
 
                                                 
That latter condition, however, applies to a relatively small number of respondents (167 
respondents, roughly 2.5 percent of the sample respondents, compared to 17.5 percent 
with either temporary or part-time contracts, and nearly 80 percent of employed workers 
in full-time, permanent positions). Since temporary and part-time contracts might not 
constitute additive risks I also consider the simpler binary measure of Flexible 
employment (binary): 0=neither part-time nor temporary worker; 1=either part-time 
and/or temporary worker.  
Finally, estimations include controls that arguably influence support for 
unemployment assistance and economic insecurity, as well as non-standard employment.  
The specifications for the baseline models include seven controls. Whether or not 
respondents are employed can be expected to diminish the degree to which they depend 
on unemployment assistance in the short term, certainly compared to unemployed 
respondents. Age should increase concerns of economic risk and thus support for 
unemployment assistance.  Female gender has been found to positively influence support 
for welfare programmes generally and increases chance of non-standard employment.  
Education, measured in categories of low, medium and high levels of education based on 
respondent age upon finishing ‘full time education’, should partly capture level-of-skill 
and risk, and diminish support for unemployment compensation. And Household income 
categories, measured as dummies in four categories (“refused” or “don’t know” being the 
excluded category), should entail lower-income categories positively affecting support 
for unemployment assistance. Having children under 5 should increase financial 
responsibilities that working respondents face, spurring support for compensation, and 
should strongly spur nonstandard employment for primary care-givers. Employed partner 
can reduce concern over employment risks and hence support for unemployment 
assistance, and also influence selection into nonstandard employment. Finally, Right 
ideology (Right as opposed to Center or Left) captures broad ideological or political-
economic attitudes, based on self identification on a ten-point scale of political views 
from “left” to “right.” 
The full models focus on employed respondents and add to the above controls a 
few extra controls that address particular work orientation and experience relevant to the 
social policy preferences of those in flexible employment compared to other employees. 
 
Previously unemployed (in the last five years) should also spur concern about job security, 
support for unemployment assistance, and conditions entry into non-standard 
employment contracts.  Private-sector employment may increase economic insecurity 
and support for unemployment assistance, while affecting nonstandard employment. 
Union membership should inspire support for policies that increase work-place and 
bargaining power, and select against non-standard employment. 
 
To test the hypotheses, I estimate subjective insecurities and support for unemployment 
assistance, all as functions of part-time employment, of temporary employment and/or 
their combination as well as the above controls. Further, I report models on two kinds of 
samples and selections of controls – a baseline model focused on all respondents, 
including those employed and those not working and another, full model, focused only on 
employed respondents that allow further controlling for workplace conditions. All models 
are estimated using ordered probit with probability weights to account for sampling 
across surveyed countries103. To address heteroskedasticity and within-country 
correlation of errors, I calculated robust standard errors clustered by country. And all 
models include country dummies to absorb possible heteroskedasticity and unobserved 
national effects.  
   
6.2.4 Results 
Table 6.1 summarizes results for hypothesis one. It considers how part-time employment, 
temporary employment, and their combination affect subjective job insecurity (1-4) and 
subjective income insecurity (5-8). The controls generally perform in line with intuition.  
For instance, more educated respondents tend to judge their jobs as less insecure and be 
less dissatisfied with their job security. Having been unemployed within five years 
strongly spurs both measures of insecurity. And income is strongly negatively related to 
both job and income insecurity. Finally, having an employed partner reduces chance of 
worrying about falling into poverty, though as one would expect has no significant 
impact on job insecurity. Other conditions, however, tend not to be statistically 
significant, though are signed as expected. Older respondents, for instance, tend not to 
103 A special thanks to Brian Burgoon, for his methodological assistance. 
 
                                                 
experience either more job insecurity or judgment of risk of falling into poverty than do 
younger respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 Flexible Employment and Economic Insecurity  
Job insecurity Income insecurity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Part-time employment 0.140*    0.098***    
 (0.074)    (0.036)    
Temporary employment  0.470***    0.175**   
  (0.086)    (0.072)   
Flexible employment    0.209***    0.112***  
    (categorical)   (0.058)    (0.032)  
Flexible employment    0.210***    0.133*** 
    (binary)    (0.069)    (0.033) 
         
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female -0.010 0.011 -0.033 -0.028 -0.039 -0.020 -0.044 -0.046 
 (-0.041) (-0.034) (-0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) 
Education -.103*** -.099*** -.101*** -0.101*** -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (-0.026) (-0.027) (-0.026) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Previously unemployed 0.425*** 0.403*** 0.405*** 0.409*** 0.363*** 0.359*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 
 (-0.039) (-0.038) (-0.038) (0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
Private sector 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.214*** 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.016 
 (-0.046) (-0.045) (-0.046) (0.046) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Partner employed 0.012 0.019 0.011 0.011 -0.079** -0.077** -0.081** -0.081** 
 (-0.032) (-0.032) (-0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
Have children 0.011 0.015 0.002 0.003 0.032 0.036 0.032 0.032 
 (-0.027) (-0.028) (-0.028) (0.028) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Lowest income 0.261*** 0.264*** 0.253*** 0.255*** 0.429*** 0.439*** 0.426*** 0.426*** 
 (-0.079) (-0.081) (-0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Medium-low income 0.038 0.026 0.028 0.030 0.154** 0.150** 0.151** 0.153** 
 (-0.062) (-0.062) (-0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Medium-high income -0.098** -0.102** -0.1** -0.101** -0.051 -0.051 -0.049 -0.049 
 (-0.043) (-0.045) (-0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
High income -.15*** -.147*** -.146*** -0.149*** -.236*** -.233*** -.233*** -0.233*** 
 (-0.035) (-0.035) (-0.035) (0.035) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Observations 6022 6021 6003 6003 6028 6029 6009 6009 
Pseudo R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
Log pseudolikelihood -7524.800 -7507.100 -7487.400 -7492.14 -7825.400 -7827.300 -7796.100 -7795.73 
Dependent variables: (1-4) Job insecurity: ‘My job is secure’ (1=strongly agree; 4=strongly disagree);  
(5-8) Income insecurity: ‘Feel I could fall into poverty in coming years’ (1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly 
agree). 
Ordered probit with robust standard errors (clustered over countries).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
As for the main results, the estimates suggest that both part-time and temporary 
employment spur economic insecurities. Part-time employment, temporary employment, 
and their combination significantly increase the likelihood that respondents judge their 
present jobs to be insecure (models 1-4, respectively). And here it is clear that temporary 
employment is substantially more likely to do so than part-time employment – consistent 
with my expectations above. And subjective poverty risk is also increasing in both 
measures of flexible employment – but here, again, temporary work has a stronger 
spurring effect than part-time employment.  Substantively, the size of flexible 
employment’s effect is strongest towards job insecurity. The results clearly support the 
first hypothesis, and build on other studies finding positive correlation between measures 
of flexibility and measures of job insecurity. 
 
Table 6.2 turns to the main results on how flexible employment affects support for 
unemployment assistance. The focus, here, is on support for government policies 
assisting the unemployed on two kinds of samples and constellations of controls – the 
baseline models (1-4) focused on both employed and non-working respondents and 
limited controls, and the full models (models 5-8) focused on employed respondents and 
more controls. The controls themselves perform broadly in line with expectation. This is 
most clearly true for low income, union membership, and previous unemployment, all of 
which tend to increase support for unemployment assistance. And it applies also to 
private-sector employment, partner employment, and right ideology, all of which tend to 
significantly decrease support for unemployment assistance. Less educated, older and 
female respondents do not significantly support such assistance, though the signs are in 
the expected directions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 Flexible Employment and support for government assistance to the unemployed 
                                                  All respondents                             Employed respondents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Part-time employment 0.077***    0.065**    
 (0.025)    (0.032)    
Temporary employment  0.142*    0.144*   
  (0.086)    (0.084)   
Flexible employment    0.084***    0.078***  
   (categorical)   (0.027)    (0.029)  
Flexible employment    0.084***    0.073** 
   (binary)    (0.031)    (0.037) 
         
Employed -0.302*** -0.290*** -0.307*** -0.305***     
 (0.040) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037)     
Age -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female -0.011 -0.003 -0.014 -0.013 0.022 0.033 0.016 0.019 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) 
Education -0.042* -0.043* -0.042* -0.042* -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Lowest income 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.025 0.037 0.030 0.031 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Medium-low income 0.055 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.025 0.032 0.033 0.034 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Medium-high income -0.024 -0.025 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
High income -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.036 -0.009 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.071) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) 
Partner employed -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.075** -0.068** -0.072** -0.071** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
Have children -0.032 -0.028 -0.030 -0.030 -0.026 -0.024 -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
Right ideology -0.198*** -0.200*** -0.198*** -0.198*** -.188*** -.191*** -.188*** -0.188*** 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
Previously unemployed     0.268*** 0.262*** 0.261*** 0.263*** 
     (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Private sector     -0.064* -0.063* -0.063* -0.063* 
     (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Union member     0.104*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 
     (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Observations 8839 8836 8818 8818 4848 4852 4834 4834 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Log pseudo-likelhood -11457.6 -11447.2 -11426.3 -11426.9 -6472.4 -6475 -6454.8 -6455.4 
 
Dependent variable:  Support government insuring that unemployed have a decent standard of living 
Ordered probit with robust standard errors (clustered over countries).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As for the main results, Models 1-4 consider how part-time employment (1), temporary 
employment (2), and their combination (3) and (4) affect support for unemployment 
assistance, with a minimal set of controls. Models 5-8 consider the same flexibility 
measures focusing on a fuller set of controls that limit the sample to employed 
respondents. Consistent with the second hypothesis, temporary employment, part-time 
employment and their combination tend to spur support for unemployment assistance.     
 
In a final step, I will be focusing on how the link between (different measures of) flexible 
employment and support for unemployment assistance are affected by adding economic 
insecurity, job insecurity, or both to the analysis. Table 6.3 reports only the coefficients 
and standard errors for the given measure of flexible employment from their respective 
regressions. Column (1) reproduces Table 6.2’s key results for the four measures of 
flexible employment from the full-specification models 5-8.  Column (2) shows how each 
of the coefficients and significance levels are affected by adding income insecurity 
(subjective judgment of risk of falling into poverty in the coming five years) to the 
respective regressions. Column (3) does the same by adding job insecurity. And column 
(3) adds both income insecurity and job insecurity. The models do not substantially 
reduce the number of observations. And no single VIF score is above 2.5, and no mean 
VIF score is above 1.62, even when controlling for both measures of insecurity 
simultaneously – suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a problem in these exploratory 
estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Economic Insecurity as intervening link          
                                       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
From table 6.2: 
Models 5-8 
After controlling for 
Income insecurity 
After controlling for 
Job Insecurity 
After controlling for 
Job Insecurity and 
Income insecurity 
Part-time employment 0.065** 0.055* 0.045 0.038 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) 
Temporary employment 0.144* 0.105 0.125 0.095 
 (0.084) (0.089) (0.082) (0.086) 
Flexible employment  0.078*** 0.062** 0.06** 0.049* 
   (categorical) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) 
Flexible employment 0.073** 0.058 0.052 0.043 
   (binary) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Dependent variable:  Support government insuring that unemployed have a decent standard of living 
Ordered probit with robust standard errors (clustered over countries).  
Results for controls and country dummies not shown.  Mean VIF scores never higher than 1.61. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Consistent with expectation, adding the measures of subjective economic insecurity tend 
to lower the size and significance of the coefficients for flexible employment – often to 
below standard levels of statistical significance. The survey instrument’s measures of 
income insecurity and job insecurity mostly “explain away” how flexible employment 
tends to increase support for social policy. The partial exception is the categorical version 
of the composite flexible employment, where size and significance appreciably drop but 
remain within standard levels of significance even when controlling for both income and 
job insecurity. Such a result suggests that I cannot rule out that flexible employment has 
implications for support for social policies that go beyond dynamics of economic 
insecurity. But the tenor of the results still corroborate my contention that part-time work, 
temporary work and their combination influence support for social policies by virtue of 
increasing economic insecurities.  
 
 
 
 
6.2.5 Conclusions and discussion 
In short, the survey analysis harbors substantial information on how flexible employment 
affects economic insecurity and welfare politics. Part-time employment, temporary 
employment and their combination appear to cause feelings of job insecurity and income 
insecurity. They also spur support for social policy assistance. Furthermore, the 
experience of economic insecurity appears to be a relevant intervening link in explaining 
social policy preferences, mostly accounting for how flexible employment spurs support 
for unemployment assistance.  
Further study ought to investigate alternative intervening links between flexible 
employment and social policy preferences in addition to the economic insecurities on 
which my analysis has focused. Further study might also reveal whether other measures 
of flexible employment, insecurity and social policy preferences, and data from other 
countries, harbor patterns like those found here. Most importantly, further research ought 
to consider the more aggregated politics of welfare policy-making, studied over time and 
in varying national settings, to see if the patterns of micro-politics translate into actual 
policy outcomes in welfare provision – that is, to see how flexible employment affects 
the supply-side as well as demand-side of welfare state politics (Brooks and Manza 2007).   
In the meantime, the present study suggests that if employment is to become more 
flexible in the near future, feelings of insecurity will increase which, in turn, will fuel 
substantial demands for more social protection. Hence, the results provide a link between 
my findings that flexible employment has little impact on solidarity, but significantly 
increases subjective job insecurity, and studies which indicate that economic insecurity 
spurs welfare state protection. Clarifying these issues is important in the search for a 
balance between flexibility and security that has become a central issue for European 
polities. 
 
6.3 Understanding functional flexibility and risk  
 
As argued in chapter one, cross-country differences may impact on my findings. The 
previous part of this chapter dealt with employees having flexible labour contracts. This 
part of the study aims at explaining perceived risk among functionally flexible workers 
 
across different countries. The central question is whether the earlier findings on 
functional flexibility and the perception of risk are robust across various national contexts. 
Although the main focus in this study is on the Netherlands, I will incorporate the 
international context in order to test the generalizability of my results.  
 
The results in chapters three and four lead to the conclusion that functional flexibility is 
positively related to feelings of employment security. I have also demonstrated that there 
is no relationship between functional flexibility and perceived job security. In chapter one, 
I have pointed out that the consequences of labour flexibility for workers may differ by 
country-specific conditions, such as the social security system, the industrial relations 
system and economic and employment conditions. Looking at functional flexibility, it is 
possible that the Dutch context is related to more positive outcomes for individual 
workers. As said before, because of a history of long-term cooperation between the 
government and social partners, mandatory works councils and a high level of collective 
bargaining coverage, functional flexibility may foster positive outcomes for workers in 
the Netherlands (cf. Godard, 2001). These factors may be rooted in the broader cultural 
context with respect to justice principles and fair treatment among workers (De Jong, 
2008; Gallie, 1978).  
While the issue of functional flexibility and managerial ‘choice’ has been taken as 
a starting point in chapter four, I will now discuss the national context as level of analysis.  
 
6.3.1 Functional flexibility and risk 
Over the last decades, several researchers have investigated the quality of working life in 
different countries. According to Gallie (2003), Scandinavian countries (Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland) report higher qualities of working life. Due to a strong emphasis 
on co-operation between employers and employee representatives, workers experience 
more varied work tasks, high levels of participation in decision-making and high levels of 
employer-provided training. Gallie concludes that in countries with a strong emphasis on 
so-called ‘consensual industrial relations’ (Gallie, 2003: 64), such as the Scandinavian 
countries, a greater priority will be given to the quality of work-issues. The European 
Foundation (2007b: 53) also concludes that ‘(…) ‘advanced’ forms of work organization 
 
are considerably more prevalent in the northern European countries, while they are least 
prevalent in the southern and eastern European countries’. These empirical studies 
presented up to this point, show that more coordinated market economies are associated 
with more beneficial outcomes for employees. However, as Gallie (2007) has shown in a 
more recent study, this line or reasoning does not hold for all countries. Gallie found that 
workers in Germany experience a lower control over tasks and less participation in 
decision-making compared to workers in Britain, which can be seen as an example of a 
liberal market economy. In general, the empirical evidence suggests there are clear 
differences in the quality of employment between countries which can be explained by 
their specific industrial relations system, but we must treat theoretical models of 
economic organization -such as the production regime framework104- as ideal-typical. In 
conclusion, these institutional features may affect the findings on functional flexibility 
and risk. At the same time, several macroeconomic factors such as the unemployment 
level and economic conditions also have a potential impact on experienced risk, while 
high levels of social security spending may lessen perceived risks (as reported in chapter 
one). Finally, strict employment protection legislaton (EPL) may influence the incidence 
of ‘atypical’ employment and the perception of risk. However, the level of strict 
employment protection legislation may influence the incidence of functional flexibility 
and the perception of risk as well. While firms may shift to external flexibility (‘atypical’ 
forms of employment) they can also shift to internal flexibility (functional flexibility) in 
order to avoid labour market regulations (cf. Keller and Seifert, 2005). Furthermore, with 
respect to the perceived risk of losing a job, people are less insecure under conditions of 
strict employment protection legislation (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). All these 
considerations raise the following research question: are my findings on functional 
flexibility and perceived risk consistent across different national contexts? If so, 
functionally flexible workers should report more employment security, while there is no 
connection with the perception of job security. Unfortunately, for this purpose cross-
country datasets are limited. However, the 2005 ‘EWCS dataset’ allows me to study the 
perception of job insecurity among functionally flexible workers in different developed 
104 See Hall and Soskice (2001). 
 
                                                 
countries105. In the next section, I will present the 2005 ‘EWCS dataset’ and the 
methodological approach. 
 
6.3.2 Data and methods 
Data are taken from the 2005 ‘EWCS survey’106. This includes a random sample of the 
population aged 15 years and over of the EU Member States107. The questionnaire 
consists of more than 100 questions on a wide range of work-related themes. The data has 
been collected in 2005, and provides information on functional flexibility and the 
perception of job insecurity. Unfortunately, no information is available on the perception 
of employment security. I focus on employees and those aged 15-64 only. I made the 
decision to exclude the inactive and self-employed people because these persons are not 
employees. The sub-sample includes 21.113 persons in 27 countries.  
 
The dependent variable is perceived job insecurity. The perception of job insecurity is 
measured with the item: ‘I might lose my job in the next six months’ (1=strongly disagree, 
5=strongly agree). The EWCS sample includes two questions on functional flexibility: 
teamwork and task rotation. The variable teamwork is measured with the following item: 
‘Does your job involve doing all or part of your work in a team?’ The variable is coded 0 
for people who do not work in teams and 1 for people who do. The variable task rotation 
is measured as follows: ‘Does your job involve rotating tasks between yourself and 
colleagues?’ The variable is coded as 0 for people who do not rotate tasks and 1 for 
people who do. 
 Several independent variables are included in the analysis. Type of contract is 
coded 0= indefinite contract and 1=flexible contract (fixed term contract; temporary 
employment agency contract). The age of respondents is measured in years. Gender is 
coded 0=male and 1=female. Educational level is coded in seven groups of completed 
education: 0=no education and 6=tertiary education (advanced level).  
105 The 2005 ‘EWCS dataset’ does involve items on the possibility to learn on the job, but no indicators of 
employment security (see European Foundation, 2008). 
106 See http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/index.htm. 
107 Included are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
 
                                                 
 Since the data have a multilevel structure (an individual and a country level), I 
conduct multilevel regression analysis to estimate the results. This is the most appropriate 
method for country-level analyses (Hox, 2002). The analysis is performed in two steps: it 
starts with a null model without indicators, followed by a model one that adds these 
variables. The deviance indicates whether the model improves. The intraclass correlation 
(ICC) shows how much variation of job insecurity exists at the country level. In the 
analysis that follows, I will find out whether the previous result on functional flexibility 
and job insecurity stand the test.  
 
6.3.3 Results 
Table 6.4 shows the results of the multilevel regression analysis. 
 
Table 6.4 Multilevel analysis of job insecurity among functionally flexible workers 
(standardized regression coefficients; estimation: maximum likelihood) 
Model (0) (1) 
Intercept 2.12*** 2.12*** 
Team work  -0.01 
Task rotation  0.00 
Controls   
Type of contract  0.02*** 
Age  -0.04*** 
Education  -0.14*** 
Gender  -0.02** 
ICC 0.07 0.07 
Deviance 55622.29 54303.29108 
Source: EWCS (2005) 
*** P <0.001 
** P <0.01  
* P <0.05 
108 After six variables (degrees of freedom) were added to the model, model one is a significant 
improvement of the null model. It includes a drop in deviance of 1319 (55622.29-54303.29). According to 
the chi-square distribution, this drop is highly significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
                                                 
 The results make clear that functional flexibility is not related to feelings of job security. 
The findings indicate that ‘atypical’ employment is related to increased job insecurity. 
This is in line with my argument that flexible employment contracts increase job 
insecurity, while functional flexibility does not play a significant role. Table 6.4 also 
reveals the results from different controls. It displays significant effects for age, education 
and gender. The higher educated are clearly less insecure. This confirms findings of 
earlier studies. Women and older people are also less job-insecure. These last two results 
are somewhat unpredicted. However, as discussed by Sverke et al. (2006:9), the issue of 
gender and job insecurity is not yet settled. Further, it is clear that the influence of age is 
also still ambiguous. Some researchers find a negative effect on experienced job security, 
others a positive effect and some are unable to detect any influence at all (see, for an 
overview, Erlinghagen, 2007). Overall, I can conclude that functional flexibility is not 
linked to job security, while job security is significantly lower for ‘atypical’ workers.  
 
6.3.4 Conclusions and discussion 
This part of the study had the empirical goal of investigating functional flexibility and the 
perception of risk across different national contexts. The primary empirical contribution 
of this part of the study is that it reveals there is no relationship between functional 
flexibility and perceived job security across multiple contexts. The implication is that 
functional flexibility does not secure workers in the internal labour market. In other 
words, there is little reason to believe that functional flexibility matters. Unfortunately, 
data availability limits the possibility to extrapolate my findings on functional flexibility 
and employment security in the Netherlands to different national contexts. Therefore, the 
question if functionally flexible workers feel more employment-secure across national 
heterogeneity should be tackled as soon as relevant cross-country data sets become 
available. For example, in the Netherlands, a high degree of union coverage and 
substantial cooperation between government and social partners may have a positive 
impact on perceived employment security among functionally flexible workers. 
Furthermore, future work on functional flexibility and employment security should try to 
explore the specific institutional, such as union coverage, and labour market variables, 
 
such as the unemployment rate, in more detail. While I have controlled for country 
differences, other studies could explore the impact of specific national mechanisms in 
more detail. Finally, another challenge is to gain more insight into the effects of different 
types of security (job and employment security) on social policy preferences across 
national contexts. It would be interesting to study these links in a multi-level design as 
well.      
 
6.4 Understanding self-employment and social policy preferences 
 
In the last part of this cross-country chapter, I analyze social policy preferences among 
the self-employed across eight different countries. This selection of countries represents 
different institutional characteristics, including political and cultural factors such as 
labour market regulation, social security coverage and uncertainty avoidance. The 
analyses will reveal if I am able to extrapolate my previous findings to other countries. In 
other words, this chapter controls for cross-country differences. The section 6.4.1 will 
elaborate on the question why I should expect variation in individual support for social 
security among the self-employed between countries. Section 6.4.2 will assess the data 
and methods, followed by the results (section 6.4.3) and a concluding part 6.4.4.     
 
6.4.1 Self-employment and social policy preferences 
In this study, social policy preferences have been analyzed at the individual level. 
However, looking at self-employment and policy preferences there may be differences in 
support across national settings. Harbi and Anderson (2010: 437) state that the self-
employed ‘act within society and that their entrepreneurial process is shaped by that 
society’. 
First, previous studies on self-employment tell us that individuals may be 
‘pushed’ or ‘pulled’ into self-employment (Storey, 1982). Put differently, ‘necessity’, 
such as unemployment, may ‘push’ people into starting a business (Hevenstone, 2010; 
Bogenhold and Staber, 1991). Unemployment may ‘push’ employees into self-
employment, while the unemployment rate and economic conditions are connected to 
 
someone’s policy preferences as well (Blekesaune, 2007; Fraile and Ferrer, 2005; Durr, 
1993).  
Second, in countries where the levels of labour market regulation are high, 
employers have more incentives to outsource their production which may create 
unemployment for some categories of workers (Autor, 2003). Rather than staying 
unemployed these employees are ‘forced’ to become self-employed (cf. Arum and Müller, 
2004; Acs et al., 1994). In this way, self-employment is a second-best choice. The profile 
of this ‘false’109 self-employed worker is one who is less qualified and more vulnerable in 
the labour market. This ‘vulnerability’ may influence policy preferences to social security. 
So, apart form the unemployment rate, the level of labour market regulation may be 
related to the level of self-employment and individual support for social security as well.  
Third, while self-employment may be attractive regarding the opportunities for 
obtaining profits and autonomy, it is more risky than dependent employment. During 
economic downturn, the self-employed carry the risk of income loss and they are 
generally excluded from social security law, regarding risks such as old age, sickness and 
disability (Aerts, 2007; cf. European Foundation, 2009). In short, the risks for the self-
employed are not considered as social risks, but individual risks instead. In the literature 
on social policy preferences, there seems to be substantial agreement that this is in line 
with the opinions among the self-employed: they do not support social security. First, 
there is good reason to assume that the self-employed do not prefer collective 
arrangements, because they are more individually oriented than the rest of the population 
(Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven, 2005; cf. De Swaan, 1988). Furthermore, support for 
government spending is not in their own-interest because government intervention 
probably leads to higher taxes and less profit (Iversen and Soskice, 2001). In short, there 
are different reasons to assume low levels of support for social security among the self-
employed; they experience neither emotional grounds nor self-interest for supporting 
collective arrangements, which are relevant factors in explaining social policy 
preferences (Van Oorschot, 2002; Gelissen, 2001). Nevertheless, I have seen that the self-
employed and employees are not highly different in their social policy preferences in the 
Netherlands. While the self-employed are less supportive of unemployment spending 
109 See OECD (2000). 
 
                                                 
compared to employees, no variation in individual support exists with respect to the so-
called ‘external’ risks such as sickness and old-age. As was argued in chapter five, I 
therefore suggest a distinction between employment-related risks and other risks in 
understanding the nature of coping by self-employed workers.  In part, these differences 
may be linked to self-interest: the self-employed support social security arrangements 
which are obligatory for ‘regular’ as well as self-employed workers. Because they are 
entitled to social security programmes, these arrangements are also in the interest of the 
self-employed. According to the European Foundation (2009), there are differences in 
coverage between countries. For example, in Finland the self-employed fall within the 
scope of the earnings-related pension scheme, they are covered by a health insurance 
scheme and are entitled to a basic unemployment allowance (Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health, 2007). Simply put, the state provides generous social security arrangements 
for dependent employees as well as the self-employed. In Germany, the self-employed 
are more responsible for managing their risks. Schulze Buschoff and Schmidt (2009: 155) 
conclude that: ‘the majority of self-employed people are not subject to any kind of 
mandatory social insurance’. Given these differences, the self-employed may also differ 
in their level of support for social security.  
Fourth, there is theoretical literature emphasizing cultural explanations of self-
employment. Referring to the cultural indices of Hofstede (1991; 1980)110, Noorderhaven 
et al. (1999: 6) suggest that ‘in strong uncertainty avoidance countries111 people have a 
stronger emotional needs for rules and procedures, and have a tendency to stay longer in 
a job at a particular organization’. According to their data in 23 countries, in strong 
uncertainty avoiding countries there is a negative connection between wealth and the rate 
of self-employment. Noorderhaven et al. (1999: 15) propose this is ‘a sign that people in 
these countries see self-employment as a necessity rather than as a vacation’ (see alo 
Shane, 1993). However, in a more recent study, Wennekers et al. (2006) state that 
dissatisfaction with a climate of too high uncertainty avoidance may ‘push’ individuals 
towards self-employment. In this way, self-employment is recognized as an opportunity 
110 These indices are: power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), masculinity (MAS) and 
individualism (IDV). See also www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php   
111 Noorderhaven et al. used the uncertainty avoidance index from Hofstede (1980). It relates to the 
acceptance of unpredictable, unstructured situations. A higher score means strong uncertainty avoidance.  
 
                                                 
to escape this highly ‘inflexible’ environment. Overall, culture seems to play a role in 
explaining differences in self-employment (Noorderhaven et al., 2004). In addition, 
uncertainty avoidance may also be related to social policy preferences: in high-
uncertainty avoiding countries people are most likely more in favour of compensating 
social security arrangements compared to individuals living in low-uncertainty avoiding 
countries.   
 
As far as national differences are concerned, the important point I would like to make is 
that there is a variety of factors that may impact on the link between self-employment and 
social policy preferences. It can be asked: if my previous findings on self-employment and 
social policy preferences are consistent across different national contexts? Therefore, in 
order to test the consistency of my earlier findings, I will analyze data on eight 
industrialized countries. In the next part, I describe the data and methods. 
 
6.4.2 Data and methods 
The analyses are based on two samples. First, I use the 2006 International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP). This data allows me to study the policy preferences of the self-employed. 
Second, the 2002/2003 ‘European Social Survey set (ESS)’ contains two relevant 
questions on support for government intervention. I have selected eight industrialized 
countries: Finland, France, Germany, the United States (Ireland in the ESS dataset), 
Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These countries represent a diversity 
in labour market regulation (for example, a high level of regulation in Spain versus a low 
level in the United Kingdom112), social security coverage for the self-employed (for 
example, a high level of coverage in Finland versus a low level in Germany113) and 
differences in uncertainty avoidance (for example, a high level of uncertainty avoidance 
in France versus a low level in Sweden114).  The groups that were not active on the job 
market (students, pensioners, housewives/house husbands and those on disability benefit) 
112 See OECD (2004). 
113 See Tangian (2004). 
114 See www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php   
 
 
                                                 
were removed from the datasets. In this way, the effective sample sizes are 6.871 (ISSP) 
and 9.055 respondents (ESS).  
 
The dependent variables used are as follows. First, in the ISSP dataset, support for social 
security is measured by three questions on the desired level of collective expenditure in 
three different policy areas (health care, old age and unemployment). For each theme, the 
respondent was required to indicate on a sliding scale from 1 to 5 whether the 
government should spend much less (1) or much more (5). The ESS dataset asked 
respondents: ‘The less that government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for 
[country]’ (1= agree strongly, 5= disagree strongly) and ‘The government should take 
measures to reduce differences in income levels’ (recoded to 1=disagree strongly, 
5=agree strongly). In both ways, a higher score is associated with a desire for 
collectivistic intervention. It is noteworthy, that the specific wording of the questions in 
the ESS dataset suggests a preference for government intervention in the field of the 
economy. In other words, it seems to reflect a desire for economic intervention while I 
have seen (in chapter five) this may clash with the opinions of the self-employed towards 
individual responsibility. Put differently, I have seen that the self-employed feel that 
individuals are (to a large extent) responsible for achieving their income security, in case 
of unemployment in particular. For many people, the most important way of obtaining 
income security is through work. I expect that the self-employed do not hold the state 
responsible for achieving this goal. Attempts to reduce income differences are most likely 
not in line with the strong commitment to work among the self-employed. In their 
opinion, only the ‘truly’ needy, such as the sick, the old and disabled, should be the focus 
of government activity. Therefore, to test my proposed distinction between work-related 
risks and ‘external’ risks (Giddens, 1998) in order to understand the policy preferences 
among the self-employed, I hypothesize that: 
 
The self-employed do not differ in their social policy preferences from employees 
regarding the domains health care and old age (hypothesis 1a); 
The self-employed differ in their social policy preferences from employees regarding the 
domain unemployment and economic intervention in general (hypothesis 1b). 
 
 The independent variables are similar to those in chapter five; gender, age, education 
level and political ideology. Following the literature on policy preferences, women, older 
people, leftist people and the lower educated are more inclined to support social security 
(Rehm, 2007; Yang and Barrett, 2006; Svallfors, 1997; Taylor-Gooby, 2001). However, 
the variable household income was not available in standardized codes. I control for 
household characteristics by including whether the respondent has a partner. I include 
this variable because married or cohabiting persons have more chance to be self-
employed (Van Es and Van Vuuren, 2010)115. Furthermore, having a partner may imply a 
higher household income which decreases the need for social security. Gender is captured 
by a dummy variable (1=female), the respondent’s age is in years, the educational level is 
a quasi-interval variable with six categories in the ISSP dataset (0=no or lowest formal 
qualification, 5=university degreed completed) and years of full-time and completed 
education in the ESS dataset. Political ideology is measured by quasi-interval variables 
with five categories in the ISSP dataset (1=left, 5=right) and 11 categories in the ESS 
dataset (0=left, 10=right). I use a dummy variable for having a partner (1=partner). For 
the employment status, people who worked for their own account (their own company) 
made up the group of the self-employed (1=self-employment). 
As the data have a multilevel structure (respondents within countries), I apply 
multilevel regression analyses. In the next section, I will discuss the results.  
 
6.4.3 Results       
In table 6.5, I will present the results (null models not shown). 
115 See, for a critique, Blumberg and De Graaf (2004). 
 
                                                 
Table 6.5 Multilevel analyses of social policy preferences among the self-employed (standardized regression coefficients; estimation:  
maximum likelihood) 
Determinants Health care  Old age Unemployment Intervention in the 
economy 
Income redistribution 
Intercept 3.98*** 3.73*** 3.06*** 3.25*** 3.70*** 
Self-employment 
(1=self-employed) 
.00 -.01 -.04* -.04*** -.05*** 
Gender (1=female) .07*** .07*** .06** .04*** .10*** 
Age .01 .04** .04* .02 .05*** 
Education  
(low-high) 
-.09*** -.18*** -.13*** .09*** -.12*** 
Political ideology (left-
right) 
-.10*** -.09*** -.21*** -.11*** -.24*** 
Partner (1=partner) .02 .00 -.02 .01 -.02* 
ICC .04 .06 .12 .04 .06 
Deviance116 5031.82 4969.97 5269.46 22424.37 22466.06 
Source: ISSP (2006) and ESS (2002/2003). 
***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05
116 All models are significant improvements of the null models. 
 
                                                 
There are clear signs that the self-employed do not differ from employees regarding the 
policy areas health care and old age. This is in line with my argument that the self-
employed and ‘regular’ employees do not necessarily differ in their policy preferences. 
However, with regard to the policy area unemployment, the self-employed appear to have 
lower levels of support compared to employees. It also turns out that the self-employed 
do not favour government intervention in the economy and reject income redistribution. 
This confirms my hypotheses and might indeed point to a distinction between 
employment-related (or: ‘manufactured’) risks and social risks, such as health care and 
old age. Turning to the control variables, I observe some significant effects. As shown in 
table 6.5, women demand higher social spending on health care, pensions and 
unemployment. They also support government intervention in the economy and income 
redistribution in general. Differences in opinion between men and women have also been 
found in earlier research on welfare support (see, for example, Gelissen, 2001). 
Furthermore, older people are more supportive of social spending in the areas old age, 
unemployment and desire income redistribution. These results also fit the expectations. In 
general, the analyses also reveal that the higher educated are less supportive for social 
spending and income redistribution. These results are in line with the findings in the 
existing literature. (see, for example, Rehm, 2007). Because the higher educated are less 
exposed to risks, they do not support social spending and income redistribution. However, 
a ‘puzzling’ finding is that the higher educated demand government intervention in the 
economy. An interpretation is that they still perceive it is important that institutions, such 
as the state, play a role in the economy. Simply put, for the higher educated there is no 
reason to support social spending and economic redistribution, but in their opinion 
governments may still be of interest as they control for ‘deviant’ behaviour in the 
economy. Finally, people on the political right show lower support on all domains and 
having a partner decreases support for income redistribution. These findings are in line 
with the expectations.  
 
To summarize, the results basically seem to confirm my previous findings in the 
Netherlands. There are clear signs that the self-employed do not differ in their policy 
preferences from ‘regular’ employees, as long as it concerns so-called ‘external risks’, 
 
such as sickness and old age. The risk of unemployment as well as income redistribution 
and government intervention in the economy, seem to clash with the ideas of the self-
employed that individuals are (to a large extent) responsible for the occurrence of risks in 
this work-related domain.        
 
6.4.4 Conclusions and discussion 
In this part of the study, I have examined social policy preferences among the self-
employed across different national contexts. In accordance with my findings in chapter 
five, this study has shown no variation in individual support between the self-employed 
and employees, regarding the domains health care and old age. Furthermore, the self-
employed do not prefer unemployment spending and economic intervention in general. 
These types of state intervention secure against risks which are closely related to the 
labour market and, therefore, perceived as ‘manageable’ by individuals.  
The most important conclusion of this part of the study is that the self-employed are not 
that different from employees, regarding their social policy preferences. It is the specific 
domain of government intervention that matters. This needs to be addressed in future 
research, both theoretically and empirically. General notions that the self-employed 
favour free markets and a low level of social protection (Rehm, 2007; Iversen and 
Soskice, 2001; De Swaan, 1988) are no longer satisfactory. For policy-makers, these 
findings are important as well, in order to secure ‘atypical’ workers against risks on a 
transitional labour market.   
This study is clearly a first attempt to investigate social policy preferences among the 
self-employed in more detail. Naturally, more research is required to resolve some of the 
study limitations. There is still plenty room for improvements. Obviously, the most 
important limitation concerns the cross-sectional character of the analyses. Therefore, 
future studies should try to expand the analyses over time. Furthermore, the self-
employed form an extremely heterogeneous group of people (European Foundation, 2009; 
Arum and Müller, 2004). Distinguishing, for example, the social policy preferences of 
‘dependent’ self-employed workers (ILO, 2003), self-employed people working in 
different economic branches as well as self-employed workers with and without 
 
personnel is an interesting avenue for future research. Finally, I would like to suggest 
more research into the question how specific country differences may impact on social 
policy preferences of the self-employed. Although my aim was investigating the 
robustness of the empirical findings in the specific Dutch context across a large amount 
of national variation, it seems fruitful to explore country differences in more detail. In 
spite of these limitations, I would argue that studying social policy preferences among the 
self-employed is back on the research agenda. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This study focuses on flexible labour and its consequences for social policy preferences. 
This issue was chosen because of the rise of flexible employment conditions. During 
recent decades, traditional employment has been partially replaced by flexible types of 
employment, such as temporary contracts, self-employment and functional flexibility. 
The question can be asked how workers in the modern, flexible labour market perceive 
risk and a sense of community, which are important determinants of supporting social 
security. While fundamental socio-economic changes may impact on the development of 
the welfare state, research into labour flexibility and social policy preferences is still 
scarce. This study therefore aims to provide an answer to the following central research 
question: does labour flexibility play a role in the formation of social policy preferences 
and if so, in what way and why? In the previous chapters, I have looked at people with 
‘atypical’ employment contracts, functionally flexible workers and the self-employed in 
different organizational contexts and across different macro level settings. Because of the 
large size of the flexible workforce and the increasing number of self-employed persons 
(without personnel), the Netherlands was chosen as a starting point. In this concluding 
chapter, the overall picture of the empirical findings will be presented (section 7.2), 
followed by a theoretical reflection in section 7.3. In section 7.4, the implications for 
social policy-making are presented, while the limitations of the study and directions for 
future research are given in the final section (7.5).         
 
7.2   Labour flexibility and social policy preferences 
 
Over the last few decades, the Netherlands has experienced an increase in various types 
of labour flexibility (Dekker, 2007). By adopting labour flexibility, organizations are 
better able to operate in a fluctuating market environment caused by the globalization 
process, while it allows individual workers to cope with, for example, the demands of 
family life. At the same time, labour flexibility may imply risks for employees. Theorists 
 
like Beck (2000) and Bauman (2001) predict that employment instability for different 
types of ‘atypical’ employees will become a permanent feature. Furthermore, it is 
expected that ‘atypical’ employment undermines loyalty, trust and the sense of belonging 
to a wider collectivity (Sennett, 1998). Regarding functional flexibility, theory suggests 
that risk and sense of community may have contradictory effects: functional flexibility 
should enhance an employee’s sense of belonging to a wider collectivity and it is 
assumed to lessen risk (see chapter 3).  
 
Risk, self-interest and a sense of community are of great significance in understanding 
social policy preferences (see, for example, Van Oorschot, 2002), while different macro 
level conditions and organizational issues, such as the cultural and organizational context, 
the industrial relations system and/or labour market conditions may impact on the 
perception of risk and consequently on social policy preferences. This was explained in 
chapter 1. Having stressed the significance of these factors, empirical evidence has 
clearly shown the influence of policy preferences to actual social policy (see, for example, 
Brooks and Manza, 2007; Burstein, 1998; Page and Shapiro, 1983). As labour flexibility 
has become a significant element of the contemporary labour market it is, therefore, 
important to study the effects of labour flexibility on perceived risk, sense of community 
and social policy preferences.  
I will now briefly present all the research questions and the empirical results.      
 
7.2.1 ‘Atypical’ employment, perceived risk and sense of community  
In the empirical literature on the perception of risk and flexible employment, ‘atypical’ 
employment is related positively to perceived job insecurity (De Witte and Näswall, 
2003). Job insecurity refers to the perception of the possibility of losing one’s current job. 
In line with previous findings, I hypothesize that ‘atypical’ workers are more job insecure 
than other workers. Another type of perceived risk, associated with the labour market, is 
the perception of not finding employment in the external labour market. This refers to 
employment insecurity (or low ‘employability’). I expect that ‘atypical’ workers also 
experience less employment security, because they receive less training and opportunities 
for learning from employers (Eurostat, 2004). This possible link between ‘atypical’ 
 
employment and the perception of employment security has not been addressed by 
existing literature.  
As far as social policy preferences are concerned, individual support for social 
security can be explained by the perception of risk, such as job and employment 
insecurity, and by affective feelings towards others (De Beer and Koster, 2009). This 
raises a new question: does ‘atypical’ employment erode the sense of belonging to a 
wider community? For several researchers, ‘atypical’ employment is symbolic of the 
post-industrial trend towards greater ‘liquidity’ in the workplace. In a nutshell, this idea 
of ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2007; 2000) refers to a weakening of social bonds. With 
respect to the modern labour market, flexible labour has replaced the traditional 
relationships in work and no longer offers forms of community (see chapter 1). While 
this thesis is expressed by theorists like Bauman and Sennett, empirical studies are 
missing. Generally speaking, Bauman and Sennett expect ‘atypical’ employment to make 
solidarity harder to maintain (see also Wheelock, 1999). Drawing on their suggestions, I 
have hypothesized that workers with flexible employment contracts will report a less 
well-developed sense of community than other workers.  
To answer the questions above, data sets relating to Dutch workers were analysed 
from 2006 and 2008. These data sets provide information on the type of labour contract 
and the different motives for supporting social security. In chapters 2 and 3, it is argued 
that ‘atypical’ workers do indeed experience lower levels of job security compared to 
other workers. Additional analyses from 1998 to 2004, pointed out that this finding does 
not seem to be the result of the wider situation on the labour market (e.g. times of rising 
unemployment rates). However, ‘atypical’ workers do not seem to experience lower 
levels of employment security than other workers. I have indicated that the perceived risk 
of not finding other employment in the future may be something that ‘atypical’ workers 
do not yet worry about. It is, for example, possible that ‘atypical’ workers always expect 
it to be possible to find a temporary job. Hence, short-term employment contracts 
increase the occurrence of short-term risk (job insecurity), but not the occurrence of long-
term risk (employment insecurity). Another important finding is that the type of 
employment contract is not a significant factor in accounting for sense of community. 
Contrary to the decline-in-solidarity view, the sense of community is not dwindling 
 
among ‘atypical’ workers. This finding indicates that the type of labour contract has no 
effect on sense of community. It is more likely that sense of community is influenced by 
a person’s deeply rooted values and beliefs about community. Finally, I have shown that, 
as De Swaan (1989) has argued, the willingness to help others can partly be a function of 
self-interest: the feeling of belonging to a wider community and, consequently, the 
preferred need for collective insurance against risk may also refer to one’s self-interest 
(e.g. job insecurity).      
 
7.2.2 Functional flexibility, perceived risk and sense of community  
In chapters 3 and 4, the consequences of functional flexibility are investigated. Unlike 
‘atypical’ employment, functionally flexible workers are assumed to perceive greater job 
and employment security than other workers. By broadening and/or diversifying tasks at 
work, working in teams or rotating between tasks or departments, workers increase their 
skills levels and, therefore, become more valuable to organizations. An important way to 
retain these ‘valuable’ workers is by offering them job security. In addition, multi-skilled 
workers also feel more secure in the external labour market (employment security).  
 As for sense of community, functional flexibility may increase the motivational 
effect of this as a basis for individual support for social security. Increased cooperation 
between team members and learning from others by rotating between tasks and 
departments may improve the sense of belonging to a wider community. The 2008 
‘Labour and Welfare Opinions survey’, has provided the basis for the statistical analyses 
of functional flexibility, the perception of risk and sense of community. The results show 
that job security is not related to functionally flexible working, but these workers do 
perceive themselves as more ‘employable’ in the external labour market. For functionally 
flexible workers, ‘doing the job’ that they were initially hired for as well as the overall 
economic performance of the company are more salient factors in understanding 
perceptions of job security. The situation is different when it comes to employment 
security: functional flexibility seems to improve the perceived human capital of 
employees and their employment security. Theoretically, this implies that different types 
of labour flexibility may be linked to different types of security in the workplace: 
‘atypical’ workers feel more job-insecure than other workers, while functionally flexible 
 
workers feel more employment-secure than other categories of employees. Previous 
studies have focused mainly on ‘atypical’ forms of employment and perceived job 
insecurity. By doing this, these studies have largely ignored the importance of 
differentiating between ‘atypical’ and functional flexibility and different types of security. 
The findings presented in my study demonstrate the necessity of doing so. 
Again, there is no evidence that labour flexibility influences sense of community. 
This implies that sense of community neither diminishes nor strengthens under conditions 
of flexible labour. This finding calls into question the assumptions made by Bauman and 
Sennett. In spite of their suggestions, there seems to be no link between any of the types 
of labour flexibility that I have discussed and sense of community. In other words, on the 
basis of this research, their ‘grand theories’ on the transformation of work and its social 
consequences have to be challenged.    
 
7.2.3 Organizational issues  
It is possible that the organizational context affects the relationship between functional 
flexibility and the perception of risk: employers can choose how to implement functional 
flexibility. In chapter 4, I distinguished between the ‘high road’ and the ‘low road’ to 
functional flexibility. These different paths may involve different experiences of risk for 
employees. The ‘high road’ to functional flexibility involves autonomy and learning 
opportunities for employees, while the ‘low road’ provides little room for obtaining 
qualifications. In other words, the ‘high road’ context provides possibilities for increased 
job security and employment security in particular. I have investigated this issue in two 
contrasting work contexts: the ICT sector and the printing industry. Contrary to 
expectations, I have seen that functional flexibility may be beneficial for workers in both 
the ‘high road’ and the ‘low road’ work setting. In both of the companies that I studied, 
workers who are functionally flexible perceive employment security. Although more 
‘advanced’ forms of functional flexibility, such as more formal training and learning 
opportunities as well as greater autonomy, are found in the ICT sector, the results 
indicated that the individual expectations of workers are more important in understanding 
the effects of functional flexibility on perceived risk than the method of implementation 
(cf. Vidal, 2007). This finding does not undermine the importance of the organizational 
 
strategy (i.e. how functional flexibility is implemented). Rather, it implies that 
management practices must be in line with the expectation that workers have. In other 
words, different categories of workers may recognize the importance of functional 
flexibility, but they may wish for different workplace designs. From an employee 
perspective, this finding therefore questions the promotion of ‘high road’ solutions as the 
best route to change (European Commission, 2007).         
 
7.2.4 The self-employed 
Self-employment is another form of flexible employment investigated in this study. In the 
Netherlands, the number of self-employed persons increased from 11.7% in 1996 to 
12.9% in 2009. The increasing rate of self-employment in the Netherlands is largely 
connected to the growth in those who are classified as ‘self-employed without 
employees’117. The self-employed include a variety of different workers, from 
professionals working in the service sector to semi-skilled manual workers. 
 Chapter 5 examined the risk perception and social policy preferences of the self-
employed in the Netherlands. A key assumption in the literature is that the self-employed, 
by definition, tend to be less supportive of social security (see, for example, Iversen and 
Soskice, 2001; De Swaan, 1989). As I have already pointed out, a problem with previous 
research on social policy preferences is that self-employment has not been introduced as 
a central object of study. In contrast to earlier studies, therefore, my analysis has 
considered the social policy preferences of the self-employed in more detail. My analysis 
is based on data from the 2006 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and on 40 
in-depth interviews among self-employed workers without personnel. I put forward the 
hypothesis that self-employed workers are, indeed, more negative towards social security 
than employees, and that it is most clearly visible when it comes to risks for which they 
are not covered by social security. Contrary to expectations, however, the results 
presented in chapter 5 make it clear that the self-employed seem to favour collective risk 
protection. The overall picture that emerges is that support for social security among the 
self-employed is related to the type of risk: they do not have different policy preferences 
from employees when it comes to the policy domains health care, disability and old age, 
117 In Dutch: ‘Zelfstandige Zonder Personeel’ (ZZP). 
 
                                                 
but they are less supportive regarding the risk of unemployment. These views can be 
explained by self-interest and altruism: they support social security (health care and old 
age) because they are also, partially, entitled to social security and they view these risks 
as ‘external’ (Giddens, 1994). By perceiving risks as ‘external’, they feel comfortable 
with collectivistic risk strategies such as social security. In this way, support for 
collective risk-sharing is promoted by a sense of belonging to a wider community. Or, in 
the words of one of our respondents: “Some risks may happen to all of us”. Overall, then, 
assuming that self-employment by definition correlates negatively with support for social 
security is problematic. However, despite the similarities in social policy preferences 
between the self-employed and employees, self-employed persons claim that 
unemployment is a ‘manufactured’ risk. In other words, unemployment is not something 
that simply happens to people. As a consequence, when comparing the social policy 
preferences of the self-employed and employees, support for spending on unemployment 
benefits is lower among the self-employed. In the context of a growing proportion of self-
employed workers, this result suggests a potential threat towards the financial and social 
sustainability of social security programmes regarding the risk of unemployment. One 
could argue that our findings have been influenced by the global economic crisis118. Like 
other countries, the Netherlands’ economy was hit by rising unemployment levels and 
declining economic growth in 2009. However, I observed exactly the same social policy 
preferences among the self-employed before and during the economic crisis, so this 
argument can be countered.                               
 
7.2.5 Social policy preferences across national contexts 
In chapter 6, I made the first step in examining my findings across different national 
contexts. Institutional frameworks, such as social security and labour market regulations, 
as well as macro economic factors may impact on the findings in the Netherlands. For 
example, the unemployment rate, the level of employment protection legislation and the 
level of active labour market spending may all be linked to the perception of insecurity. 
When comparing the results in the Netherlands with the cross-country findings, it also 
118 Rising levels of poverty among the self-employed (SCP/CBS, 2010) may increase support for social 
security. 
 
                                                 
becomes clear that the results are valid across national variation. It is shown that 
perceived job and income insecurity is higher among those with a flexible employment 
contract, while I found that being functionally flexible had no effect on the perception of 
job insecurity. In sum, the cross-national results seem to demonstrate a consistent picture 
across countries: it is ‘atypical’ workers who most often face labour market risks, which 
increases their support for social policy assistance. In chapter 6, I also suggested that the 
experiences of risk and social policy preferences among the self-employed are shaped by 
the specific macro level context. For example, differences in economic development 
and/or the level of labour market regulation may influence the motives that people have 
for moving into self-employment, as well as the possible outcomes in terms of their 
social policy preferences. Furthermore, the particular cultural context and the level of 
social security coverage for the self-employed may have implications for paths to self-
employment and social policy preferences as well. My results show that, despite the 
cross-country heterogeneity, self-employment does not negatively influence support for 
social security, the risks of sickness and old age in particular. In accordance with the 
results in the Netherlands, self-employment reduces support for spending on 
unemployment benefits. Furthermore, it turns out that the self-employed do not favour 
government intervention in the economy and reject income redistribution. According to 
these findings, government action to protect people against the risk of unemployment, as 
well as government intervention to redistribute incomes, and intervention in the economy 
more generally, are all factors that seem to clash with the prevailing view among the self-
employed that people are, to a large extent, responsible for their own protection against 
risks in work-related domains. The self-employed consider these risks to be 
‘manufactured’. Yet, this conclusion is clearly different from the widespread claim that 
the self-employed always argue against any form of social security whatsoever.         
 
7.3 Solidarity in a flexible labour market 
 
I can draw some general conclusions from the results of this study. In the academic and 
policy debate, several assumptions have been made about how people in an increasingly 
flexible labour market perceive risks and sense of community and, hence, to what extent 
 
they support the social security system. A common statement among policy-makers is 
one of an inflexible social system, which needs reform to sustain its legitimacy. In other 
words, social security reform is needed in order to meet the demand for more 
individualized social security among a heterogeneous, flexible workforce (cf. Hosseini, 
2006; Leijnse et al., 2002). From a theoretical perspective, it was also assumed that 
individuals become less attached to each other and more sceptical about state intervention 
(Sennett, 1998; Bauman, 2001). These expectations relate to a ‘classical’ theme in 
sociology: the study of social change and the potential loss of solidarity which it may 
generate. This study contributes to the question of solidarity in changing societies as well 
as to the debate on the sustainability of the social security system (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).  
 
It is certainly true that there are new forms of work in the contemporary labour market, 
but employees with flexible labour contracts as well as the self-employed do not reject 
the idea of social security. Although these flexible workers are less integrated into 
collective groups in the labour market, they still support collective solutions to protect the 
members of a given society against risk. In simple terms, it appears that social security 
remains popular, despite a more fragmented workforce. Although it is often assumed that 
flexible labour is less conducive to a sense of belonging to a wider community, people 
still express solidarity on the basis of self-interest as well as in terms of sense of 
community. This conclusion confirms the findings of other, more general research that 
show that people remain committed to the social security system in modern societies (De 
Beer and Koster, 2009; Taylor-Gooby, 2001).  
In the sections that follow, I will discuss the theoretical implications in more 
detail. What do my findings imply for theories on class and community in a flexible 
labour market?                 
 
7.3.1 Class: a recommodification of risk  
Several social researchers have claimed that the concept of social class has expired 
(Pakulski and Waters, 1996; Clark and Lipset, 1991), while others (such as Achterberg, 
2006) continue to think that social class is a relevant factor in sociological research. In 
this debate, there have been no systematic studies on the consequences of labour 
 
flexibility for new inequalities (e.g. risk). Some researchers argue that risks are becoming 
more individualized in contemporary labour market (such as Beck, 1999; 2000), while 
others (such as Breen, 1997) claim that risks will follow traditional lines of social class. 
Breen (1997) argues that, in order to cope with changing demands in the globalized 
market environment, organizations are increasingly shifting their risks to employees. At 
the organizational level, labour flexibility is one strategy for dealing with the changes 
faced by organizations (Delsen, 1995). The attendant risks are transferred to less 
powerful groups in the labour market in particular. These groups include less-skilled 
employees working in jobs with poor working conditions. In other words, according to 
Breen, risk is following traditional class patterns in the global economy.  
The empirical results in this study suggest a ‘recommodification’ of risk; risks 
associated with labour flexibility are transferred onto employees and onto the lower-
skilled in particular. Large numbers of workers are expected to work on ‘atypical’ 
employment contracts, while another, core group is functionally flexible and becoming 
more employable on the external labour market. Generally, younger people, women and 
the less-qualified have ‘atypical’ employment contracts (see also OECD, 2002). These 
characteristics usually indicate a weak position on the labour market (Eurostat, 2007). My 
analysis clearly shows that these ‘atypical’ workers feel more job-insecure than other 
workers, while older, male, functionally flexible workers with open-ended contracts tend 
to feel more employment security. Hence, the workforce that has traditionally been more 
disadvantaged is becoming more vulnerable in the flexible labour market, while the core 
workforce continues to enjoy more secure employment. In other words, the risks of a 
flexible labour market do not affect different groups equally. Younger workers as well as 
women and the less-skilled are more likely to have ‘atypical’ employment contracts and, 
thus, experience the most risk (i.e. job insecurity). In this way, labour flexibility 
intensifies class-specific risks, as suggested by Breen (1997). Not all workers will be 
affected by ‘modern’ labour market risks, but those who have traditionally been 
disadvantaged in the labour market are becoming more disadvantaged. In conclusion, 
there seems to be a risk cleavage between ‘atypical’ (peripheral) and ‘functionally 
flexible’ (core) workers.      
 
One can argue that macro level conditions, such as the welfare state and labour 
market institutions, also impact on the level of this inequality between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ (Barbieri, 2009). For example, ‘atypical’ workers in tightly regulated labour 
markets, such as Italy and Spain, face the highest risks of not achieving permanent 
employment (Barbieri and Lucchini, 2006; Polavieja, 2005; Muffels and Luijkx, 2006). 
In this way, flexible employment may lead to structural insecurity. In the Netherlands, 
most flexible workers eventually move into permanent jobs (OECD, 2006)119. However, 
reviewing the cross-country results of this study, some general patterns emerge across 
institutional heterogeneity: insecurity is linked to ‘atypical’ employment while there is no 
connection between functional flexibility and the perception of job insecurity.          
 
7.3.2 Understanding social policy preferences: risk and sense of community 
My study focuses on people’s preferences for social security in a flexible labour market. 
The social security system is, among other things, based on what people consider to be 
legitimate. When citizens no longer believe that social security arrangements are ‘just’, 
policy-makers have to consider some degree of adjustment – due to electoral voting 
pressure, for example (see, for example, Brooks and Manza, 2007). At an individual level, 
social policy preferences are determined by self-interest and the degree to which they feel 
a sense of community (Van Oorschot, 2002; Gelissen, 2000). As a consequence of labour 
flexibility, ‘atypical’ workers feel more job-insecure, while functionally flexible workers 
feel more employment-secure. Job-insecure workers are expected to benefit from social 
security, particularly unemployment benefit, while employment-secure workers do not 
benefit directly. I thus expect job-insecure workers to show a higher level of individual 
support for social security while employment-secure workers show a lower level of 
support, particularly regarding the risk of unemployment. Furthermore, building on 
previous research (Van Oorschot, 2002), I hypothesized that a higher level of support for 
social security is guided by a higher level of perceived sense of community.  
  
119 However, certainly not all ‘atypical’ workers face mobility into permanent employment in the 
Netherlands (see, for an overview, Goudswaard, 2003; Heyma et al., 2010).  
 
                                                 
As can be seen in the different chapters, job-insecure workers did indeed show a higher 
level of support for spending on unemployment benefits. This is strong evidence for a 
self-interest explanation for social policy preferences: those who are likely to benefit 
from social security will be more likely to support it. Additionally, there is no 
relationship between perceived job insecurity and social policy preferences in other 
policy domains. One other result was surprising: employment-secure people do not show 
less support for spending on unemployment benefits. As I discussed in the chapters 3 and 
4, one possible explanation is that people are unable to judge risks that lie in the future 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). This stresses the significance of risk perception bias. In 
chapter 4, I have seen that although workers may feel employment-secure, they can still 
perceive long-term uncertainty when working in relatively high-risk sectors, such as the 
printing industry. In summary, the findings in this study have shown that self-interest is 
certainly an important factor in explaining social policy preferences. Although this 
finding is not new, no studies have examined various forms of insecurity in a flexible 
labour market and its influence on social policy preferences to my knowledge. A 
theoretical contribution is therefore that specific labour market risks (such as job 
insecurity) are, as a result of self-interest, related to social policy preferences in specific 
policy domains (e.g. unemployment-related domains). It is the type of labour market risk 
and the type of policy domain that matter. Furthermore, risk perception bias must be 
taken into account in order to fully understand why specific labour market risks (i.e. 
employment insecurity) are not related to social policy preferences. In this way, feelings 
of long-term uncertainty can partially explain why people still support social security 
despite feeling employment-secure.     
 
This study has also indicated that labour flexibility is not linked to sense of community. It 
was assumed that functional flexibility would be beneficial to sense of community, while 
‘atypical’ employment would not be. As stated earlier in this chapter, a person’s 
ideological values and beliefs are more likely to account for their sense of community. I 
would also like to argue that theorists who assume a decline in sense of community due 
to labour flexibility, such as Sennett and Bauman, consider sense of community as a 
somewhat static concept. For them, community is based on similarity (i.e. open-ended 
 
contracts with the same employer) rather than diversity (i.e. ‘atypical’ employment 
contracts and self-employment). Rather than assuming a decline in the sense of 
community as a result of the emergence of post-industrial labour relations, one could also 
suggest the realization of a ‘new’ community based on diversity and individualism. In his 
classical work on solidarity, Durkheim (1964) already labelled this as mechanical versus 
organic solidarity. According to this view, societal differentiation is then the basis for 
community, rather than homogeneity. Or, in the words of Delanty (2003: 195), 
“community is more flexible than may be thought at first sight”.              
 
While my analysis clearly shows there is no link between labour flexibility and sense of 
community, sense of community still plays an important role in understanding social 
policy preferences. Including sense of community in the theoretical framework offers a 
more complete understanding of social policy preferences. Even the most ‘employable’ 
and multi-skilled workers in my study did not show the calculating behaviour predicted 
by asset theorists (Iversen and Soskice, 2001). These researchers argue that workers with 
generic skills are unlikely to support social security. However, these workers still support 
collective social security, referring to people in their own social network, simply not 
wanting to choose between public and private social security arrangements and, because 
of a sense of community. This finding accords with other research projects, indicating the 
importance of more considerations than the rational choice approach in understanding 
social policy preferences (see, for example, De Beer and Koster, 2009; Jaeger, 2006). In 
the end, support for social security does not depend solely on the distribution of risk.   
 
7.3.3 The self-employed: class and social policy preferences revisited 
If one follows theory on class and political orientations (see, for example, Barone et al., 
2007; Heath et al., 1995; Lipset, 1970)120, supporting social security ought not to be in 
the interest of the self-employed. Firstly, the self-employed are assumed to favour their 
individual autonomy (De Swaan, 1989) and, secondly, paying for collective social 
security arrangements is not expected to be in their economic interest (Iversen and 
120 However, depending on the changing nature of the political culture, material issues may be less central 
in social policy preferences (Achterberg, 2006; Van der Waal et al., 2007). 
 
                                                 
Soskice, 2001). However, in this research I have argued that this claim should not be 
overstated. While one can still argue that the self-employed demonstrate a negative 
preference for government intervention when it comes to employment-related, 
‘manufactured’ risks, they do not differ much from employees in their social policy 
preferences regarding ‘external’ risks such as sickness, disability and old age. In other 
words, the ‘traditional’ view that the self-employed have no reason to support collective 
social security no longer holds. As discussed earlier in the chapters 5 and 6, it is the 
specific domain of government intervention that matters for social policy preferences 
among self-employed workers. Political sociologists should, thus, be sceptical of the idea 
that there is, necessarily, a negative correlation between a self-employed occupational 
position and support for social security. It is the type of risk that matters.                
 
7.4 Policy implications 
 
Turning to the future of the social security system in the Netherlands, the most important 
outcome of this research is that the flexible labour market is not putting the social 
legitimacy of the social system under strain. In the Dutch policy debate, it is often 
suggested that moving towards a more flexible labour market requires some kind of 
reinvention of the welfare state (cf. De Mooij, 2007; CPB, 2006), with more individual 
responsibility and a larger degree of freedom of choice (Hosseini, 2006; Goudswaard, 
2002; Leijnse et al., 2002). This study has shown that labour flexibility does not lead to 
any obvious decline in support for collective social security. In fact, due to increased job 
insecurity among ‘atypical’ workers, there is even a strong preference for more 
unemployment-related services, and although the self-employed are less willing to 
support unemployment-related spending, they are not as negatively disposed towards 
social security as is often assumed. For this reason, if a future government were to aim 
for greater labour flexibility, this should be accompanied by relatively high levels of 
social protection (e.g. income protection and/or schooling facilities) in order to balance 
the risks and needs of citizens in a flexible labour market. This study clearly shows that 
labour flexibility is related to risks for ‘atypical’ workers, so social protection for that 
group would seem desirable. Furthermore, the Social and Economic Council of the 
 
Netherlands (SER) has recently published its advice on the social security needs of the 
self-employed without personnel (SER, 2010). Unfortunately, although studies show that 
less than half of all self-employed persons without personnel have taken out disability 
insurance (RWI, 2009), the SER has decided not to reopen the discussion on a public 
disability insurance scheme for the self-employed. This study has shown that the self-
employed prefer a basic guarantee against risks over which they cannot exercise much 
influence. If policy-makers require greater labour flexibility, what is needed from an 
individual perspective is a system that offers basic social guarantees (cf. Hemerijck, 
2002). In this way, social protection may enhance labour market flexibility: people will 
change jobs more easily if they do not have to worry about losing their social insurance 
(Ferrera et al., 2001). In addition to basic health care and a first-pillar pension scheme, 
this implies a public disability insurance scheme for the self-employed.           
  
7.5 Limitations of the study and future research  
 
While this study offers more insight into the question of whether labour flexibility plays a 
role in understanding social policy preferences, more research is still needed. My 
research is based on various cross-sectional surveys as well as in-depth interviews. This 
combination of research methods is a fruitful way of increasing the validity of the 
findings. However, as mentioned previously in this study, future research should try to 
disaggregate the results to specific groups of flexible workers in order to gain a more 
detailed understanding. For example, within ‘atypical’ workers, one could differentiate 
between temporary workers, on-call workers and agency workers. Regarding functional 
flexibility, more indicators could be included, while it would also be useful to distinguish 
the results between the self-employed with employees and without employees. Another 
interesting subject for a future study would be the risk perceptions among functionally 
flexible employees in other sectors and/or organizations. For example, the selection of 
organizations that develop different approaches to functional flexibility at the same time 
(such as the ‘high road’ and the ‘low road’) would be needed in order to make more 
detailed comparisons in risk perceptions between different groups of workers. Finally, 
one important point to make concerns the need for detailed studies in different 
 
institutional contexts. My study design was aimed at understanding social policy 
preferences in the relatively flexible Dutch labour market. In chapter 6, the cross-national 
results indicate external validity to other contexts. Nonetheless, my study was not 
designed to be particularly sensitive to contextual, macro level differences. 
Understanding social policy preferences among flexible workers in specific national 
contexts would require additional research.    
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Dutch summary 
 
Flexibele arbeid, risico’s en de verzorgingsstaat 
 
Inleiding en probleemstelling  
 
Van oudsher biedt het stelsel van sociale zekerheid bescherming tegen verschillende 
vormen van inkomensverlies. Mensen die onvoldoende in hun eigen bestaan kunnen 
voorzien, kunnen rekenen op de steun van anderen. Deze steun kan op individueel niveau 
gebaseerd zijn op vormen van welbegrepen eigenbelang en/of op gemeenschapsbesef.  
Allereerst is eigenbelang een belangrijke factor om de opvattingen van mensen over 
sociale zekerheid te kunnen begrijpen. Risico’s en problemen waar mensen tegenaan 
lopen kunnen via collectieve arrangementen, zoals het stelsel van sociale zekerheid, 
worden opgevangen. Dit besef resulteert in een positieve opvatting van burgers over 
sociale zekerheid. Een ander mechanisme dat van invloed is op de opvattingen van 
mensen over sociale zekerheid heeft te maken met gemeenschapsbesef. Niet het 
eigenbelang maar de overtuiging dat mensen deel uitmaken van een groter geheel is dan 
de grondslag voor positieve opvattingen over sociale zekerheid. Dit proefschrift gaat over 
de mogelijke consequenties van flexibele arbeid op de opvattingen die mensen hebben 
over sociale zekerheid. We hebben hierbij aandacht voor verschillende beleidsterreinen, 
zoals gezondheid, oudedagsvoorziening en werkloosheid. Het belang van de bestudering 
van opvattingen van mensen over sociale zekerheid blijkt uit het gegeven dat zij een 
factor van betekenis is bij de totstandkoming van sociaal beleid. Dit is inmiddels al 
diverse malen door onderzoek bevestigd.  
 
Tegenwoordig werken steeds meer mensen op basis van een flexibel arbeidscontract 
en/of zijn ze functioneel flexibel actief binnen bedrijven en/of werken ze als zelfstandig 
ondernemer (al dan niet met of zonder personeel). In 2009 werkte ongeveer 13,5 procent 
van de Europese beroepsbevolking in een flexibele baan en was 15,5 procent zelfstandig 
ondernemer. Ondanks dat minder gegevens bekend zijn over de aard en omvang van 
functioneel flexibele arbeid wijzen de beschikbare cijfers er ook in dit geval op dat het 
 
een onlosmakelijk onderdeel is van de hedendaagse arbeidsmarkt. In de wetenschap zijn 
tegenstrijdige opvattingen te vinden over de mogelijke relaties tussen flexibele arbeid en 
opvattingen over sociale zekerheid.  
In een breed theoretisch verband zijn er allereerst theoretici die veronderstellen 
dat de opkomst van flexibele arbeid leidt tot een situatie waarin iedereen, tijdelijk, met 
onzekerheid en werkloosheid te maken krijgt (Beck, 2000; Heery en Salmon, 2000) 
terwijl anderen veronderstellen dat het vooral de ‘traditioneel’ kwetsbaren zijn op de 
arbeidsmarkt, zoals laaggeschoolden, die met de risico’s van een flexibele arbeidsmarkt 
geconfronteerd worden (Breen, 1997). Dit zijn belangwekkende theoretische noties 
waarvan de empirische houdbaarheid tot op heden nog niet in kaart is gebracht. Als het 
gaat om risico’s gaat het in dit proefschrift om de ervaren baan- en werkonzekerheid. Bij 
baanonzekerheid gaat het om de onzekerheid over het behoud van de baan, terwijl het bij 
werkonzekerheid gaat om de onzekerheid van het vinden van werk in de toekomst.  
Ten tweede zijn er theoretici die ingaan op de gevolgen van flexibele arbeid voor 
het gemeenschapsbesef. In de ogen van de sociologen Sennett (1998) en Bauman (2001) 
leidt flexibele arbeid tot een verminderde betrokkenheid bij de ander. Volgens Sennett is 
een duurzame betrokkenheid bij anderen niet langer mogelijk aangezien flexibele arbeid 
zich juist kenmerkt door korte, voortdurend wisselende relaties. Ook Bauman is 
pessimistisch over het gemeenschapsbesef binnen een flexibel arbeidsbestel. Bauman 
stelt dat er sprake is van ‘fragmentarisering’ op de arbeidsmarkt. In zijn optiek verliezen 
‘traditionele’ instituties als de vaste arbeidsrelatie aan betekenis en is het de individuele 
werknemer die zelf verantwoordelijk wordt voor zijn of haar loopbaan. Dit resulteert, net 
als bij Sennett, in een afnemend sociaal besef. Wederom is empirisch weinig bekend over 
de houdbaarheid van deze redeneringen. Over het algemeen heeft bestaand onderzoek 
weinig tot geen aandacht voor de verbanden tussen flexibele arbeid, ervaren risico’s, 
gemeenschapsbesef en opvattingen over sociale zekerheid. Doel van het onderzoek is 
daarom de beantwoording van de centrale problemstelling: 
 
Is het hebben van een flexibele arbeidsrelatie van invloed op de opvattingen van mensen 
over sociale zekerheid en zo ja, op welke wijze en waarom? 
  
 
De tot dusver besproken theoretische veronderstellingen hebben betrekking op de 
gevolgen van flexibele arbeid in algemene zin, en zijn daarom nog onvoldoende 
vruchtbaar om te komen tot toetsbare onderzoeksvragen. In dit proefschrift zijn daarom 
diverse theorieën behandeld die ingaan op de gevolgen van drie vormen van flexibele 
arbeid voor de opvattingen over sociale zekerheid. De nadruk ligt op ‘atypische’ arbeid, 
functioneel flexibele arbeid en zelfstandig ondernemerschap. Deze vormen van flexibele 
arbeid zijn het meest ingebed in de literatuur. Nederland is vervolgens gekozen als 
strategische casus aangezien het beschikt over één van de meest flexibele arbeidsmarkten 
van Europa (De Vries en Wolbers, 2005; Delsen, 1995). De verschillende 
onderzoeksvragen en verwachtingen die in dit proefschrift per type flexibele arbeid 
gebruikt zijn, worden hieronder in het kort weergegeven.      
 
Onderzoeksvragen en structuur 
 
Een eerste vraag die zich aandient is of ‘atypische’ arbeid invloed uitoefent op de 
opvattingen van mensen over sociale zekerheid. Met ‘atypische’ arbeid worden 
arbeidsrelaties bedoeld die afwijken van ‘reguliere’ arbeidscontracten van onbepaalde 
duur. Het gaat dan in de eerste plaats om werknemers met tijdelijke contracten (zonder 
uitzicht op een vast contract), uitzendwerk en op- en afroepcontracten. In aansluiting op 
de veronderstellingen in de bestaande literatuur verwachten we dat ‘aypische’ 
werknemers een grotere mate van baan- en werkonzekerheid ervaren.  Deze 
onzekerheden kunnen vervolgens, via het motief van eigenbelang, bijdragen aan een 
grotere behoefte aan sociale zekerheid. Daarnaast vragen we ons af wat ‘atypische’ 
arbeid betekent voor het gemeenschapsbesef van mensen. Zoals we hebben gezien zijn er 
diverse sociologen die de conclusie trekken dat gemeenschapsbesef, en hiermee ook het 
collectieve stelsel van sociale zekerheid, niet kan gedijen in een flexibele arbeidsmarkt. 
Onderzoek hiernaar is schaars. In eerder onderzoek is alleen de relatie tussen ‘atypische’ 
arbeid en ervaren baanonzekerheid onderzocht. In hoofdstuk 2 staan de gevolgen van 
‘atypische’ arbeid voor de opvattingen van mensen over sociale zekerheid centraal. 
Hiermee wordt voorzien in een duidelijke lacune in de literatuur. Het empirische gedeelte 
 
van dit hoofdstuk wordt gevormd door statistische analyses op databestanden die in de 
jaren 2008 en 2006 zijn verzameld en over de periode 1998-2004.  
 
Een tweede vraag heeft te maken met de gevolgen van functioneel flexibele arbeid 
voor de opvattingen van mensen over sociale zekerheid. Functionele flexibiliteit 
heeft diverse uitingsvormen. Als we in dit proefschrift spreken over functionele 
flexibiliteit gaat het om praktijken als taak- en afdelingsrotatie en/of het werken in 
teams. Ondanks dat in de literatuur verschillende visies bestaan ten aanzien van de 
consequenties van functioneel flexibele arbeid voor werknemers, zijn de meeste 
onderzoekers van mening dat functioneel flexibele arbeid bij kan dragen aan de 
ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden en hiermee aan de ervaren zekerheden van werknemers 
op de arbeidsmarkt. Doordat functioneel flexibele werknemers multi-inzetbaar (of: 
‘employable’) zijn kunnen ze veel leren en ontwikkelen ze een sterkere positie op de 
arbeidsmarkt in vergelijking met anderen. Versterking van de baan- en 
werkzekerheid kan vervolgens, via het motief van eigenbelang, bijdragen aan 
verminderde voorkeuren voor sociale zekerheid. Een andere veronderstelling is dat 
functioneel flexibele arbeid, in tegenstelling tot ‘atypische’ arbeid, bij kan dragen 
aan versterking van het gemeenschapsbesef. Doordat werknemers meer met 
verschillende mensen in contact komen binnen de organisatie ontstaat eerder een 
gevoel van samenhang en betrokkenheid bij de ander en ontstaat er eerder 
instemming met sociale zekerheid, zo is de verwachting. Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op 
deze veronderstellingen en voorziet wederom in een aantal hiaten in de literatuur. 
Een statistische analyse is verricht over data uit een landelijke steekproef in 2008.         
 
In hoofdstuk 4 verschuift de focus naar het bedrijfsniveau. We vragen ons in dit 
hoofdstuk af of de organisatiecontext de relatie tussen functioneel flexibele arbeid 
en opvattingen over sociale zekerheid beïnvloedt. We stellen vast dat functioneel 
flexibele arbeid via een zogenaamde ‘high road’ dan wel via een ‘low road’-strategie 
kan worden ingevoerd. In het eerste geval staan de opbrengsten voor werknemers 
(mede) centraal, terwijl in het laatstgenoemde geval primair de bedrijfsmotieven 
(zoals kostenoverwegingen en vergroting van de wendbaarheid van de organisatie) 
 
leidend zijn. Naast de aandacht voor de organisatiecontext proberen we in dit 
hoofdstuk ook antwoord te geven op de vraag of functioneel flexibele werknemers 
zich, via de ontwikkeling van meer generieke vaardigheden, bij hun opvattingen 
over sociale zekerheid exclusief laten leiden door het eigenbelang, zoals aanhangers 
van de zogenaamde ‘Asset Theory’ veronderstellen. Het empirische gedeelte bestaat 
uit twee casestudies. Eén organisatie is gekozen als representant van de industriële 
economie (de ‘low road’) en één organisatie is geselecteerd als representant van een 
post-industriële setting (de ‘high road’).          
 
De zelfstandig ondernemers vormen een andere groep ‘atypische’ werkers en staan 
centraal in hoofdstuk 5. Sinds een aantal jaren lijken steeds meer Nederlanders naast de al 
eerder genoemde flexibele dienstverbanden te kiezen voor het zelfstandig 
ondernemerschap. Als wordt gekeken naar de ontwikkelingen in het ondernemerschap 
blijkt dat het percentage zelfstandig ondernemers vanaf 1996 is toegenomen van 11,7 
procent naar 12,9 procent in 2009. Binnen dit segment is met name het aandeel 
zelfstandigen zonder werknemers (de zzp’ers) in relatieve zin gestegen, van 54,5 procent 
in 1996 tot 66,1 procent in 2009. De gangbare opvatting in de literatuur is dat 
zelfstandigen van oudsher wantrouwend staan tegenover collectieve arrangementen. 
Dergelijke collectiviteiten zouden in hun beleving de individuele soevereiniteit beperken. 
In eerder onderzoek wordt weinig tot geen specifieke aandacht geschonken aan dit thema. 
Via data afkomstig uit het International Social Survey Programme (2006) en 40 
aanvullende interviews met zzp’ers in de zakelijke dienstverlening en de bouwnijverheid 
wordt bezien of zelfstandig ondernemers in het algemeen en zzp’ers in het bijzonder 
inderdaad geen voorkeur hebben voor sociale zekerheid.     
 
In hoofdstuk 6 is getracht de onderzoeksbevindingen in de Nederlandse context te 
generaliseren naar andere landen. Dit hoofdstuk richt zich hierbij niet op de vraag op 
welke wijze een specifieke sociaal-economische omgeving de bevindingen kan 
beïnvloeden, maar eerder op het in beeld krijgen van de empirische reikwijdte van de 
resultaten gegeven de variatie tussen landen. Een minder strenge ontslagbescherming van 
flexibele werknemers kan bijvoorbeeld van invloed zijn op de mate van ervaren 
 
baanonzekerheid, terwijl het niveau van nationale bestedingen aan actief 
arbeidsmarktbeleid van invloed kan zijn op de mate van ervaren werkonzekerheid. De 
situatie op de arbeidsmarkt en conjuncturele effecten zijn andere factoren die in de 
literatuur al vaak met ervaren baan- en werkonzekerheid in verband zijn gebracht. In de 
literatuur zijn ook aanwijzingen gevonden dat de wijze waarop functionele flexibiliteit 
binnen bedrijven wordt ingezet en de consequenties hiervan voor werknemers, varieert 
tussen landen. Onder andere de institutionele kenmerken van landen, denk hierbij 
bijvoorbeeld aan de corporatistische structuur in Nederland waarbij ruimte is voor 
geïnstitutionaliseerde samenwerking tussen overheid en sociale partners, kunnen van 
invloed zijn op de opstelling van werkgever ten aanzien van functionele flexibiliteit en de 
gevolgen voor werknemers. Wat betreft de zelfstandig ondernemers laat de literatuur zien 
dat beslissingen om als zelfstandige te opereren op de arbeidsmarkt eveneens zijn 
ingebed in institutionele en sociaal-economische structuren. Naast de situatie op de 
arbeidsmarkt en conjuncturele effecten kan ook de mate van ontslagbescherming van 
vaste werknemers van invloed zijn op de beslissing om als zelfstandig ondernemer aan de 
slag te gaan. Een andere veronderstelling in de literatuur luidt dat culturele 
karakteristieken, zoals de mate van onzekerheidsvermijding, van invloed kunnen zijn op 
de beslissing om te starten als zelfstandig ondernemer. Naast de invloed van deze 
factoren op het zelfstandig ondernemerschap kan er tevens een relatie worden gelegd met 
de opvattingen over sociale zekerheid. Zo is economische neergang bijvoorbeeld een 
goede voorspeller van minder individuele steun aan sociale zekerheid, gaat een 
oplopende werkloosheid over het algemeen juist gepaard met een grotere vraag naar 
sociale zekerheid en mogen we veronderstellen dat individuen die leven in een 
samenleving met een hogere onzekerheidsvermijding ook meer belang hechten aan de 
zekerheden van het sociale stelsel. Ten slotte is het niet ondenkbaar dat de mate waarin 
zelfstandig ondernemers vallen onder de personele werkingssfeer van het stelsel van 
sociale zekerheid van invloed is op hun opvattingen over dit stelsel. Om te kunnen 
onderzoeken in hoeverre de bevindingen uit de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5 stand houden 
in weerwil van de aanzienlijke verschillen tussen landen, worden in dit hoofdstuk een 
aantal hypothesen getoetst met behulp van data uit de Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001), de 
 
European Working Conditions Survey (2005), het International Social Survey 
Programme (2006) en de European Social Survey (2002/2003).         
 
Tot slot worden in hoofdstuk 7 de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit proefschrift 
samengevat en de implicaties en beperkingen van de studie besproken.  
 
In het volgende figuur is het conceptueel model weergegeven, waarin de verklaring van 
opvattingen van mensen over sociale zekerheid in een flexibel arbeidsbestel centraal staat. 
 
 
 
 
Resultaten en implicaties 
 
De resultaten laten zien dat ‘atypische’ werknemers een grotere mate van 
baanonzekerheid ervaren dan andere groepen op de arbeidsmarkt. Opvallend is dat er 
geen relatie is met gevoelens van werkonzekerheid. Van belang is derhalve om een 
onderscheid aan te brengen naar het type risico dat met ‘atypische’ arbeid samenhangt. 
Flexibele 
arbeidsrelatie: 
-‘atypische’ 
arbeid; 
-functionele 
flexibiliteit; 
-zelfstandig 
ondernemer- 
schap 
  
Ervaren risico’s: 
baanonzekerheid 
werkonzekerheid 
 
Gemeenschaps- 
besef 
Opvattingen 
sociale zekerheid 
Type implementatie:  
‘empowerment’ vs. ‘control’ 
 
Ook zien we dat er geen relatie bestaat tussen het werken met een flexibel arbeidscontract 
en gemeenschapsbesef. Dit betekent dat flexibiliteit op de arbeidsmarkt niet het 
gemeenschapsbesef ondermijnt, zoals verschillende onderzoekers suggereren. Als het 
gaat om de opvattingen over sociale zekerheid constateren we dat de ervaren 
baanonzekerheid positief samenhangt met een voorkeur voor ruimere 
werkloosheidsbestedingen. Dit is de conform de verwachtingen: op basis van het motief 
van eigenbelang resulteert baanonzekerheid in een grotere behoefte aan collectieve 
compensatie van het werkloosheidsrisico. Er zijn geen relaties met opvattingen over 
andere beleidsterreinen.   
 
Zoals verwacht is het gevoel van werkzekerheid groter bij werknemers die functioneel 
flexibel zijn. Functionele flexibiliteit gaat daarentegen niet gepaard met verhoogde 
gevoelens van baanzekerheid. Dit zijn nieuwe inzichten. Ook opvallend is dat er geen 
verband is tussen de ervaren werkzekerheid van functioneel flexibele werknemers en 
opvattingen over sociale zekerheid. We hebben tevens verondersteld dat functionele 
flexibiliteit verband kan houden met een groter gemeenschapsbesef. Hiervan lijkt echter 
geen sprake te zijn. Op basis van deze resultaten kunnen we concluderen dat flexibele 
arbeid niet van belang is bij het begrijpen van gemeenschapsbesef: ‘atypische’ arbeid 
noch functionele flexibiliteit spelen een rol van betekenis.   
 
De conclusie van hoofdstuk 4 luidt dat het bedrijfsniveau geen onderscheidend effect 
heeft op gevoelens van werk- of baanonzekerheid van werknemers. Een veel 
voorkomende veronderstelling is dat werknemers hun situatie als minder gunstig 
beoordelen wanneer zij geconfronteerd worden met de invoering van functionele 
flexibiliteit via een zogenaamde ‘low road’-strategie. Het door werkgevers onvoldoende 
aandacht schenken aan de autonomie en leermogelijkheden van werknemers resulteert bij 
het personeel niet in een perceptie van verhoogde kansen op de arbeidsmarkt, zo is de 
verwachting. De resultaten laten echter zien dat niet zozeer de organisatiecontext als wel 
het verwachtingspatroon van werknemers ten aanzien van functionele flexibiliteit de 
bepalende factor is. Dit is een verklaring voor het feit dat, zowel bij werknemers in een 
werkomgeving waarbij een ruime aandacht bestaat voor personeelsbelangen bij de 
 
invoering van functionele flexibiliteit als bij werknemers in een ‘low road’-
werkomgeving, de ervaren werkzekerheid onder invloed van functionele flexibiliteit 
toeneemt. Daarnaast hebben we in dit hoofdstuk gerapporteerd dat in tegenstelling tot wat 
aanhangers van de ‘Asset Theory’ beweren, het hebben van relatief veel brede 
vaardigheden niet per definitie leidt tot een afnemende bereidheid tot collectieve 
risicodeling in de sociale zekerheid. De bevindingen laten juist zien dat alternatieve 
factoren van even groot belang kunnen zijn om opvattingen van mensen ten aanzien van 
het sociale stelsel te verklaren.      
 
In hoofdstuk 5 is onderzocht of het zelfstandig ondernemerschap samen gaat met een 
lagere bereidheid om het stelsel van sociale zekerheid te steunen. Een belangrijke 
conclusie is dat zelfstandigen in hun opvattingen over sociale zekerheid in veel opzichten 
niet verschillen van werknemers. Zelfstandigen staan duidelijk negatiever tegenover 
werkloosheidsuitgaven, maar verschillen niet van werknemers in hun opvattingen over 
collectieve uitgaven voor gezondheid en ouderdom. Er zijn geen aanwijzingen gevonden 
dat de financieel-economische crisis deze bevindingen beïnvloedt. 
 
Tenslotte is in hoofdstuk 6 getoetst in hoeverre de eerdere bevindingen generaliserbaar 
zijn. Op basis van de resultaten uit dit hoofdstuk kunnen we concluderen dat er 
voldoende empirische ondersteuning is gevonden dat de bevindingen ook in andere 
landen op kunnen gaan. Verschillende indicatoren voor ‘atypische’ arbeid hangen samen 
met een verhoogde voorkeur voor sociale bescherming in het geval van werkloosheid. De 
ervaren baanonzekerheid is een belangrijk mechanisme dat hieraan ten grondslag ligt. 
Wat betreft de gevolgen van functionele flexibiliteit voor werknemers zien we wederom 
dat functionele flexibiliteit niet de ervaren baanzekerheid stimuleert. Tot slot gaat een 
zelfstandige beroepspositie gepaard met een verminderde steun voor publieke 
interventies rondom de bestrijding van het werkloosheidsrisico, maar zijn er geen 
verbanden met opvattingen over andere beleidsterreinen.   
 
Er kunnen op basis van de bovenstaande bevindingen tevens een aantal meer algemene 
conclusies worden getrokken. 
 
 ‘Insiders’ en ‘outsiders’ op de flexibele arbeidsmarkt 
Allereerst kunnen we stellen dat de ervaren risico’s die samenhangen met flexibele arbeid 
vooral terecht komen bij groepen die al relatief kwetsbaar zijn op de arbeidsmarkt. 
Jongeren, vrouwen en laaggeschoolden zijn eerder aangewezen op flexibele 
arbeidscontracten en worden meer geconfronteerd met ervaren baanonzekerheid 
vergeleken met anderen. Daarentegen zijn het de werknemers met vaste 
arbeidscontracten die eerder te maken krijgen met functionele flexibilisering en zij 
verwerven hiermee meer werkzekerheid. Dit proces heeft een belangrijk gevolg: het 
ontstaan van een mogelijke tweedeling tussen ‘insiders’ die in aanraking komen met de 
kansen op de hedendaagse flexibele arbeidsmarkt en ‘outsiders’ die in mindere mate 
profiteren van het werken in een flexibel arbeidsbestel.   
 
Flexibele arbeid en opvattingen over sociale zekerheid 
Hoe verhouden de bevindingen zich tot onze kennis rondom de opvattingen die mensen 
erop nahouden als het het gaat om sociale zekerheid? De theoretische veronderstelling 
van diverse sociologen dat flexibele arbeid het gemeenschapsbesef ondermijnt blijkt in 
ieder geval niet houdbaar. Een blinde vlek in het debat over de gevolgen van flexibele 
arbeid voor het gemeenschapsbesef is dat gevoelens van verbondenheid tussen mensen 
ook kunnen bestaan op basis van verschillen (differentiatie in arbeidsrelaties) in plaats 
van overeenkomsten (de ‘norm’ van een vast contract). Flexibele arbeid ondergraaft in 
deze zin, kortom, niet het gemeenschapsbesef als grondslag voor het stelsel van sociale 
zekerheid.  
 
We hebben daarnaast gezien dat flexibele arbeid wel van invloed is op de risico’s en 
kansen die mensen ervaren. ‘Atypische’ arbeid hangt samen met een grotere mate van 
baanonzekerheid maar er is geen verband met ervaren werkonzekerheid. Bij functioneel 
flexibele werknemers neemt de ervaren werkzekerheid toe maar is er geen relatie met 
ervaren baanzekerheid. Hieruit blijkt dat verschillende vormen van flexibiliteit verband 
houden met verschillende risico’s voor werknemers. Baanonzekerheid houdt vervolgens 
verband met een grotere behoefte aan sociale zekerheid als het gaat om compensatie van 
 
het werkloosheidsrisico. Het theoretische mechanisme achter deze relatie is het 
calculerend eigenbelang van mensen: sociale zekerheid levert de betreffende groep 
werknemers voordeel op. De bevinding dat functioneel flexibele, werkzekere, 
werknemers daarentegen geen verminderde voorkeur vertonen voor sociale zekerheid 
staat hiermee in contrast. Theoretisch kan echter worden onderbouwd dat er sprake is van 
een mogelijke ‘bias’ in de risicoperceptie. Dit doet zich in dit geval voor omdat het 
betreffende risico verband houdt met de langere termijn. De arbeidsmarktsituatie op de 
langere termijn is door een gebrek aan informatie dan niet goed in te schatten. Uit de 
interviews met werkzekere respondenten in de grafische sector hebben we bijvoorbeeld 
gezien dat zij tegelijkertijd een mate van onzekerheid ervaren als het gaat om het 
toekomstige werken in de desbetreffende sector. Dit betekent dat zij zich, ondanks hun 
ervaren werkzekerheid, nog onvoldoende een voorstelling kunnen maken van hun risico’s 
op de langere termijn. Dit zou een mogelijke verklaring kunnen zijn. Het perspectief dat 
dit proefschrift in ieder geval wil bieden is dat individuen minder rationeel zijn dan 
aanhangers van ‘rational choice’-theorieën vaak verwachten. De bevinding dat zelfs de 
werknemers met generieke vaardigheden en een hoge mate van ervaren werkzekerheid  
bij hun opvattingen over sociale zekerheid wijzen op de verbondenheid met mensen in 
het eigen sociale netwerk, een gevoel van gemeenschapsbesef en/of wijzen op het 
verschijnsel ‘keuzestress’ past eveneens in het beeld dat mensen hun opvattingen niet 
slechts baseren op basis van een optimalisatie van puur eigenbelang.       
 
Een andere vaststelling is dat zelfstandigen niet a priori in hun opvattingen over sociale 
zekerheid verschillen van andere groepen op de arbeidsmarkt. Werkloosheid is in hun 
optiek weliswaar niet simpelweg domme pech maar beïnvloedbaar, waarbij mensen 
kunnen worden aangesproken op hun eigen verantwoordelijkheid. Zelfstandigen hebben 
daarentegen belang bij bestaande socialezekerheidsregelingen die ook hun risico’s 
dekken, en bij niet of moeilijk beïnvloedbare risico’s zoals ziekte en ouderdom ligt 
eveneens steun voor sociale zekerheid voor de hand. Dit zijn relevante bevindingen voor 
onderzoekers die zich bezig houden met opinie-onderzoek rondom de verzorgingsstaat. 
 
 
Tot slot zijn er enkele implicaties voor de beleidspraktijk. In de afgelopen jaren zijn 
diverse rapportages verschenen met als onderwerp herziening van het sociale 
zekerheidsstelsel. Onder andere tegen de achtergrond van een heterogene 
arbeidssamenleving zou het huidige stelsel niet meer van deze tijd zijn. Verschillende 
pleidooien zijn gehouden voor een kleiner stelsel met meer eigen verantwoordelijkheid 
en keuzevrijheid. Dit versterkt de legitimiteit van het stelsel, zo is de redenering. Deze 
studie heeft echter laten zien dat mensen die actief zijn op een flexibele arbeidsmarkt 
eerder lijken te vragen om meer sociale bescherming en niet om een grotere mate van 
keuzevrijheid. ‘Atypische’ arbeid gaat gepaard met een hogere mate van 
baanonzekerheid en zelfstandig ondernemers lijken niet eenduidig afscheid te willen 
nemen van sociale beschermingsconstructies. In de toekomst ligt er voor beleidsmakers 
een uitdaging om een (betere) balans te vinden tussen de risico’s van ‘atypisch’ arbeid en 
baan- en werkzekerheid. Wat betreft de zelfstandigen geven de resultaten aan dat –na 
eerdere invoering van het zwangerschaps- en bevallingsverlof voor zelfstandig werkende 
vrouwen– opnieuw discussie kan worden gevoerd over een basispakket van sociale 
verzekeringen voor zelfstandigen. Het gaat dan niet om risico’s van het vak, zoals 
werkloosheid, maar om risico’s waar zelfstandigen onvoldoende invloed op hebben zoals 
ziekte, arbeidsongeschiktheid en ouderdom. Een dergelijke verbreding van het sociale 
stelsel naar zelfstandigen toe zou wel eens kunnen zorgen voor een nog verdere 
flexibilisering van de arbeidsmarkt c.q. stijging van het zelfstandig ondernemerschap. 
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